



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Soviet Union

***WORLD ECONOMY &
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS***

No 2, FEBRUARY 1987

SPECIAL NOTICE

Effective 1 June 1987 JPRS reports will have a new cover design and color, and some reports will have a different title and format. Some of the color changes may be implemented earlier if existing supplies of stock are depleted.

The new cover colors will be as follows:

CHINA.....	aqua
EAST EUROPE.....	gold
SOVIET UNION.....	salmon
EAST ASIA.....	yellow
NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA...	blue
LATIN AMERICA.....	pink
WEST EUROPE.....	ivory
AFRICA (SUB-SAHARA).....	tan
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY.....	gray
WORLDWIDES.....	pewter

The changes that are of interest to readers of this report are as follows:

USSR reports will become SOVIET UNION reports.

The USSR REPORT: NATIONAL ECONOMY will be titled SOVIET UNION/ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (UEA).

The USSR REPORT: POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS will be titled SOVIET UNION/POLITICAL AFFAIRS (UPA).

The following Soviet journals will be added to those which are already issued in separate series:

EKO: ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION (UEO)
THE WORKING CLASS & THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (UWC)
PEOPLES OF ASIA & AFRICA (UAA)
MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL (UMJ)
FOREIGN MILITARY REVIEW (UFM)
AVIATION & COSMONAUTICS (UAC)
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES (USS)

If any subscription changes are desired, U.S. Government subscribers should notify their distribution contact point. Nongovernment subscribers should contact the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161.

4 JUNE 1987

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

SOVIET UNION
WORLD ECONOMY & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

No 2, FEBRUARY 1987

[Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences.]

CONTENTS

English Summary of Major Articles (pp 158-159).....	1
USSR Steps Toward Nuclear-Free World Detailed (pp 3-12) (O. Bykov).....	5
Potential of Socialist Economic Integration (pp 13-23) (A. Grabovskiy) (not translated)	
Present Stage of Emergent Countries' Development Struggle (pp 24-40) (N. Karagodin, A. Elyanov) (not translated)	
U.S. Justifications for Arms Race Countered (pp 41-51) (S. Nadel).....	18
Role of Parliamentarians in European Peace Process (pp 52-61) (L. Tolkunov).....	31
Evolution of U.S. Goals in Asian Conflicts (pp 62-72) (I. Zvyagelskaya).....	43

DEBATE

Evolution of Capitalist Regulation of Private Entrepreneurship (pp 73-85).....	56
---	----

TOPICAL INTERVIEW

Interview with Mansur Khalid, vice chairman of the International Environment and Development Commission (pp 83-85) (not translated)	
--	--

ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

FRG Greens' Political Platform (pp 86-94) (A. Zhirijskiy, R. Novikov).....	58
---	----

ROUNDTABLE

Prospects of S&T Progress in West Europe (pp 95-104) (not translated)	
---	--

SURVEYS, INFORMATION

The Public Sector in Canada's Economy (pp 105-113) (V. Popov) (not translated)	
Social Dismantling of Occupational Safety in the United States (pp 114-117) (N. Rufanov) (not translated)	

SCIENTIFIC LIFE

Bloc Symposium on Rational Use of Socialist Manpower (pp 118-120) (Ye. Tromlakova).....	66
Review of 25-Year Work of Bloc CSCE Commission (pp 121-127) (V. Razmerov).....	71
S&T Progress in the Main Spheres of the Capitalist Economy (pp 127-133) (G. Chernyavskaya, Ya. Pappe) (not translated)	

WE ANSWER READERS' QUESTIONS

Japan's Position as Major Creditor (pp 134-136) (O. Korchagina).....	82
---	----

BOOKS, AUTHORS

V. Leybin Review of 'Present-Day Capitalism and the Ideological Struggle' (pp 137-139) (not translated)	
Book on Political Extremism, Terrorism Reviewed (pp 139-140) (D. Tomashevskiy).....	87
UK Book on Ethics of Nuclear Deterrence (pp 141-143) (Yu. Osetrov).....	90
U.S. Book on Space Weapons Scientists (pp 143-145) (A. Podberezkin).....	94

L. Bagramov Review of I.A. Ornatskiy's 'Economic Diplomacy' (pp 145-147)
(not translated)

R. Kumakhov Review of 'Faire Gagner la France' (pp 147-149) (not translated)

Book Review: Capitalist Countries Conserve Transport Energy (pp 150-151).. 98

STATISTICS

Economy of CEMA and the EC in 1980-1985 (not translated)

PUBLICATION DATA

English title : WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS No 2

Russian title : MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE
OTNOSHENIYA

Author (s) :

Editor : Ya.S. Khavinson

Publishing House : Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda"

Place of publication : Moscow

Date of publication : February 1987

Signed to press : 13 January 1987

Copies : 25,000

COPYRIGHT : Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".
"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye
otnosheniya", 1987.

ENGLISH SUMMARY OF MAJOR ARTICLES

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE SVOYNOSSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to [redacted] 13 Jan 87) pp 158-159

[Text] The present unique situation pressingly demands to reverse the traditional notion of war. O. Bykov in the article "New Atomic Weapons' Disarmament Concept" stresses that a new philosophy of peace and disarmament is needed. It is to be called upon to serve as a guide in urgent and joint activities of peoples and states to avert a hitherto unknown disaster. An objective unity of the interests of security dictates the need to develop and translate into practice a new concept--the concept of a transition from military-strategic balance to a nuclear free world. The author stresses the vital necessity for states to resolutely change their political thinking in a search for realistic ways for achieving a detente and disarmament. The article elucidates the importance of the far-reaching Soviet proposals on disarmament, a programme for a stage-by-stage and total elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the 20th century. Its realization would open up for humanity an essentially new line of development, a real opportunity for transition from collision to cooperation. This programme is strictly realistic, comprehensively balanced and is aimed at quest for compromises. The article focuses on the importance of peaceful coexistence, which must become the universal norm of international relations so that the present nuclear age of confrontation be replaced by cooperation, and conflict situations resolved through peaceful political, not military means. The "balance of terror" must give way to comprehensive international security.

The article "Potential of Socialist Integration" (on the Results of the 42nd CMEA Session) by A. Grabovsky is dedicated to the 42nd regular CMEA session which noted the considerable successes of the states-participants and the growth rates of their economic development. The session convincingly indicated that mobilization of existing resources and the use of the possibilities for mutual cooperation among the CMEA states stressed the importance of unity and cohesion. Party congresses in the CMEA states stressed the importance of economic cooperation and the use of new form of the intensification of social production on the bases of scientific and technological progress for ensuring high economic effectiveness and improved living standards. They defined the strategy for the present 5-year period and for the period ending in the year 2000. The session stressed that one of the important tasks is to accelerate social and economic development by the intensification of national production

and through a major improvement of its efficiency. It should be done on the basis of scientific and technological progress thus augmenting the technoeconomic invulnerability of the community where engineering will be its catalyst. The author speaks about the importance of international scientific and production cooperation on the basis of the Comprehensive Programme of Scientific and Technological Progress of the CMEA member-states until the year 2000. This programme which is a system of interrelated agreements and treaties has become a platform for scientific and technical cooperation within CMEA. It promotes broader specialization and cooperation in science, technology and production and faster growth of foreign trade. The session stressed that one of the main tasks is to further deepen production specialization and partnership through promoting such progressive forms of cooperation as direct ties in the field of science and production between economic organizations of member states and the creation by interested states on a cost-accounting basis of joint associations, enterprises and other international teams. To that end CMEA states are taking steps to broaden the powers of economic and R&D organizations and to create conditions for their direct cooperation.

N. Karagodin and A. Elyanov in the article "Newly Independent Countries: Present Stage of Struggle for Development", analyse the nature and roots of the economic problems the Third World countries have come across in the 80s in connection with the aggravation of the external economic conditions of their development. At the same time the authors examine the role of such factors as changes at the raw material market, new situation in financing and mounting protectionism at the markets of the West. The authors note that the consequences of these changes in certain countries are in many respects interrelated with the peculiarities of their economic structure. The states with an effective divers economic structure capable of adjusting themselves to the world-economic situation proved to be in a better position. The article considers also the efforts undertaken by the developing countries for overcoming negative economic trends. Special attention is paid to the debt crisis and its consequences for the national strategies of economic and social development. In particular the authors examine export measures aimed at stimulating, mobilizing internal accumulations and raising the efficiency of state management of economy and other problems. The authors cite IMF and IBRD estimations on the above mentioned issues.

S. Nadel in the article "The Socio-Economic Apologia of Arms Race and Reality" says that the proponents of American militarism have launched an intense psychological campaign advocating the unprecedented arms race by the necessity to provide for the Western security against the "Soviet military threat". In fact the U.S. rightist forces seek the supremacy over the Soviet Union. Their expectation is that the new round of arms race would exhaust the USSR economically. At the same time a number of the bourgeois mass media presents the growth of military spending as a catalyst of economic development. Some Western economists and sociologists suggest that the military sector doesn't divert labor and material resources but contributes to a speedy technological progress, to the reduction of idle capacities and the provision of new jobs for the unemployed thus smoothing down economic crises. According to their views military projects are a powerful instrument to increase the U.S. international competitiveness in high technology fields. One can find the explanation of the background of these views and also the criticism of such

postulates in S. Nadel's article. Under the study are the issues of a correlation between the dynamics of military expenditures and the aggregate macro-economic indices. Furthermore the exhaustion of different resources diverted to military projects is quantified and assessed. The arms race aggravates global problems in various perspectives: environmental damage, the diversion of resources from the assistance to developing countries. The humanity nowadays faces the dilemma--to slide down to self-destruction or to curb the arms race and move forward in the disarmament talks. The article ends with the analysis of the probable reshaping of military production, its reorientation to the civilian needs and subsequent socio-economic adjustment. Here the initiatives of the Soviet Union are to play a crucial role and to be taken into consideration.

In L. Tolkunov's article "Parliamentarians and All-European Process" special attention is given to European security as a core of the problem. Europe which in the 20th century survived two devastating wars cannot be an indifferent observer of the Soviet-American dialogue on which crucially depends its very existence as well as the existence of entire mankind. Europe should be delivered from the nuclear weapons, cease to be a nuclear hostage and become a worthy example of peaceful coexistence and cooperation of states with different social orders. Helsinki, Belgrade, Madrid, Stockholm--all these capitals have already become important milestones in the European history of detente. Parliaments and parliamentarians continue to play a ponderable historic role in saving the continent from nuclear catastrophe. The author describes the important work being carried out on the world arena by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, its Presidium, Parliamentary group and the deputies themselves. The experience of the last ten-fifteen years clearly shows that, provided there is good will, the parliamentarians in different countries can reach understanding on the most burning international issues. The article elucidates the work of the six conferences on the issues of security and cooperation in Europe conducted under the aegis of the Interparliamentary Union. The author singles out three principal trends of their work: the clearing of international relations in Europe from the "cold war" layers; a general widening and deepening of bilateral relations among socialist European and capitalist states in conformity with the principles of coexistence; the adjustment on a multilateral level of all-European cooperation of states concerned, meeting the demands of peace and detente and opening perspectives for building up a system of reliable guaranteed security.

I. Zwiagelskaya in the article "Evolution of US Approach to the Conflicts in Asia" considers some new aspects of American participation in the conflicts which characterized Asia in the late seventies and early eighties. Washington's rigid course of confrontation with the USSR, pursued both on global and regional levels, predetermined the line of "globalization" of conflicts, considering them exclusively through the prism of Soviet-American confrontation. The appearance of the "low intensity conflict" doctrine within the framework of which practical measures are being elaborated and applied by US policy-makers to channel the conflicts into an advantageous for the USA course clearly speaks of the growing share of the "conflict policy" in US general planning. This policy presupposes US open military interference in the events in the developing world, supports different counter-revolutions, Grenada-type operations and attacks on regimes, pursuing an anti-imperialist

course. The "controlling" of conflicts to American liking is carried out through American mass armament supplies to the zones of conflicts, the building up and expansion of military bases, through military presence, open action, with the aid counter-revolutions as well as through attempts to force their partners and allies to follow the anti-Soviet line. The author examines the US policy in the Middle East, the Iran-Iraqi, Indo-Pakistani and Kampuchee conflicts, Afghan conflict and the situation on the Korean peninsula. As a whole the American policy geared at kindling conflicts in Asia, creating new hotbeds of tension and seeking to incite the conflicts emerge beyond the regional frameworks is fraught with a world catastrophe.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".

"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987.

CSO: 1816/6

USSR STEPS TOWARD NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD DETAILED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 13 Jan 87) pp 3-12

[Article by O. Bykov: "New Concept of Nuclear Disarmament"]

[Text]

I

A hitherto unprecedented threat looms over mankind: in the event of the outbreak of nuclear war, not only the mutual annihilation of the belligerents but also the loss of the entire human race and even life itself on our planet are inevitable. The colossal destructive capacity of modern weapons and the ineluctable globally disastrous consequences of their use leave no one with any hope of survival. There is no effective means of protection against the danger of mass extermination. Salvation from catastrophe is to be found only in the elimination of the weapons capable of wiping out civilization.

The uniqueness of the current situation imperatively demands a fundamental reconsideration of the traditional notions of war. What is needed is a new philosophy of peace and disarmament taking into consideration the ominous realities of the present day and designed to be a reference point for the assertive, immediate, joint actions of peoples and states in the name of averting a disaster such as would be without precedent in the history of human society and which would be the final chapter of its history.

The mortal danger could be nipped in the bud. Forty years ago, back on the threshold of the nuclear era, the Soviet Union presented a prudent and farsighted proposal--banning the use of atomic energy for military purposes, averting a dangerous and ruinous nuclear arms race and making warfare with the use of weapons of mass destruction impossible. But the ruling stratum of the United States opted for a different path, to which it was prompted by the tenets of the "policy of strength" and imperial ambitions. It converted the qualitatively new weapons into the main means of pressure on the USSR and the achievement of dominating positions in the world. Intoxicated with the illusion of omnipotence, the most bellicose American politicians and strategists hoped with the aid of the "absolute weapon" to destroy socialism and forcibly turn back historical development.

Such designs were not destined to be. The nuclear arms race unleashed by Washington did not produce for it decisive superiority. By a tremendous exertion of its powers the Soviet Union was able to parry the challenge that had been thrown it in the sphere of military competition--it at first deprived the United States of its nuclear monopoly and then the invulnerability of its territory and ultimately reached the level of military-strategic balance with the United States. The aggressive imperialist forces' hopes of victory in a nuclear war proved groundless.

The approximate equivalence of military forces put international security on a firmer foundation. However, the balance that has been achieved is not an end result but merely a necessary stage in the struggle for the removal of the nuclear threat. Even within the framework of the parity, which has evolved it is difficult to control the rapid development of military technology. The continued stockpiling and upgrading of nuclear weapons is fraught with unpredictable consequences for strategic stability and increases the likelihood of the outbreak of a world-incinerating conflagration.

The objective community of security interests dictates the need for the formulation and implementation of a new concept--one of transition from military-strategic balance to a nuclear-free world. What is required for this is a renunciation not only of the decrepit clichés of power confrontation but also of the long discredited stereotypes of the futile counterposing of knowingly unacceptable positions at the arms limitation negotiations. A decisive change in political thinking toward a search for practicable paths toward detente and disarmament is a vital necessity.

To secure a turn for the better on the international scene the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the Soviet Government adopted a decision at the start of 1986 on a number of major foreign policy actions of a fundamental nature. Their purpose was to contribute to the maximum to an improvement in the atmosphere, overcome the confrontational trends, clear the way toward a winding down of the arms race on earth and the prevention thereof in space, reduce the military danger and strengthen mutual trust.

A wide-ranging set of foreign policy initiatives was put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his statement of 15 January 1986. They represent an organic blend of the new philosophy of general security and a radical formulation of the tasks of disarmament. At the center of the proposed measures is a specific, state-by-stage program of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

The Soviet program of nuclear disarmament, historic in scale and significance, was a substantial contribution to a fundamental restructuring of political thinking in the sphere of international relations. Its realization would open to mankind a fundamentally new period of development and afford a realistic opportunity for escape from the vicious circle of confrontation and transition to cooperation for the sake of the accomplishment of constructive tasks.

The vital need for disarmament as the main component of international security was confirmed by the 27th CPSU Congress. Realization of the program of the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and removal of the military threat

advanced in the 15 January 1986 statement is to be, as the congress determined, the central direction of the USSR's foreign policy for the coming years.

A specific expression of the Soviet Union's new approach to the problem of nuclear disarmament was its position at the top-level Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik 11-12 October 1986. The bold, large-scale proposals put forward by M.S. Gorbachev were based on the principles of equality and equal security and took account of the interests of the USSR and the United States, their allies and the peoples of all states. The Soviet side's position revealed a prospect of accord on such most important issues as a 50-percent reduction in, and subsequently the complete elimination of strategic offensive arms and medium-range missiles in Europe. The achievement of these goals would pave the way toward a radical improvement in the international atmosphere, removal of the nuclear threat and the development of the peaceful cooperation of all members of the world community.

The outcome of the meeting in Reykjavik was ambiguous. It was poisoned by the distress of disappointment--it was not possible to embody the broad consent which had practically been reached in mutually binding accords. This was prevented by the U.S. Administration's devotion to the plans for "star wars" and its stubborn reluctance to create the conditions for nuclear disarmament by way of strengthening the ABM process and adopting the appropriate commitments identical for both sides.

At the same time the unusual nature and genuine novelty of the negotiations in the Icelandic capital were expressed in the fact that study of the problems of nuclear disarmament was raised to a considerably higher level. A wide road ahead, toward a radical reduction in nuclear arsenals--as far as their complete elimination--was opened. Unswervingly advancing along this main highway is the sole reasonable option for the USSR and the United States and for all mankind. It is determined not by pious wishes or considerations of one-sided advantages but by the objective universal need for survival in the nuclear age and mutual and general interest in a removal of the danger of self-annihilation.

II

The Soviet-American top-level meeting in Reykjavik revealed a "common denominator" of interests which for the first time adequately reflects the nature and scale of the real threat looming over both the USSR and the United States and the whole world. It was expressed in a mutual understanding that under current conditions the reliable mutual security of the USSR and the United States and, along with it, international security as a whole is possible primarily on the paths of nuclear disarmament.

The course of the Soviet-American dialogue throughout recent decades has led to this realistic conclusion. Recognition of the interdependence of security interests began to blaze a trail for itself in the 1960's. The first steps were taken at that time toward a curbing of the arms race, primarily the banning of nuclear weapons tests in three environments. The 1970's brought mutual recognition of the need to be guided by the principle of peaceful

coexistence in relations between the USSR and the United States. Agreements were concluded on a limitation of strategic offensive arms and antimissile defenses. The first half of the 1980's, unfortunately, was marked by the actual disruption of the process of the formulation of mutually acceptable decisions. Leading circles of the United States preferred a spiral in the arms race, increased levels of confrontation and a deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union, rather than a search for ways of disarmament.

However, ignoring the imperatives of the nuclear opposition means not only being at odds with the demands of general security but also jeopardizing one's own interests. However great the temptation to gain the upper hand in the confrontation, it is sooner or later necessary to return to the search for reasonable compromise, particularly if the other side expresses a serious readiness for this.

The appearance in U.S. policy of signs of realism did not go unanswered on the part of the USSR. A meeting of the leaders of the two countries became possible. The negotiations between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in Geneva 19-21 November 1985 culminated in the adoption of a joint document, which declared: nuclear war must not be unleashed, it could have no winners. Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the United States could have catastrophic consequences, the sides emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them--nuclear or conventional. They mutually undertook not to aspire to the achievement of military superiority.

The leaders of both states agreed that the work of the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms be accelerated, referring to the accomplishment of the tasks set in the Soviet-American joint statement of 8 January 1985, namely: prevention of an arms race in space and a halt thereto on earth, limitation and reduction in nuclear arms and a strengthening of strategic stability.

From Geneva the path lay toward new top-level meetings and the formulation of specific accords based on the mutual understanding that had been reached. The Soviet Union went more than half-way. Its major, out-of-the-ordinary initiatives, at the center of which was the comprehensive disarmament program, contributed to a large extent to the construction of stable security based on reciprocity. However, instead of a reciprocal movement toward disarmament, the U.S. Administration continued the development of militarist programs, with particular emphasis on the SDI. The Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms idled. Precious time was being lost, and no progress toward accords was in sight.

Under such conditions the Soviet leadership adopted a decision which was equivalent to a major conceptual breakthrough in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, in terms of its significance. Having proposed an immediate top-level meeting in Reykjavik, the Soviet Union submitted there, not individual questions of arms limitation, but an integral package of radical proposals pertaining to the central set of problems of nuclear disarmament.

It would, of course, be unfounded to counterpose radical measures to individual, partial ones. The latter also are capable of markedly improving

the political climate and strengthening mutual trust. But in the current situation they are inadequate. Only deep cuts in nuclear arms can fundamentally improve Soviet-American relations and the whole atmosphere in the world. Only large-scale interconnected measures are capable of touching the very core of international security.

The breadth and boldness of the USSR's new approach to problems of nuclear disarmament were not a manifestation of some maximalism. On the contrary, granted all their radical nature, the Soviet package of proposals was distinguished by a strict realistic approach, comprehensive balance, consideration of the sides' concerns and an orientation toward a search for compromise. It was essentially a package of accords for it correctly and fully reflected the balance of interests of the sides' security which has objectively evolved in the strategic sphere. It was for this reason that it proved possible in Reykjavik to approach directly a global solution of the central problem--winding down the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States. On the basis of this fundamental mutual understanding, it was possible to bring the sides' positions closer together on a number of key components of the package.

First, assent was reached on reducing strategic offensive arms by half over 5 years and on completely eliminating the remaining elements of ground-, sea- and air-based strategic forces in the subsequent 5-year period.

Second, leaving aside the question of the nuclear potentials of Britain and France, the sides agreed to reduce to zero American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe given a reduction to 100 warheads on Soviet missiles in the Asian part of the USSR with the right for the United States to have the same number of warheads on medium-range missiles on its territory. In addition, agreement also emerged on a start on negotiations concerning missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km, existing levels of which would have been frozen.

Third, on the question of strategic defenses fundamental mutual understanding was also recorded concerning the fact that the sides would not withdraw within 10 years from the ABM Treaty. However, the way toward a further rapprochement of positions was tightly blocked off by the American side's unwillingness to limit work on the SDI program.

Fourth, the possibility of progressing toward a complete ban on nuclear testing, in the course of negotiations at which it would have been possible also to discuss interim solutions of a limitation of nuclear explosions in terms of yield and number and the 1974 and 1976 treaties, opened up a little.

The question of verification arose from a new angle in the course of coordination of problems of the nuclear-space complex. Embarking on a specific stage of elimination of nuclear weapons, the sides reached an understanding that verification should not only be an organic component of disarmament but also be tightened up to the utmost. The Soviet side advocated triple verification--national, bilateral and multilateral--which would ensure complete mutual confidence in security. As a result the question of verification, which had always been a stumbling block, was practically settled to the sides' mutual satisfaction.

Thus almost everything contained in the Soviet package was agreed, except for the question of SDI and, partially, nuclear testing. And although the American side thwarted a truly historic agreement, when it was literally a handshake away, it is hard to exaggerate the permanent, fundamental significance of the understandings which were reached.

The meeting in Reykjavik showed the efficacy of the large-scale, essentially political formulation of the question of nuclear disarmament. It is thus that it is necessary to think and act in the interests of accomplishing the central task--preventing nuclear catastrophe and ensuring reliable international security.

Without a high-minded, innovative approach and without mutual political will, escaping from the labyrinths of expert collations of an innumerable multitude of technical details, fruitless debate over numbers and vain quests for ideal formulas of balancing each component in the opposed nuclear forces is inconceivable. Even granted a mutual desire, it is difficult building an edifice of accord from fragmented blocks of various sizes if there is no concerted plan and general timetable for the construction.

The rapprochement of positions in Reykjavik was possible primarily because the sides moved to the high political level of solution of the problem. The futile routine of technical casuistry with all its levels and sublevels, limits and sublimits gave way to the simple and effective logic of radical nuclear disarmament. Within the framework of a global solution subordinated to the main political goal--a lessening of the danger of mutual and general annihilation--it proved not that difficult to negotiate the order of priority of practical steps leading to the elimination of nuclear arms within a specific timeframe.

In the event of coordination of all problems of the nuclear-space complex, the top leaders of both countries could have instructed the participants in the negotiations in Geneva to embark on formulation of the wording of specific documents based on the basis of the understanding that had been reached in principle, and the advancement of political provisions of future agreements with the necessary technical details. It stands to reason that the technical aspect would no longer be self-sufficing here but would merely assist the implementation of joint political decisions.

It by no means follows from what has been said that fitting technical details would be easy, automatic, virtually. Even given the most favorable conditions, a quest for the practical accomplishment of many difficult problems is necessary. It is sufficient to cite, for example, the problem of ensuring equality and equal security in the course of the stage-by-stage winding down of the two sides' nuclear arsenals, which are dissimilar in terms of composition and structure. However, such difficulties are entirely surmountable if it has been possible to reach a decision on striving jointly for the set goal.

III

The Reykjavik model of a political solution of the problems of nuclear disarmament serves as an effective method of finding mutually acceptable solutions to the remaining knots of disagreements and consistent progress toward the conclusion of agreements. It was such a constructive approach which determined the main content of the Soviet document "Key Provisions of Agreements Between the USSR and the United States in the Nuclear Disarmament Sphere Subject to Further Preparation for Signature". This draft of a kind of "framework understanding" was presented by USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze at the meeting with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz in Vienna 5-6 November 1986. At the negotiations in Geneva the delegation of the Soviet Union submitted on 7 November 1986 specific interconnected proposals on all aspects of the problem of nuclear and space-based arms. The Soviet documents set forth the main parameters of understandings pertaining to all four areas of the negotiations on the nuclear-space complex as defined at the Reykjavik meetings and outlined approaches in order to surmount existing differences.

This applied primarily to the central point of the disagreements--the question of the SDI. For the purpose of providing for a way out of the impasse the Soviet side once again displayed flexibility and constructiveness. It did not insist on a suspension of all the research being conducted in accordance with the SDI program, on condition that it not go beyond the laboratory framework. Only the testing of the space-based components of antimissile defenses in near-Earth space were subject to prohibition. Over the next several years, and in the course of negotiations, the sides could find further mutually acceptable solutions in this sphere. It was also proposed beginning high-level negotiations in the very near future for the purpose of determining which kind of work on antimissile weapons is permitted by the ABM Treaty, and which not.

The Soviet side submitted an important new proposal on a question directly abutting the space arms sphere. The reference was to accords being found pertaining to a ban on antisatellite weapons. The development of such weapons could open a wide channel for circumventing a ban on the creation of space-based antimissile weapons systems, and for this reason it is necessary to close off this channel before it is too late.

The main thing, however--and the Soviet proposals pertaining to various technical aspects of the problem of strategic defenses were subordinated to this--was the high-minded political approach to the very idea of the SDI. It was emphasized with all clarity and unambiguity here that the interests of the sides' mutual security demand not antimissile defenses but the elimination of those same weapons against which such defenses are contemplated. For this reason mention was made once again of the permanent significance of the ABM Treaty of unlimited duration and the need for strict compliance with all its provisions. In order to preclude the possibility of a disturbance of the balance as deep cuts in nuclear arms are implemented, the proposal that an understanding be arrived at that the USSR and the United States would not within a period of 10 years avail themselves of their right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty was confirmed.

Nonetheless, the U.S. Administration remains in the grip of illusions concerning the role and place of the SDI in the system of strategic confrontation. This purely technical program has been elevated to the level of high conceptual significance--both as a "new principle" of protection against nuclear weapons and as virtually the philosophy of transition from a nuclear world to a nuclear-free world. It is being presented as some kind of unorthodox revelation, although it essentially represents the deformed outcome of old political thinking.

The primordial intention of the SDI itself is profoundly fallacious. Under the conditions of strategic parity a technical solution of the political problem of security cannot be found. Both cover with the aid of antimissile defenses in the event of nuclear war and the use of a space shield for to protect the delivery of a disarming first strike are unrealistic. Nor is the SDI any use at all as "insurance" for the period that offensive nuclear arms are being eliminated. Preparations for "star wars" could not insure but undermine and destroy the entire process of nuclear disarmament. And it is by no means to assist the dismantling of nuclear arsenals that the U.S. military-industrial complex has clutched so tightly at the SDI. It needs this militarist program because it hopes with its help to derive over coming decades tremendous profits from the general spiraling of the arms race--space-based, nuclear and conventional--at a qualitatively higher technical level, what is more. The most reactionary and bellicose circles of the United States and certain other imperialist states have tied themselves so closely to the SDI because they see it as a powerful catalyst of a total confrontation with the forces of peace and progress and the principal obstacle to nuclear disarmament.

The devotees of a space shield are putting their egotistic interests higher than international security and ultimately the security of America itself. Proving to them the danger of such a senseless position is extremely difficult--impossible rather. But in the United States itself and throughout the world there is still sufficient political wisdom to refrain from the fatal step leading to the transfer of the arms race to space.

Prudence also dictates the adoption as a matter of principle of a decision pertaining to another question left hanging following Reykjavik. It is the question of nuclear testing.

The Soviet Union has been and remains a decided and convinced supporter of an immediate and complete prohibition of this. It was for this purpose that it consented to a unilateral suspension of all nuclear explosions and called on the United States to join this action. Extending its moratorium time after time over 18 months, the USSR demonstrated in practice the possibility of the adoption of effective measures capable of putting barriers in the way of the nuclear arms race. However, Washington failed to follow the Soviet Union's example and continued to carry out a program of nuclear tests.

Under such conditions the USSR could not indefinitely show one-sided restraint without detriment to its own security. It was forced to adopt the decision on a cessation of the moratorium following the first U.S. nuclear explosion in 1987. If the United States ceases testing, the USSR will be prepared on the basis of reciprocity to halt immediately the realization of its own program.

Simultaneously the Soviet leadership proposed on immediate start on full-scale negotiations on a complete ban on nuclear testing. The USSR expressed a readiness here to negotiate also the stage-by-stage accomplishment of this task, referring to the ratification of the Soviet-American treaties of 1974 and 1976 and the imposition of interim restrictions on the number and yield of nuclear explosions.

The current categories of political thinking demand the maximum restraint in the strategic sphere. Progress toward nuclear disarmament is impossible without it. An example is being set by the Soviet Union: not succumbing to the flagrant provocations of the opponents of disarmament, it is as yet refraining from withdrawal from the SALT I and SALT II Treaty limitations in order to preserve these key inhibitors of the strategic arms race. The Soviet side believes that there is still a possibility of halting the dangerous development of events which the U.S. Administration is bringing out by its irresponsible actions.

In the complex situation which is taking shape mutual restraint naturally constitutes only a minimal demand. The main thing is progress in the line of ascent of the positive process whose starting point was the Reykjavik meeting. The political will for nuclear disarmament is capable not only of paving the way toward specific mutually binding accords in this sphere. It can and must serve as a powerful stimulus for the just as large-scale formulation of other problems of disarmament and military detente--among these, primarily a significant reduction in armed forces and conventional arms.

Guided by the new political thinking, the USSR and its allies have already put this urgent problem on a practical footing. At its meeting in Budapest 10-11 June 1986 the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee addressed to the NATO states and all European countries a program of an appreciable reduction in armed forces and conventional arms on the territory of all of Europe--from the Atlantic to the Urals. The successful completion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe is contributing to the development of this large-scale initiative. Stockholm I will lead to Stockholm II--to measures of real disarmament on the European continent. Vigorous interaction in the broad political plane of the two processes--nuclear and conventional disarmament--will become a powerful factor of removal of the nuclear threat.

IV

After Reykjavik the struggle against the menacing catastrophe has reached a qualitatively new frontier. Nuclear disarmament, which only recently seemed merely a dream and a matter for the distant future, has now been put on the firm ground of political realism and acquired the outlines of a specific program which is practically feasible within a short period of time. A process of rethinking current reality and a quest for mutually acceptable solutions of the problems of general disarmament has been stimulated.

The prospect of a nuclear-free world does not, perfectly understandably, suit the forces which derive benefits from the continuation and further excitation of total confrontation. The conglomerate of opponents of disarmament has

united in its ranks reactionaries of all stripes--from representatives of the immediate entourage of the U.S. President, the government machinery and the Congress through ultraright groupings, the big wheels of military business and fierce militarists from the Pentagon and NATO staffs. They include new-fangled "globalists" and moss-backed "Atlantists," anticommunist fanatics and professional specialists in diverting attention from domestic upheavals like "Irangate" by means of playing up the imaginary "danger from outside," champions of a "strong America" and speculators in fear in the face of the loss of jobs should military production wind down. For the sake of their selfish interests--both long-term and, frequently, market-related--all these adherents to the old way of thinking are stubbornly unwilling to abandon the gamble on nuclear weapons and a policy of strength. They are fanning an atmosphere of hostility, rejecting the very possibility of the achievement of agreements and directly and indirectly shaping the confrontational direction of Washington's official policy and also that of certain of its allies.

The positive results of the meeting in the Icelandic capital brought about a sharply negative reaction on the part of rightwing political circles of the West. In the United States and West Europe certain figures, terrified by the very possibility of a radical lowering of the level of nuclear opposition and an improvement in the international atmosphere, have adopted a policy of discrediting the Reykjavik understandings and efforts toward their actual dismantling.

Immediately following the meeting the U.S. Administration began to retreat from the high frontiers of agreement which had been scaled there. Many accords were subjected to high-handed revision, arbitrary abridgment and dilution by a multitude of reservations, conditions and one-sided interpretations. Things went as far as Washington beginning to call in question even the fundamental, pivotal understanding on the elimination of the strategic nuclear arms of the USSR and the United States.

Of course, it is in the power of the leaders of American policy to attempt to cross out the results of Reykjavik. But it is given to no one to "abrogate" the realities of the strategic situation and the interdependence of the security interests of the two sides and the international community as a whole conditioned by them. One may choose to gamble stubbornly on preparations for "star wars," undermine the ABM Treaty, destroy the treaty-legal structure of SALT and exceed its restraints for the sake of an unchecked nuclear arms buildup. But it is impossible seriously to hope here to "extricate" oneself from the rigid framework of strategic parity and achieve decisive military superiority. This the USSR will never allow. It has sufficient opportunities opportunely and effectively to neutralize the United States' attempts to obtain tangible military advantages, whether in the sphere of strategic offensive arms or the creation of space-based arms.

But this is not what the Soviet Union would want. Restoring a balance that has been disturbed is incomparably more difficult and burdensome than maintaining it in the current state and, even more, imparting to it growing dependability by means of limiting and reducing nuclear arsenals. By its very nature the strategic equation cannot become more stable by ascending the spirals of a qualitative and quantitative buildup of its components. An expansion of the

scale, acceleration of the pace and complication of the entire system of "action--counteraction" of military competition will inevitably lead to the shattering of strategic stability--the basis on which the process of ensuring international security and progress toward real disarmament relies.

If one forswears the tenets of confrontation and is guided not by narrow self-interest but considerations of the big perspective, by the simple instinct of self-preservation even, it has to be seen that America's true national interests also demand not a spiraling but a winding down of the arms race. And in this sense the concept of nuclear disarmament which the U.S. President adopted in Reykjavik was by no means a matter of chance. Even less was it the result of the "cunning actions" of the Soviet side, which allegedly succeeded in luring R. Reagan into a trap. When the problem of mutual security is posed commensurate with its far-reaching scale, the sides' fundamental deep-lying interests begin to show through distinctly in their positions.

The attempt to disturb the evolved balance is not only undermining international security but is also fraught with consequences which would inevitably be severely detrimental to the interests of the initiators of this hopeless enterprise themselves. In engendering danger the United States cannot fail to draw it onto itself. Bringing about strategic instability, it runs the risk of suffering from it. The unpredictability of an unchecked arms race would put in a difficult position both those forced to respond to the challenge and the instigators of an acceleration of military competition themselves.

In the race for unattainable military superiority the present U.S. Administration is not, to judge by everything, reckoning with the costs connected with a destabilization of the strategic situation. The impression is being created even that there are forces in Washington hoping to turn instability to their advantage, to the detriment of the other side. Dangerous delusion! Not having achieved decisive superiority, they could only face a strategic chaos equally disastrous for the USSR and the United States and for all mankind.

Nor are the material and other resources even of such a great power as the United States unlimited if they are squandered on far-reaching superarmament programs. The huge chronic budget deficit, the intensification of the contradiction between militarism and the country's socioeconomic needs, the combination of structural and cyclical crises, difficulties in the foreign trade and currency-finance spheres, a weakening of positions in the competitive struggle on world markets--all this and much else cannot fail to impede the ambitious aspirations of aggressive groupings in the U.S. ruling upper stratum.

And, what is most important, militarism is inscribed increasingly less in contemporary world development and does not conform to the growing need for a constructive solution of urgent problems. In building up military strength which is incapable of restoring to it its past might it is merely engendering a threat of general catastrophe. And the more militarism persists in its hopeless aspiration to domination, the more it is counterposing itself to all mankind.

In our time the tune in international development is being called not by a policy of strength but the strength of a policy--one of peace and disarmament. It is consonant with the cherished aspirations of all peoples. The Soviet concept of nuclear disarmament has evoked the broadest response worldwide. It has been supported by many governments, prominent statesmen, political parties and the public.

This concept was further developed in the "Delhi Declaration of Principles of a Nonviolent World Free of Nuclear Weapons" signed by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi on 27 November 1986. This document of truly historic scale says that peaceful coexistence should be the universal norm of international relations in order that, in our nuclear age, cooperation come to replace confrontation and conflict situations be settled by political and not military means. All-embracing international security should come to replace the "balance of terror".

On behalf of the more than 1 billion persons constituting the population of the two states, the Soviet Union and India appealed to the peoples and leaders of all countries for the adoption of immediate actions which should lead to a world without weapons of mass destruction and without wars. This goal demands specific and immediate actions aimed at disarmament, nuclear primarily. They include the complete destruction of nuclear arsenals before the end of the current century; prevention of the guidance of any weapons into space, which is the common property of mankind; a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests; and a ban on the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

Until nuclear weapons have been eliminated, the USSR and India proposed the immediate conclusion of an international convention banning the use or threat of nuclear weapons. This would be an important specific step en route to complete nuclear disarmament.

The release of mankind from the nuclear threat will, naturally, not come about of its own accord. The objective prerequisites for this alone are not enough. Nor is the mere concept of nuclear disarmament sufficient, however important it is as a true reference point and guide to action. What are needed are actions--purposeful, consistent and incremental.

The old gives way to the new only in struggle, resists stubbornly and attempts to turn back the course of events. But the new in world politics is becoming a powerful force. And this force is on the side of nuclear disarmament, which corresponds to the vital interests of the whole world community. It is the sole intelligent path toward reliable general security, for winning victory is impossible not only in an arms race and nuclear war but also in political dialogue. Victory may be achieved only as a result of negotiations, but only mutual or multilateral, on the basis of honest and just accord. Victory may only be common victory over the common threat of annihilation.

"The SDI was the reason the meeting in Reykjavik failed to justify the hopes which the world community had put in it," M.S. Gorbachev emphasized. "But we have sufficient political will, perseverance and patience to continue to seek

profound, radical accords pertaining to a reduction in and the elimination of nuclear weapons--but only such as ensure mutual stability and equal security."

A new path was opened with the boundaries of accord reached in Reykjavik--forward, toward a radical reduction in nuclear arms. The Soviet Union is unshakable in its resolve to abide by them unswervingly. As soon as Washington recognizes that there is no other intelligent path for the United States also, a historic shift in the struggle for a nuclear-free world could become a reality. This is what the peoples of the whole world want.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".

"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987.

8850

CSO: 1816/6

U.S. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ARMS RACE COUNTERED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 13 Jan 87) pp 41-51

[Article by S. Nadel: "Socioeconomic Advocacy of the Arms Race and Reality"]

[Text] The ideologists of American militarism are conducting the persistent psychological indoctrination of the broad masses of the population, instilling in them that the present unprecedented arms race is dictated by the need to safeguard the West's security against the "Soviet threat". In reality, rightwing forces of the United States are interested in a buildup of military potential for other reasons. The representatives of the upper echelons of power believe that it will in this way be possible to achieve military-strategic superiority to the Soviet Union. The calculation also is that a new costly round of the arms race will economically exhaust the leading socialist power. The circles connected with arms production see the development of military programs as a source of enrichment. Meanwhile many bourgeois mass media are depicting the unchecked growth of military spending as a catalyst speeding development of the capitalist economy.

Soviet authors have published many studies on questions concerning the economic and social consequences of the arms race and military spending, and attention to these problems is not diminishing (1). Under the conditions of the threat of nuclear war looming over the world all forms of struggle against the greatest danger in the history of mankind are important. It is also difficult to exaggerate the role performed in this struggle by exposure of the sophistry with which bourgeois ideologists, politicians and propagandists are confusing people concerning the true purposes and consequences of military preparations. V.I. Lenin pointed out that it is perhaps sophistry which is the main means of enlisting the masses on the side of the most bellicose circles of imperialism (2).

It should be mentioned that in academic circles of capitalist countries also there are economists and sociologists who believe that the military sector not only diverts society's material and labor resources but also produces certain benefits in the plane of a stimulation of S&T progress, an increase in the load of industry's production capacity, the creation of new jobs, an easing of economic crises and so forth. In their opinion, military programs serve as a powerful instrument ensuring for the United States' competitiveness in the

advanced technology fields (3). A number of authors believes that although it is difficult to establish a direct correlation between the growth rate of military spending and aggregated economic development indicators, such a dependence undoubtedly exists (4).

The very formulation of the question concerning the possibility of a direct connection between the dynamics of military spending and the growth of such indicators as GNP and labor productivity is highly problematical. After all, the values of the indicators in question are the result of the actions of diverse factors, varidirectional included. But it is not so much a question of this as of the general approach to this set of problems. Attention is focused primarily on the consequences of an increase in appropriations for military purposes (the use of certain results of military R&D in the civilian sector, the expansion of military production and an increase in employment in military industry and so forth), whereas the second and third categories of consequences, which do not appear that manifestly on the surface of economic life but which affect the deep-lying processes of all social production, remained overshadowed. An investigation of the complex phenomena of present-day reality may be approached by various paths. But partial truth cannot be passed off as the whole truth. In order to determine the true nature of the influence which the arms race is exerting on economic and social development it is essential to reveal a multitude of various components of the mechanism of this influence.

Military Spending and the Development of the Economy

An argument adduced by those who attempt to substantiate the proposition concerning the salutary impact of the arms race on economic development is that military industry, being technically and technologically the most advanced, contributes to an acceleration of S&T progress in the civilian sectors of production. It is pointed out here that the results of a number of R&D projects of a military nature have subsequently been used to produce civilian goods.

Very many scientific discoveries and technical innovations, regardless of the sphere in which they were made, were initially applied and continue to be applied in military production. The use, however, of the secondary results of military developments for civilian purposes occurs on a very limited scale. A UN report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and military spending points out that no more than one-fifth of military-technical innovations in the world have to this extent or the other been used for civilian needs. However, a true estimate of what military R&D produces for the development of civil engineering is impossible without comparison with the resources which it swallows up, depriving the peaceful sectors of production of the latter. In the United States, for example, one-half of all appropriations for R&D, including both government and private, is channeled into the creation of new types of arms or the modernization of existing weapons. Over one-half of the scientists are engaged in the fulfillment of military orders. What the military sector provides the civilian sector is incomparable with the tremendous intellectual, financial and material resources which are diverted from productive use for peaceful purposes.

Military appropriations are one of the biggest items of expenditure of the U.S. federal budget. By 1985 they constituted 33 percent of government outlays. Monetary resources destined for military programs grew more rapidly in the first half of the 1980's than appropriations for any other purposes. In the period 1980-1985 they increased in current prices almost twofold. It may be said without exaggeration that the arms race is a principal cause of the growth of the budget deficit.

To pay for the increasingly costly military projects the U.S. Administration is having to resort to deficit financing, that is, to turn to loan capital. In the period 1980-1985 the U.S. Treasury Department annually withdrew an average of 30 percent of the resources of the loan capital market compared with 18 percent in 1976-1979. Imports of capital into the United States in the period 1983-1985 amounted to \$235 billion or 13 percent of domestic investment. The flow of foreign capital is to a certain extent making good the amount of loan capital which is being swallowed up by the government and thereby easing the strain on the credit market.

The rise in interest rates had seemingly removed the threat of disastrous consequences of the deficit financing of military programs. In reality, however, this policy found itself in a labyrinth of contradictions. The rise in interest rates, which attracted foreign investors of capital, increased demand for the dollar, driving up its price on the currency markets. This fact was inauspiciously reflected in the United States' foreign trade: proceeds from the export of American goods declined. The United States has now been forced to take steps to lower the dollar's exchange rate.

The deficit financing of military programs also creates inflationary pressure inasmuch as to cover the budget deficit the U.S. Administration issues bonds and from time to time resorts to the emission of additional paper money. The cyclical crisis of the start of the 1980's and the fall in the price of oil, mineral raw material and farm products slowed down the rate of inflation. However, the danger of an increase therein is not over and emanates to a considerable extent from the unchecked growth of military spending.

Representatives of the military-industrial complex refer to the fact that the growth of military appropriations increases the number of enterprises obtaining contract or subcontract orders. The question, however, is what percentage do the firms participating directly or indirectly in military business constitute in relation to the overall number of firms in the country.

In 1983 some 20,000 large-scale contractor companies and 100,000 subcontractor firms worked for the Pentagon. This number also includes firms employed in service of military bases (5). In the United States altogether, according to the data for 1981, there were approximately 14 million firms operating in various sectors of nonagricultural production, trade and services. Consequently, less than 1 percent of the total number of companies (although these companies naturally have colossal influence in the country) works for the U.S. Defense Department. It may be said that the proportion of enterprises participating to this extent or the other in military business is not necessarily equal to the relative significance of the military product and corresponding services in the GNP. After all, they include many of the biggest

industrial concerns also. However, even this relative significance is very slight. Its value, as of 1983, may be put at approximately 4 percent.

Yet this 1 percent of companies which produce military products (4 percent of GNP), more precisely, their military enterprises, swallows up as much in the way of appropriations on R&D as the entire civilian economy. Thus for the vast majority of firms engaged in the peaceful sectors of the economy the buildup of military potential means a further increase in the unevenness of the distribution of national resources in favor of the military sector.

For other bourgeois authors the fact that a buildup of arms production increases a country's GNP is convincing testimony to the stimulating impact of military spending on economic development.

However, GNP is quite a conditional indicator. Tanks, guns and other weapons become neither producer goods nor consumer items owing to the fact that the value of arms is included in the GNP. From the capitalist viewpoint outlays producing profit are productive, therefore military spending is such also. But from the viewpoint of the interests of society as a whole, appropriations for arms production are merely resources spent to no purpose.

Certain circles in the industrially developed capitalist countries also regard the arms race as an effective means of solving problems born of economic crisis and recessions. As an example, they often refer to Germany at the time of the 1929-1933 world economic crisis.

In 1933 capitalism began to gradually emerge from the crisis. We would recall that the distinctiveness of Germany's economic development following the establishment of the fascist dictatorship was that millions of people were mobilized into the army and other militarized organizations and that all possible resources were mustered for arms production. A policy of the country's accelerated preparation for war was adopted.

Had the progress of the movement of the capitalist cycle not been interrupted by war, the militarization of the economy would not have saved Germany from a new economic crisis, which the capitalist world had approached directly. And all postwar history testifies that militarization of the economy is incapable of overcoming the law of cyclical development of the capitalist economy.

One of the sturdiest myths preventing many people in the West seeing the true state of affairs is the delusion that an expansion of military production raises the overall level of employment in the country. Clearing away this delusion is not easy since many S&T specialists and skilled workers have been enlisted in the military sector. Thus in the United States 2.1 million persons worked directly in military industry and 1 million were employed in a variety of services for the military sector in 1981 (6).

The negative impact of the arms race on the manpower market is most often substantiated by computations showing that the capital invested in the civilian spheres of the economy creates 1.5-2 times more jobs than the same amount of capital spent in military industry. This is understandable: military industry is more capital-intensive compared with a number of civilian sectors

of industry, not to mention services. However important the argument based on a comparative analysis of the possibilities of the creation of jobs in the military and civilian sectors of the economy, given identical outlays of capital, there are also other no less serious arguments proving the negative influence of military spending on employment.

Let us examine this problem from the angle of reproduction processes. A buildup of military potential is accompanied by an increase in the budget deficit and the national debt, a weakening of the credit-finance system, an intensification of inflationary pressure and a number of other negative phenomena, which lead to a disruption of the normal progress of social reproduction. The civilian spheres of the economy, which provide work for approximately 95 percent of the country's gainfully employed population (7), incur heavy losses in this connection. It may with every justification be claimed that militarization of the economy undermines the base on which the provision of employment for the vast majority of the population depends.

And one further circumstance related to the issue in question: the military sector deforms the professional-qualifications structure of the personnel, harming the civilian sectors of the economy. Relying on data pertaining to the United States for 1930, it is not difficult to determine that in the military sector the proportion of skilled workers is far higher than in the civilian sector. Thus engineers and other highly skilled specialists constitute 20.3 percent, skilled workers 22.5 percent, semiskilled workers 33.5 percent and unskilled workers 7.3 percent in the production of gun armament and its accessories. Engineering-technical specialists constitute 86.8 percent, skilled workers 10.8 percent, semiskilled workers 11.2 percent and unskilled workers 0.6 percent in the production of guided missiles. At the same time in manufacturing industry as a whole engineers and other technical specialists account for 12 percent of persons employed, skilled workers 18.5 percent, semiskilled workers 43.4 percent and unskilled workers 7.7 percent (8).

Such significant differences in the professional-qualifications structure of manpower between military and manufacturing industry as a whole are explained not by the technical structure of capital alone. In a privileged position in the sense of government financing of military programs, military industry has opportunities for attracting skilled personnel which the civilian sectors do not have. This exacerbates an important problem in the sphere of employment at the level of the economy as a whole: the combination of a shortage of highly skilled specialists with a surplus of low-skill workers, many of whom can for a long time find no work. Deforming the professional-qualifications structure of employment, the military sector contributes to an increase in structural unemployment.

President R. Reagan's government hoped that an accelerated arms race would spur the economy and change conditions for the better on the manpower market. These hopes proved groundless. Although unemployment has declined compared with the crisis years, its level even in the phases of recovery and upturn has not fallen below 7 percent. There are many reasons for the mass unemployment, but the arms race is among the main ones.

Western literature analyzing the economic and social consequences of the arms race and military spending may be subdivided into three main groups: justification for militarization of the economy; studies showing that the arms race has a disastrous effect on economic development; works evaluating critically the impact of military appropriations in the long term but recognizing a certain positive influence thereof on the economy in the short term. The authors who adhere to the last proposition believe that a significant increase in military spending is capable of bringing about a "multiplier effect" (9). It is a question of the fact that in the short term an expansion of the military sector increases demand for various types of product of the civilian sectors necessary for arms production. There is thereby allegedly an increase in the overall load of production capacity, a rise in employment, an acceleration of the introduction of new technology and new products and so forth. Let us see to what extent these claims correspond to reality.

U.S. military spending in the 1981-1985 fiscal years grew (in real terms) four times faster than in the 1976-1980 fiscal years. Such an unprecedented peacetime growth thereof should, in accordance with the said concept, have been reflected at least in the load of industrial production capacity. However, there can be no mention of any manifestations of such influence: the average load in 1976-1980 constituted 82.4 percent, and in 1981-1985, 77.4 percent. There was also a growth in the total number of bankruptcies in the country: 7,600 in 1979, 24,900 in 1982, 52,100 in 1984 and 57,100 in 1985. As far as employment is concerned, the following example is typical. An American independent research firm specializing in study of the impact of government policy on the economy surveyed 156 sectors of industry. It was revealed as a result of the analysis that in only 29 of them did the number of jobs increase with the rise in military spending. In four-fifths of the sectors polled employment declined or, at best, remained at the previous level with the growth of the military budget (10).

Nor can it be said that the growth of military spending was manifested in the increased competitiveness of the civilian sectors. Many American-made products, including home electronics, radio equipment and automobiles, fail to stand up to competition from similar types of product made in Japan, the FRG and certain other industrially developed countries, where the level of military spending is lower. In the period 1980-1985 the relative significance of American companies of manufacturing industry in sales on the national market declined from 92 percent to 88 percent. On many commodity markets the proportion of imports doubled, at a minimum.

Having analyzed the impact of military spending on the machine tool-building, aviation and electronics sectors of industry, specialists of the American Center for Defense Information concluded that the diminishing competitiveness of these sectors is largely explained by the fact that R&D of a military nature is seriously limiting the possibilities of an increase in the efficiency of civilian industries.

Of course, the reduced load of production capacity, the increase in the number of bankruptcies, the acute employment problem and the decline in the competitiveness of American firms are the result of the action of many

factors such as, for example, the superseding of live labor by machines, structural crises in the metallurgical, shipbuilding and textile sectors of industry, the increased competition on world markets, the transfer by the TNC of manufacturing industry enterprises from the United States to other countries and so forth. As far, however, as the role of military spending in the formation of overall economic conditions is concerned, it not only has not had any stabilizing impact on the economy but, on the contrary, has made worse the position of the civilian sectors since the military sector has swallowed up vitally important resources necessary for their development.

Limitless Squandering of Resources

Endeavoring to obtain as much in the way of budget resources for arms production as possible, militarist circles of capitalist countries are attempting to convince the public that the present spending for military purposes is not so burdensome as it might seem. Thus, for example, leaders of the Pentagon refer to the fact that in 1953--at the height of the Korean War--the proportion of military spending in the U.S. GNP constituted 13.8 percent, whereas three decades later, 6.4 percent (11).

It transpires, given this comparison, that the burden of military spending is for American society half of what it incurred at the time of the Korean War. However, there are also other criteria of an evaluation of the burden of military spending, the level of the budget deficits, for example. We would recall that in 1951, at the start of the Korean War, the United States had a surplus federal budget balance. But in 1953 even, as a consequence of the sharp increase in military appropriations, a deficit of the order of \$9.4 billion appeared, which constituted 15 percent of the revenue side of the budget. It has increased considerably since then. In 1983 the federal budget deficit amounted to \$207.7 billion or 35 percent of Treasury proceeds (12). The absolute amounts of military spending in the current decade are so great that they have proven more burdensome for the budget than in the years when the United States was waging war in Korea.

The national debt is reflected negatively in the position of the working people. Graphic evidence of this is the curtailment of social programs in a number of capitalist countries. Thus in the first term of R. Reagan's presidency (1980-1984) the federal government cut spending on social security, education, health care, youth job training, housing assistance and other needs by more than \$110 billion altogether (13). However, this measure did not lead to a reduction in the budget deficit, mainly because the administration simultaneously sharply increased appropriations for military purposes. The "economies" in government spending proved nothing other than a camouflaged policy of redistributing budget resources in favor of the military-industrial complex. As a result the living standard of millions of Americans, who were denied social benefits, declined to such an extent that many of them found themselves below the poverty line. From 1980 through 1983 the number of Americans whose living standard is below the officially recognized minimum income level grew from 29.3 million to 35.3 million.

The U.S. Government intends to continue to take the path of a redistribution of budget resources in favor of the military sector thanks to a winding down

of social programs. If we compare the high level of appropriations for social needs (by individual item) reached prior to the assumption of office by the present administration with the outlines for 1989, the dynamics of social spending (in 1985 prices) will appear as follows: the federal employment and training program will be cut 75 percent compared with 1978; appropriations for elementary and secondary education will decline 29 percent compared with the 1980 level; spending on higher education and student grants will decline 33 percent compared with 1981; health care appropriations will be 47 percent below the 1976 level; aid to senior citizens will be reduced 35 percent compared with the amount which was allocated in 1979 (14). Yet U.S. military spending continues to grow: in the period from 1986 through 1990 it will amount, it is anticipated, to more than \$2 trillion (15).

The arms race unleashed and spurred by the United States and other leading capitalist countries led, according to data of the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, to world military spending in 1985 being expressed in the sum total of \$850-870 billion (16).

While the arms race is devouring hundreds of billions of dollars, many vitally important world problems are not being properly tackled owing to a lack of financial resources. It is primarily a question of the disastrous situation of vast masses of the population in the developing countries, where hundreds of millions of people are starving or suffering from malnutrition and living in poverty, are deprived of elementary medical assistance and are completely illiterate.

Nor can it fail to be seen that, instead of using all available resources for tackling urgent tasks pertaining to a rise in the engineering standard of industry and agriculture and the economic growth rate, the emergent countries themselves are spending ever increasing resources on military needs. Their share of world military spending grew from 6.2 percent in 1965 to 17.2 percent in 1985. The factors at the basis of this trend are manifold. An important part is played by the developing states' endeavor to ensure national security in the present uneasy world. This applies particularly to a number of regions wherein the situation is characterized by tension and instability. Some countries are continuing the struggle, armed included, for national integrity and independence. It is essential to take into consideration the endeavor of certain young states to solve the accumulated regional interstate contradictions from a position of strength.

The fact that the developing countries have lagged considerably in their development behind the industrially developed states is primarily and mainly the result of the long domination of the colonial powers. Even now imperialist circles of the West regard the developing countries as a source of cheap raw material and cheap manpower, a market for the sale of industrial products, a sphere of the profitable investment of capital and a periphery to which it is convenient to transfer enterprises which pollute the environment to the greatest extent. It is perfectly understandable that they are attempting by all means possible to keep these states economically, financially, technically and military-politically dependent. From this, in particular, come the attempts to "play" on the contradictions between developing countries in order to use these contradictions in their own selfish interests. Without

exaggerating in the least, it may be claimed that the strategy and tactics of imperialism were to blame to a large extent for the fact that of the 103 armed conflicts in the period from 1945 through 1983, 100 were unleashed in areas of the Near and Far East, Africa, South Asia and Latin America (17). Arms supplies remain for the imperialist powers a quite powerful lever of political influence in the developing world.

Nothing is further from the truth than the assertions of certain bourgeois economists that a direct connection is observed between the developing states' greater military spending and their industrial development rate (18). In acquiring costly arms these states are depleting their foreign currency reserves and increasing their foreign debt. It has been estimated that for the 20 emergent countries with the biggest debt (as of 1983) the volume of weapons imports in the period 1976-1980 constituted 20 percent, and in four, no less than 40 percent, of the increase in their foreign debt (19).

The arms race is also intensifying other global problems such as, for example, the depletion of nonrenewable natural resources and environmental pollution. Of course, there are many factors complicating relations between man and nature. These include the increase in the numbers of the Earth's population, the growth of people's social needs, workers' increased provision with equipment permitting the use of natural resources for economic needs at a faster pace and on a larger scale and so forth. Nonetheless, nature use could be more careful. The squandering of natural resources on arms production is particularly intolerable. Military industry swallows up a large quantity of rare types of mineral raw material. It pollutes the air, water storage basins and the soil with harmful production waste. The environment is being caused irreparable harm by the testing of nuclear, chemical, biological and other types of weapon of mass destruction.

In a word, mankind is today faced with a decisive choice: either a curtailment of military production and the use of available resources for people's benefit or the further depletion of vitally important resources and the increased danger of thermonuclear war.

In the modern world there is no more important task than the achievement of accords on a reduction in nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction and prevention of an arms race in space. Endeavoring to halt the trend toward a further arms buildup and to turn it back, the Soviet Union has in recent years adopted a number of unilateral measures to limit the race in nuclear arms and presented a series of large-scale proposals pertaining to a radical reduction of them and the creation of an all-embracing system of international security. Were East and West to come to an agreement on key issues of disarmament, this would permit the release of huge resources and the channeling thereof for social purposes in the interests of each country and the whole world community.

Problems of Conversion

A turnabout in world politics from confrontation toward a relaxation of international tension and disarmament will depend to a great extent on the activity of peace forces in the United States and other NATO countries and the

degree of involvement of the broad public in the ranks of peace supporters. Under these conditions all kinds of preconceptions concerning the economic and social consequences of a curtailment of military production are being instilled in the population. The main emphasis is being put on the inevitability of the appearance of big new detachments of unemployed. In the situation of mass unemployment in capitalist countries such propaganda is exerting a certain influence on people's consciousness, particularly of those who are directly employed in the military sector. This is why in the ideological struggle against the opponents of detente and disarmament considerable importance is attached to correct illustration of the problems of the conversion of military industry.

The restructuring of the industry producing arms for the manufacture of peaceful products will, of course, engender certain problems. The most serious of them are connected with the transfer of military enterprises to the production of civilian commodities and the retraining of the workers. Nonetheless, the experience of the conversion of a number of military plants in the first years following WWII and the findings of special studies on these problems based on data of the 1970's-1980's indicate that these difficulties are entirely surmountable.

A report of government expert I. Thorsson on the possibility of the conversion of military production in the country was published in Sweden in 1984. Its main conclusions go beyond the framework of one country for Sweden's defense industry, as the study observes, "is just as diverse and technically advanced as the defense industry of other major West European countries." "There is every reason to believe," the report observes, "that the consequences of a disarmament process are controllable. However, a prior condition of such regulation is the demand that conversion of the defense sector (including defense industry) be well planned and implemented gradually. The government, leaders of military enterprises and union leaders should be actively enlisted in this process, viewing it from the long-term angle. If these demands are observed, the disarmament scenarios presented in the report will not lead to a growth of unemployment." And, further: "As a whole, Sweden's economy would undoubtedly benefit from disarmament. The resources released from the military sector could be channeled not only into an improvement in economic and social living conditions in Sweden itself but also an enlargement of aid to third world countries over and above the planned allocations of the order of 1 percent of the country's GNP" (20).

Particular attention is often paid in the discussions pertaining to problems of conversion to the difficulties of retraining the personnel of the military enterprises. These difficulties differ for different professional-qualifications groups. The labor of workers of the majority of base occupations--lathe hands, mechanics, welders, electricians, electronics workers and forth--at military enterprises does not have any specific features. It also has to be considered that under the conditions of rapid S&T progress all workmen are in need of certain retraining. Of course, the problem of retraining scientists and engineers is more complex. But in this case also it should be mentioned that many specialists working in the sphere of military equipment--electronic, aerospace, aviation, laser, optical--may without undue complications be switched to civilian subject matter. The switch

is further facilitated by the fact that the majority of military firms simultaneously manufactures peaceful products also. An increase in the volume and broadening of the selection of civilian commodities could provide work for highly skilled specialists of a military profile.

According to a survey conducted by the Department of Employment of the state of California in the aerospace industry, of the 127 military specialties, 97 could find an application in civilian production without any retraining. Retraining lasting from 6 to 17 months would be required for the remaining 30 specialties (21).

Were practicable possibilities of a switch of military resources to civilian ends to appear, the short-term difficulties would recede into the background in the face of the prospects of a recovery of the economy and the implementation of large-scale economic and social programs such as the development of power engineering, modernization of the cities, protection of the environment, expansion of housing, the construction of new schools and hospitals and so forth. The development of such large-scale projects would stimulate economic growth and expand employment opportunities.

Disarmament would accelerate the economic and social development of the whole world community. The objective processes of an extension of the international division of labor insistently demand closer cooperation between states on a world scale. The escalation of military preparations, on the other hand, is creating artificial barriers to such cooperation. Thus, for example, the American strategic defense initiative (SDI), which is aimed at the creation, testing and deployment of strike space-based arms, not only is not contributing to, but, on the contrary, is impeding the cooperation of the USSR, the United States and other countries belonging to different military-political alliances in the peaceful conquest of space for the good of all mankind.

The Soviet Union has put forward a stage-by-stage program of the peaceful conquest of space up to the year 2000. It provides for the unification of efforts of the space powers and other economically developed states in the development of major projects of the use of space technology for the accomplishment of such tasks of socioeconomic development common to all countries as communications, navigation, development of the natural resources of the Earth and the oceans, the creation of a global weather-forecasting service and so forth.

Disarmament and a reduction in military budgets would make it possible to channel more resources into helping the developing countries (22). The appropriations allocated by the capitalist world to this end at the present time do not correspond to the scale of the tasks even pertaining to an easing of the most acute crisis phenomena in many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, not to mention the surmounting of their backwardness. Thus the OECD states spent on development purposes in 1984 some 0.36 percent of aggregate GNP. This is half the level of spending recommended by the United Nations (0.7 percent of GNP). It has to be noted that the proportion of GNP allocated the developing countries by the richest power--the United States--is considerably lower than the average indicator for the developed capitalist countries as a

whole--only 0.23 percent. And a further characteristic is that as of the mid-1960's a tendency toward a reduction in the proportion of deductions into the assistance fund for developing countries has been observed.

Of course, for an acceleration of the economic and social development of the former colonial countries which have embarked on the path of independence and self-sufficiency in domestic and foreign policy radical measures are required on the part of these states themselves both in terms of the mobilization of resources and their rational use. Nonetheless, an increase in the assistance which the industrially developed countries could render them is extremely necessary also. An important source of such assistance is a reduction in military budgets and the transfer of some of the resources thus released to development purposes. This is in the interests of the whole world community.

A reduction in and the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass annihilation is the path of the preservation of peace in the world and man's deliverance from the insane waste of resources of vital importance for economic and social development to which there is no alternative.

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, "The United States: Military Production and the Economy," Moscow, 1983; R.A. Faramazyan, "The Military Economy of American Imperialism," Moscow, 1983; MEMO No 8, 1983, pp 42-52; SShA--EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 2, 1986, pp 14-28; MEMO No 5, 1986, pp 45-57.
2. See V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 45, pp 319-320.
3. See AUSSENPOLITIK No 4, 1985, p 402.
4. See ORBIS, Summer 1985, pp 403-434.
5. See "Economic Conversion: Revitalizing America's Economy," ed. by D. McFadden, S. Gordon, Cambridge (Mass.), 1984, pp 74-75.
6. See CHALLENGE, July/August 1983, p 10. In addition, 3 million Americans were on active military service or worked for the War Department as civilian workers. The total numbers, on the other hand, of the gainfully employed population or aggregate manpower of the United States in the said year amounted to 110.3 million persons (see "Statistical Abstract of the United States," 1985, pp 340, 390).
7. Estimated from CHALLENGE, July/August 1983, p 10; "Statistical Abstract of the United States," 1985, pp 340-390.
8. CHALLENGE, July/August 1983, p 12.
9. See, for example, ALTERNATIVES No 1, 1984, p 55.
10. EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS, 17 May 1985, p 368.
11. See "Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1966," pp 224, 286; "...1985," pp 309, 431.

12. See "Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1966," p 388; "...1984," p 315.
13. See LABOR TODAY, April 1984, p 3.
14. See "Budget of the United States Government. FY 1985," Washington, 1984, pp 3-34.
15. See "Budget of the United States Government. Fiscal Year 1986," Washington, 1986, pp 2-4.
16. See "World Armaments and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook 1986," Oxford (N.Y.), 1986, P 211.
17. See "1985 Report on the World Social Situation," United Nations, New York, 1985, p 14.
18. See ORBIS, Summer 1985, p 409.
19. See "1985 Report on the World Social Situation," p 19.
20. I. Thorsson, "In Pursuit of Disarmament," Stockholm, 1984, p 48.
21. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REVIEW, March-April 1985, p 189.
22. For more detail see MEMO No 9, 1983, pp 22-24; MEMO No 9, 1986, pp 15-28.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".

"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987.

8850

CSO: 1816/6

ROLE OF PARLIAMENTARIANS IN EUROPEAN PEACE PROCESS

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 13 Jan 87) pp 52-61

[Article by L. Tolkunov: "Members of Parliament and the All-European Process"]

[Text] The discussions in the Icelandic capital of the top leaders of the USSR and the United States showed with particular poignancy to all mankind that peace is indivisible and that the security of one country is merely a part of general, collective security and that the responsibility for the fate of peace lies not only with Moscow and Washington but also with all states--large and small, nuclear and nonnuclear, bloc members and neutral.

This applies particularly to Europe. The pivotal problem confronting it today is security. Owing to its geographical compactness and oversaturation with arms, this continent is more vulnerable than any other in the face of an armed conflict, a nuclear one even more so. Europe, which has in our century experienced two devastating wars, can in no way be an impartial observer of the Soviet-American dialogue, on which the self-preservation of both itself and all mankind depends to a decisive extent. Having drunk in full measure from the bitter cup of suffering, our continent deserved to be freed from nuclear weapons, to cease to be a nuclear hostage and to represent to mankind an example of the peaceful coexistence and cooperation of states of different social systems. And Europe has largely proved worthy of this mission.

It is of the profoundest import that it was the USSR and the socialist states which were and remain the initiators and energetic proponents of a policy aimed at securing conditions of a peaceful life for all peoples of the Old World. It is they who consistently and perseveringly sought an abrupt change in the development of the situation, played a decisive part in the birth of the all-European process and took pains to ensure that it survive all the upheavals of international life of the past decade. Much of what was achieved following Helsinki has sunk deep roots and stood firm in the face of "frosts" and storms. Belgrade, Madrid, Stockholm, Vienna were important landmarks in the history of European detente.

In the accomplishment of the historic mission of salvation of the continent from nuclear catastrophe a substantial part has been and continues to be played by the parliaments and their members. Whatever the social composition of the legislative authorities and in whatever country they operate, the voter has given his member a precise and specific mandate--do everything to preserve peace. In many capitalist countries some members are betraying this instruction and in a fever of anti-Soviet and anticommunist emotions are promoting a policy of military preparations. The U.S. Congress bears considerable responsibility for the increasing world arms race. The West German Bundestag approved plans for the deployment of Pershings and cruise missiles. Representatives of the ruling parties in the parliaments of other bourgeois countries have also added fuel to the flames of confrontation on the international scene.

It has to be seen, of course, that ever increasing importance is attached in capitalist countries' foreign policy mechanism to the executive authorities. Such is the general trend. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to deny the special place of bourgeois parliaments. Their big possibilities and tremendous responsibility are obvious from this viewpoint. After all, it is they who pass legislative enactments on questions of war and peace. Furthermore, in spite of the impediments, the voice of the public is being heard increasingly loudly under parliamentary roofs also. And if it is not necessarily shaped in the form of laws and decrees, it is undoubtedly exerting a perceptible influence on their entire activity and strengthening the positions of sober-minded forces.

In the atmosphere of the nuclear threat the lofty and noble goal of strengthening peace and curbing the arms race forms the basis of the multifaceted work being done in the international arena by the USSR Supreme Soviet, its Presidium, the USSR Parliamentary Group and the members themselves--representatives of the working people in the country's highest organ of power. The Supreme Soviet is using all its vast authority and international influence in the interests of the consolidation of peace and cooperation. The pulse of the life of our planet is perceived and the cherished hopes and aspirations of the peoples are reflected in the documents which it has adopted.

Appeals and decrees of the highest organ of state power were important foreign policy acts. A call for peace was heard in the USSR Supreme Soviet appeal "To the Parliaments and Peoples of the World" of 23 June 1981 and the USSR Supreme Soviet and CPSU Central Committee appeal "To the Parliaments, Governments, Political Parties and Peoples of the World" of 22 December 1982. On 16 June 1983 the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a decree which instructed the Soviet Government to appeal to the governments of all the nuclear powers for a simultaneous quantitative and qualitative freeze on all their existing nuclear arms. In a decree of 20 December 1983 the USSR Supreme Soviet expressed serious concern in connection with the sharp exacerbation of the situation in the world brought about by the growth of militarization and the aggressiveness of imperialist forces, primarily the United States, and confirmed the

invariability of the Soviet Union's policy of preservation and consolidation of peace, curbing the arms race and the extension and deepening of cooperation between states.

Great interest in parliamentary circles and in the international community was evoked by the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers appeal "To the Peoples, Parliaments and Governments of All Countries" on the 40th anniversary of the end of WWII.

On 27 November 1985 the USSR Supreme Soviet heard and discussed M.S. Gorbachev's report "Results of the Top-Level Soviet-American Meeting in Geneva and the International Situation" and adopted a decree which declared that "the Soviet Union will continue to pursue firmly and purposefully a high-minded policy of removal of the nuclear threat and the development of international relations in the spirit of peaceful coexistence and detente."

The historic program of the complete and universal elimination of nuclear weapons and other types of weapon of mass annihilation and a suspension of nuclear tests set forth in M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 statement proclaimed to the world that the Soviet Union is fully resolved to do everything possible to avert a general catastrophe and save civilization. It was for this reason that the USSR Supreme Soviet emphatically supported these cardinal and effective measures, which would erect a firm barrier to the arms race both in space and on earth, in the appeal to the U.S. Congress of 20 January 1986.

In the qualitatively new situation which has taken shape in the world since the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in Reykjavik the USSR Supreme Soviet has solemnly confirmed that the Soviet Union will not withdraw a single one of the proposals it put forward in the Icelandic capital aimed at the elimination of all nuclear weapons. "The door to a nuclear-free future which was opened a little in Reykjavik cannot be allowed to be slammed shut," the appeal "To the Parliaments and Peoples of the World" adopted on 19 November 1986 said.

The foreign policy documents of the USSR Supreme Soviet touch, as a rule, on a most urgent question of our time--that of peace and security in Europe. It is on this that the attention of our foreign colleagues is focused at various forums, during the exchange of delegations and in individual conversations.

The experience of the last 10-15 years confirms the obvious truth that, given good will, members of parliament of different countries can find a common language on the most difficult international problems. They thereby facilitate efforts at government level aimed at a quest for compromise and promote in salutary fashion states' diplomatic activity. Six conferences on security and cooperation in Europe conducted under the aegis of the Interparliamentary Union (IPU), beginning 1973, helped formulate what was conceived in the course of difficult and strenuous government negotiations and prompted, as it were, official authorities to a search for mutually acceptable solutions.

The first was held in Helsinki in January 1973. Some 160 members representing parliamentary groupings of 28 European states and the United States and

Canada took part. The main question on the agenda read: "Ways and means for the development of cooperation on an equal basis and the achievement of lasting peace and security in Europe, considering this continent's contribution to the cause of peace and prosperity worldwide."

Of course, convening a united conference of European members of parliament was not easy. Experience was lacking. Many parliamentary groups submitted memoranda to the preparatory committee of representatives of Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Poland, Romania, Switzerland, Great Britain, Yugoslavia, the United States, the USSR, Italy and Finland which expressed their viewpoint on questions of the conference agenda. The documents were distributed to all national parliamentary groups. Familiarizing themselves with them, the latter consulted with one another, as it were, and acquired an opportunity to compare their views and seek mutually acceptable solutions.

The very convening of the interparliamentary conference reflected the change in the general political atmosphere in Europe. The winds of detente were blowing over the continent. A number of measures was being implemented here in the sphere of easing tension, and security and cooperation. The solution of such problems had henceforward been put on a practical footing. Three main directions may be distinguished in which restructuring proceeded. First are efforts to clear international relations in Europe of extraneous features of the cold war. Second, there is the constant expansion and deepening of bilateral relations between the socialist and capitalist states of Europe in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence. Finally, there is the organization on a multilateral basis of the all-European cooperation of interested states corresponding to the interests of peace and detente and affording prospects of the creation of a system of dependable security.

In fact, Europe's life was packed with events which inspired hope for a better future. The treaties of the USSR and Poland with the FRG, which recorded the inviolability of European borders, the four-power agreement pertaining to West Berlin and the treaty on the principles of relations between the GDR and the FRG were major peace actions not only of European but also international significance and created auspicious preconditions for the establishment of strong and lasting peace on the continent. Big responsibility for the direction in which events in Europe might develop rested with the parliaments.

The USSR delegation at the conference emphasized the important mission which confronted Europe: transferring the experience of bilateral relations to the channel of multilateral diplomatic practice. The central provision of the unanimously adopted final document of the conference was the expression of support to convene an all-European conference as quickly as possible following the successful completion of multilateral consultations.

The document confirmed such important principles of relations between states as sovereignty, inviolability of state borders, territorial integrity and independence, the right of all states to participate on an equal basis in international relations and their duty to refrain from the use or the threat of force.

It also expressed concerted positions on questions of economic relations and scientific and cultural relations. Specifically, it included a recommendation to the national parliamentary groups proposed by the Soviet delegation that they "exert via their countries' parliaments the corresponding pressure on their governments to ensure that accord be reached at the All-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in preparation concerning the elaboration of a European program of economic and cultural cooperation, whose implementation would contribute to the achievement of better mutual understanding between the peoples and a strengthening of peace and security in Europe and throughout the world."

The proposal submitted by representatives of Western countries concerning a broadening of the "free exchange of information and people" was accompanied by the indication proposed by the Soviet delegation of "the right of each people to protect its political and cultural values" and of the obligation to use information "for the purpose of broad mutual understanding". The conference of European parliaments reached concerted positions on other issues also. The first forum of European members of parliament was a success.

In the subsequent period members of parliament of the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact did not slacken their efforts to consolidate the result that had been achieved. The situation was conducive to this. Detente had produced successes. The East-West dialogue was becoming more intensive. The convening of the All-European Conference approached. The USSR Supreme Soviet and Parliamentary Group used all forms, including interparliamentary exchange and IPU conferences, to continue to keep at the center of the attention of the voter masses in European countries the idea of convening an all-European conference of the continent's states.

The Second Interparliamentary Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe, which was held in Belgrade in January-February 1975, served this same goal.

The USSR Parliamentary Group submitted a number of documents for its examination. They observed that the detente process was at the stage of a fundamental restructuring of international relations. Good-neighbor relations developing in the course of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems were becoming established increasingly. In this spirit, the Soviet memorandum emphasized, given due respect for existing territorial and political realities, a decisive change for the better in bilateral relations between individual European states has already been achieved and questions which were the subject of sharp disputes and serious international complications for many years have been solved. Unswerving compliance with the commitments pertaining to the treaties and agreements on whose basis the normalization of bilateral relations in Europe was achieved remains an indispensable condition of the consolidation of European detente.

The Soviet document emphasized the exceptionally important role of the All-European Conference and consolidation of the positive changes on the European continent. Highlighting the pivotal direction of the efforts of all peace-loving European peoples, the Soviet document noted the need for supplementing

efforts pertaining to an improvement in the political situation in Europe with measures in the sphere of military detente. Considerable attention was paid to questions of economic cooperation and cultural exchange.

The conference of members of parliament in Belgrade assembled in a notable period. The consistent struggle of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries for the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security and the decisive stimulation of the activity of all peace-loving forces had made the relaxation of tension a reality.

As the result of keen, but constructive discussion a document was unanimously adopted in which the members of parliament of European countries and the United States and Canada called on their governments to make every effort to bring the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to the most speedy and successful conclusion at as high a level as possible. They expressed the wish that detente in Europe become a general world process, which, given the equal participation of all countries, should lead to the peaceful settlement of international problems.

II

The forum in the Finlandia Palace, which endowed Europe with a unique code of peace, lent powerful impetus to positive trends in the life of our continent. There was a pronounced invigoration of East-West political relations. Trade and economic relations began to assume a large-scale nature. Cultural exchange expanded. Positive movements in the sphere of military detente appeared.

Simultaneously forces of the right, intimidated by the scale and pace of detente, redoubled their efforts to turn back the course of events. It was at this time that NATO adopted wide-ranging programs to modernize its armed forces and an automatic annual increase in military spending.

The situation had become complicated. It was essential, without losing time, to mobilize public opinion for defense of the Helsinki process. This was the task set itself by the Third Interparliamentary Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe, which was held in Vienna in May 1978. The main question on its agenda was: "Implementation of the provisions of the Final Act adopted in Helsinki, specifically, the initiatives and actions of members of parliament geared to a deepening of the mutual relations of the European countries, the United States and Canada pertaining to the consolidation of security and the development of cooperation in Europe for the development of the detente process in the future". Each member of parliament, the Soviet representatives emphasized, receives a credit of trust from his electorate. The peoples of Europe, who experienced to this extent or the other the horrors of WWII, wish to rid themselves forever of fear of the very thought of the possibility of general catastrophe. By virtue of the duty of their mandate members of parliament are obliged to express the latter's will when determining the country's foreign policy.

The period which had elapsed since the completion of the All-European Conference had provided much convincing evidence that the Final Act was and remained the fundamental platform of activity, based on a lengthy period of

time, of its signatories pertaining to the consolidation of peace, security and cooperation in Europe. The USSR, the Soviet delegation emphasized, was complying strictly with and implementing these principles in its mutual relations with other states. Such commitments were, inter alia, enshrined in documents adopted at the outcome of Soviet leaders' negotiations with statesmen of West European countries.

The Helsinki process is multifaceted. An integral part of the consistent policy of materialization of the Final Act is the development of political, trade, economic and S&T relations. The Soviet Union did much, unilaterally included, to expand relations in the cultural and humanitarian spheres also. It could only be regretted that the delegations of certain Western countries attempted to lead the meeting aside from an examination of questions of the further consolidation of security and cooperation in Europe. Attempts were made to turn it into a field of ideological confrontations over artificially contrived "problems". Some people attempted to assert that the Soviet delegation was "avoiding" discussion of the "human rights" issue. This did not correspond to reality. It is Soviet people, having built a socialist society, who have enshrined in their constitution human rights in full and provided guarantees of their implementation in practice.

The Soviet delegation put at the center of the conference's attention the issue of security. After all, the most essential and urgent business in our time is achieving a further easing of the military threat and a halt to the arms race. This task is particularly urgent for the peoples of Europe, which live under one roof. After all, it is sagging under the tremendous weight of weapons as it is. Yet some people would like to add to it an additional dangerous load--new types of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet state, our delegation declared, firmly believes that the time has come to give thought to a complete halt to the further quantitative and qualitative growth of the arms and armed forces of states with large-scale military potential and thereby create the conditions for their gradual reduction. It was not fortuitous that questions of disarmament occupied a central place in the unanimously adopted resolution of the conference in Vienna.

Other sections of the resolution had a constructive ring also--concerning economic cooperation, the dynamic development of trade and the diversification of its structure, the quest for new forms of industrial cooperation (including those which might be suitable for joint activity on international markets), encouragement of the most developed forms of S&T cooperation, an increase in exchanges in the sphere of culture and education, the more extensive dissemination of information and contacts between people and the solution of humanitarian problems, given full compliance with the Helsinki principles.

Unfortunately, in subsequent years detente entered a period of complications. Washington aimed to undermine the positive results of the All-European Conference. Some of its allies in Europe also associated themselves with the unseemly attempts. Their efforts were aimed at preventing the spread of detente to the military sphere and impeding the all-European process. The deployment in West Europe of American first-strike missiles caused a sharp deterioration in the situation on the continent and exacerbated relations between states. The American leaders openly proclaimed the concept of a

"limited" nuclear war (primarily in Europe, of course) and constantly confirmed their readiness to use nuclear weapons first. Imperialism's psychological warfare against the socialist world was noticeably stepped up.

In the aggravated situation the efforts of all peace-loving countries and peoples were aimed at preventing a slide toward cold war and preserving the fundamentals of detente. This was the task set by Soviet members of parliament themselves and their colleagues from the fraternal countries, employing all channels of influence in international affairs. One of them was the now-traditional institution of interparliamentary conferences on security and cooperation in Europe.

The fourth such conference, in which members of parliament from 27 European states, the United States and Canada participated, was held in May 1980 in Brussels. The main question on the agenda was "Contribution of the parliaments of the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to the further extension of general detente and genuine progress in the disarmament sphere, including by way of continued fulfillment of the Helsinki Final Act".

And the general cooling of the international climate, which was a consequence of the growth of aggressive accents in the policy of the United States and its allies, was felt in the conference hall also. The speeches of representatives of Western states permitted themselves anti-Soviet attacks, distorted the essence of the USSR's peaceable foreign policy course, gave a distorted interpretation of, specifically, its internationalist assistance to Afghanistan and distorted the true situation in the field of human rights in the socialist countries.

The Soviet delegation fittingly rebuffed the hostile sallies and concentrated attention on the USSR's proposals aimed at an extension of detente and the extension thereof to the military sphere and the adoption of specific measures to bring a halt to the arms race. The USSR delegation criticized the decision on the deployment of Pershings and cruise missiles in Europe, which had been adopted under pressure from the United States at the NATO Council December (1979) Session and which was disastrous for the cause of peace, emphasizing that it was this step, together with certain others adopted by the West, which was the reason for the exacerbation of the international situation.

The attention of Europe's members of parliament was called to an important aspect of the problem of the deployment of medium-range missiles. It was a question of an endeavor on the part of the United States, while protecting its own territory against missile attacks, to shift a possible conflict to the "regional level" and enlist therein primarily its European partners. To whom is it not clear, however, that under current conditions the missile launch pad simultaneously becomes a target for a retaliatory strike. And it is truly astounding, the Soviet representatives emphasized, that this, if you will, "warfare at the hands of others" concept has encountered support in some European capitals.

The Soviet members of parliament noted the particular urgency in the new situation to stimulate the efforts of all peace-loving states in the struggle

for peace. The need for a continuation of negotiations to halt to the arms race, including those concerning medium-range missiles, which had begun in recent years, but which had been suspended, was emphasized in this connection.

Those who were attempting to distort the lofty aims of the Soviet Union's assistance to Afghanistan were fittingly rebuked. The USSR delegation emphasized insistently that it was the unchecked buildup of military preparations by the United States, Washington's refusal to ratify the SALT II Treaty and NATO's decision on the deployment on West European territory of the new American nuclear missile weapons which were the true source of tension of the international situation and not the disinterested and friendly action of Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan.

The Soviet members of parliament called the attention of those assembled to the fact that the opponents of detente, exacerbating the atmosphere on our continent, had resorted to campaigns aimed against the socialist countries in connection with the imaginary "human rights violations," "persecution of dissidents" and so forth. Unfortunately, echoes of such tunes were heard at the conference also. However, if the discussion is serious and businesslike, it has to be acknowledged that there is real concern for man and his vital needs primarily in the socialist world.

The Soviet members of parliament called the attention of the conference to the primary and elementary right of each person--the right to life. It is this which is under constantly growing threat as a result of the continuing arms race, nuclear included. "We are convinced," the emissaries of the Soviet state declared, "that it is at strengthening general security and preventing the possibility of a military conflict that the efforts of members of parliament and all people of good will should be directed."

Although it took place in a difficult atmosphere, the conference as a whole culminated in positive results and contributed to preservation of the spirit of detente, confidence-building and the development of international cooperation. The final resolution corresponded to the Helsinki accords and outlined practical measures for their implementation. It called on the parliaments and governments of European countries and the United States and Canada to stimulate efforts in the struggle to halt the arms race, to surmount the complications in the way of detente, to consolidate security and to expand cooperation in various spheres. It was emphasized that the policy of detente had deep roots and that there was no alternative to it. It was recommended that the parliaments and governments exert efforts for the careful preparation of the Madrid meeting of representatives of the participants in the all-European meeting in order that it might lend new impetus to an extension of detente and a strengthening of security and cooperation.

The Fifth Interparliamentary Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was held in Budapest from 30 May through 4 June 1983, took place in just as difficult and tense an atmosphere.

Disquiet was heard in the speeches of the majority of delegates in connection with the fact that the planned deployment of the new American missiles in West Europe and the retaliatory measures about which the Soviet Union had warned

could lead to a new twist of the nuclear arms race spiral and a sharp increase in the danger of the outbreak of war. At the same time the representatives of the United States, the FRG and certain other Western countries engaged in anti-Soviet attacks and attempted to lead the conference away from discussion of security and disarmament issues. Attempts were made to dredge up the so-called "Afghan" and "Polish" questions, but such an obstructionist policy was not supported by the majority of participants.

The Soviet delegation duly rebuffed the attacks on the foreign and domestic policy of the USSR, cogently explained the Soviet position on questions of a halt to the arms race and informed the participants in the meeting of the Soviet state's far-reaching peaceable proposals.

The USSR delegation called on the conference and all members of parliament of Europe and the world to act without delay while there was still a possibility of curbing the arms race and switching to disarmament. Despite a keen struggle, the final resolution was adopted by the conference by way of consensus. It called on the parliaments and governments of European countries and the United States and Canada to take effective steps leading to a halt to the arms race, military detente and disarmament. The conferees advocated that the USSR and the United States exert the maximum efforts at the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms for the speediest achievement of positive results. The resolution also contained a call for the successful completion of the Vienna talks on a reduction in armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. The need for the speediest realization of a conference on confidence-building measures, security and disarmament in Europe was noted.

The section of the resolution devoted to economic and other questions included an appeal for the removal of a variety of political and economic barriers in East-West trade and the organization of extensive cooperation in the sphere of the economy, science and technology and the environment. It was emphasized that a recovery of the world economy was possible only if the arms race were halted and the possibility of armed conflicts were reduced to nothing. The resolution also contained a provision geared to continued cooperation in the humanitarian and other spheres in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act.

As a whole, the resolution adopted by the conference echoed the draft final document submitted by the neutral and nonaligned countries at the Madrid meeting. It may be said that the decision of the conference in Budapest was conducive to the successful completion of the meeting to a certain extent.

The facts confirmed that whatever the deterioration in the international situation, interparliamentary relations invariably remained a most stable and positive element of international life. Reflecting the will of the majority of the electorate concerned for the fate of peace, the members of parliament provided many convincing examples of the fact that it is possible to find a common language posed by our transient and complex times. Good will, patience and perseverance only are needed. The Sixth Interparliamentary Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe, which was held in Bonn from 26 through 30 May 1986, may serve as convincing confirmation of this.

The agenda included questions pertaining to security in Europe, specifically, detente and disarmament and the development of cooperation in the sphere of the economy, science and technology, the environment and the humanitarian and other spheres and also the question of further steps following the conference.

The discussion, which was of a constructive nature as a whole, reflected members of parliament's growing unease in connection with the exacerbation of the international situation. Representatives of NATO countries attempted to lead the conference away from the discussion of questions of security and disarmament. The majority of members of parliament from Western countries touched to this extent or the other on the question of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. Certain delegations attempted to distort the facts connected with this tragedy and use it to undermine trust in the Soviet Union. But such attempts failed. Thanks to the efforts of the Soviet delegation, questions on which the fate of Europe depends--security problems--proved to be at the center of attention.

The Soviet members of parliament explained their country's consistent peace-loving policy aimed at ridding the continent of all weapons of mass annihilation, a suspension of nuclear tests, prevention of the militarization of space and the creation in various parts of Europe of nuclear-free zones. They paid great attention to the problem of the peaceful atom, proposing the creation of international conditions of the safe development of nuclear power, and also to the problem of a ban on chemical weapons.

The Soviet delegation emphasized that, despite the negative confrontational trends in Europe, there were objective conditions for an abrupt change for the better. What is needed primarily is renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons and force in general, the concept of military superiority and the endeavor to solve contentious issues with the aid of force. The political will to implement disarmament measures based on the principle of equality and equal security is needed. It was emphasized that all the conditions currently exist for overcoming the separation of East and West, particularly in matters of security and mutually profitable cooperation.

The conference observed that the top-level Soviet-American meeting in Geneva in November 1985 had engendered hope of the possibility of an easing of international tension. Its participants commented highly on the propositions expressed in the joint Soviet-American statements that there can be no winners in a nuclear war, that such a war must never be unleashed and that the United States and the USSR recognize the need to avert any war between them--both nuclear and conventional--and will not aspire to achieve military superiority.

The conference expressed support for new efforts aimed at making detente a continuous and increasingly viable and comprehensive process, general in its scope. It called on the parliaments and governments of the participants to take effective steps in the business of halting the arms race, facilitating the adoption of specific measures for military disengagement in Europe and stimulating efforts at the regional level for the achievement of progress in the field of disarmament under international control.

The conference condemned terrorism and stressed the need for decisive measures to combat it at the national and international levels. The document contains a list of measures aimed at the further development of European cooperation in the sphere of the economy, science, technology and the environment and expresses support for the efforts of the IAEA providing for the establishment of international safety rules at nuclear power engineering enterprises.

Despite the complexity and seriousness of the situation, the conference as a whole was marked by positive results. It confirmed the possibility of accord between the countries of East and West on the most complex and serious international problems. The unanimity with which the resolution was adopted contributed to the successful start in November 1986 of the Vienna meeting of representatives of the participants in the All-European Conference.

The situation demands of representatives of the highest organs of state power of all countries on the continent new initiatives in the name of a resurgence of detente. The shoots of new thinking are taking root and responsibility for the preservation and consolidation of the "European house" is growing in Europe. The meeting in Reykjavik of the USSR's and United States' top representatives strengthened in a considerable part of the European community the hope of a change for the better. At the same time, however, certain influential figures in West European capitals are not concealing their concern at the very possibility of a Soviet-American understanding on nuclear problems.

The importance of the discussions in the Icelandic capital for the future of Europe is invariably emphasized at USSR Supreme Soviet delegates' meetings with their foreign colleagues. The meeting in Reykjavik was welcomed by the members of the European Parliament. The resolution which they adopted emphasizes the need for a reduction in arsenals of all types of arms, nuclear primarily, prevention of the emergence of weapons in space and a halt to nuclear weapons testing. The members of the Europarlament expressed support for the achievement of an agreement between the USSR and the United States providing for the withdrawal from Europe of medium-range nuclear missiles.

The Soviet members of parliament warmly support the arterial policy of the CPSU aimed at the freeing of Europe--from the Atlantic to the Urals--of the dangerous burden of nuclear, chemical, conventional and other types of arms. The USSR firmly believes that the all-European process should proceed in all directions--military, political, economic and humanitarian. It is the duty and calling of Europe's parliamentarians to contribute in every possible way to the revival of detente and the strengthening of cooperation in the name of peace and security.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".

"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987.

8850

CSO: 1816/6

EVOLUTION OF U.S. GOALS IN ASIAN CONFLICTS

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 13 Jan 87) pp 62-72

[Article by I. Zvyagelskaya: "Evolution of U.S. Approaches to Conflict Situations in Asia--the End of the 1970's-Beginning of the 1980's"]

[Text] Regional Conflicts and Global Strategy

A characteristic feature of the present stage of the development of international relations in Asia is a further increase in U.S. interference in regional conflicts. Washington's increased attention to them and, accordingly, the appearance of certain new features in American "conflict policy" have been brought about by the policy of strict confrontation with the USSR, which the United States is attempting to implement with equal intensity at the global and regional levels.

The policy of the "globalization" of conflicts in the zone of the emergent countries reflects American strategists' endeavor to regard them solely via the prism of Soviet-American confrontation. For example, in a special report to Congress on 14 March 1986 President Reagan once again accused the USSR of instigating conflict situations. Many representatives of the administration express similar views.

On the one hand this "black-and-white" interpretation of events is explained by the endeavor of U.S. ruling circles to gloss over the true causes of the outbreak of local conflicts. As Academician Ye.M. Primakov wrote, "this formulation ignores the objective and deep-lying socioeconomic and political processes developing in the modern world, the first causes of which are totally unrelated to the confrontation of the USSR and the United States" (1). On the other, the linkage of regional situations with the policy of the USSR carries a great propaganda load. Per Washington's calculations, it is intended to justify the growth of the U.S. involvement in conflicts, presenting American interventionist actions as some kind of "forced," "retaliatory" actions.

The high level of conflict potential in Asia is caused by a set of various factors. Among these are territorial, ideological and religious disagreements between states and the aggressive, expansionist policy of dictatorial or

racist regimes. Also reflected is the legacy of the colonial past of the emergent states, as a result of which arbitrarily drawn borders have artificially separated tribes and nationalities.

At the same time a serious destabilizing factor is the policy of the imperialist powers, primarily the United States, which frequently leads to an escalation of conflicts to the crisis stage and armed struggle and also to the appearance of new centers of tension. This negative role of the imperialist forces was pointed out by M.S. Gorbachev, speaking in the Soviet Science, Culture and Art Center in Delhi. "These forces cannot reconcile themselves to the self-sufficiency and independence of states and peoples. They are unwilling to recognize realities and that the world has changed. It is entirely different. It is not what it was at the start of the century. It is not what it was 40 years ago.

"The reluctance to recognize these realities--this is the root and main cause of so-called regional problems."

Among the biggest and most dangerous Asian conflicts bearing the imprint of American interference we may put the Near East, Iran-Iraq, Indo-Pakistan and Cambodian conflicts, the situation surrounding Afghanistan and on the Korean peninsula. Attempting to subordinate the development of events in this part of the world to its own interests, at the end of the 1970's and in the 1980's Washington expanded considerably the range of the methods employed to this end.

The evolution of American "conflict policy" in Asia was also dictated by the changes occurring in the United States' military-political strategy, of which the "conflict policy" is a component. The gamble on an expansion of military confrontation with the socialist world was expressed in the "horizontal escalation" concept advanced in 1982 by Defense Secretary C. Weinberger. Its essence consists of the United States' selective use of military force in various parts of the world for the purpose of putting pressure on the socialist countries.

The doctrine of "low-intensity conflicts" (LIC), which was approved by the Pentagon in the mid-1980's, testifies to the increased relative significance of "conflict policy" in overall strategic planning. It presupposes the United States' open military interference, including organized counterinsurgency operations, Grenada-type operations and attacks on regimes pursuing an anti-imperialist policy.

"The growing popularity of the LIC doctrine," the American specialist M. Clear observes in this connection, "has been brought about by two interconnected phenomena: the desire of the army to develop a formula for the use of force in regional conflicts acceptable to the public and the desire of the Reagan government to mobilize the support of the American population.... It (the doctrine--I.Z.) encompasses simultaneously a strategic plan of military operations overseas and a political program of pressure on public opinion in the country" (2).

"Low-intensity conflicts" are being presented by the U.S. Administration as "safe" military operations not capable of leading to U.S. involvement in a lengthy war, as was the case in Vietnam, and aimed mainly at combatting "international terrorism," a problem to which the American and West European public reacts very painfully. In accordance with the new doctrine, any actions on the part of developing countries running counter to U.S. interests are put in the "terrorist" category. Stressing a riskier and more enterprising use of force, Secretary of State G. Shultz emphasized: "We should agree that our retaliatory operations must go beyond the framework of passive defense and provide for active preventive and punitive measures.... We will need to be able to operate instantaneously. There will be no time to resume the national debate after each terrorist attack. And we will probably not have the witnesses to satisfy an American court" (3).

The statement of the Secretary of State showed clearly that Washington had moved toward an artificial lowering of the threshold of military interference in various regions, in conflict zones particularly. In galvanizing theories and concepts from cold war times the Reagan administration has attempted to apply them to specific situations in Asia also. Elements of the United States' "conflict policy," complementing one another and realized in combination, have been updated here with regard for the specifics of the 1980's.

'Controlling' Conflict Situations

The concept of "controlling" conflicts, which entered the vocabulary of Western political science on the eve and at the outset of the 1970's, is closely connected semantically and functionally with the concept of the "management" of crisis situations. Both terms signify a set of methods with which the party concerned proposes to direct the development of the situation into a channel profitable to itself. As a rule, the "controlling," as, equally, the "management," of a conflict or crisis does not envisage its settlement. There is a considerable gap between these concepts even at the theoretical level. In practice it may diminish or increase depending on the specific international situation. Ali Dessouki, specialist in conflict problems, observed that "crisis management does not necessarily mean a renunciation of the use of force... crisis control does not always signify its de-escalation. Crisis control is not the equivalent of solution of the crisis. The 'management' concept pertains to the method of manipulation of the crisis or the successful achievement of goals. Different parties resort in a crisis situation to different management strategies depending on their interests, goals and possibilities" (4).

In U.S. political science literature the "management" of conflict situations implies actions which would prevent their growth into a global confrontation, but which would simultaneously contribute to a strengthening of American positions and the prevention of the growth of the USSR's influence in this region or the other. Nor is the possibility of incitement of a crisis to achieve certain political goals precluded here.

The Reagan administration has transferred the main emphasis in its "conflict policy" to "controlling," having made even wider the discrepancy between

"controlling" and "settling" compared with the Carter period. Keeping within the framework of the "realistic deterrence" strategy and allowing negotiations "from a position of strength," in the 1970's the United States paid great attention to the "settlement"--with regard primarily for its own interests, of course--of conflicts. It is sufficient to recall, for example, the Democratic administration's efforts pertaining to the elaboration and promotion of the Camp David outline. It was conceived of as an alternative to an all-embracing settlement designed to transfer solution of the conflict to the channel of separate deals under American aegis. The aims of Camp David were to remove the Soviet Union from Near East affairs, exclude Egypt--Tel Aviv's strongest opponent militarily--from the ranks of Arab states confronting Israeli expansionism, preserve the conditions for Israel's continuation of annexation activity and attempt to enlist other Near East states in the process of separate negotiations.

At the start of the 1980's the Republican administration had concluded, to judge by everything, that it was possible to associate its pro-West participants with realization of its own strategy even without the solution of the basic questions of the regional conflict. While keeping Egyptian-Israeli relations "afloat," the administration concentrated mainly on the creation of an anti-Soviet informal alliance between Israel and the conservative Arab regimes.

In this context the United States' efforts pertaining to a continuation of the Camp David process receded into the background, and the "settlement" concept was suffused with new meaning. Whereas Carter and his advisers had considered the Egyptian-Israeli deal the start of movement along the path toward the conclusion of separate agreements between Israel and other Arab states, to the Reagan administration it represented initially if not the culminating stage, in any event, a perfectly "sufficient settlement" for a start on cobbling together an anti-Soviet bloc.

Later, under the influence of the failure of the idea of a "strategic consensus" and also a number of consequences of the Israeli aggression against Lebanon (1982) which were undesirable for the United States, the head of the White House presented new American "peace" proposals, which came to be called the "Reagan Plan". Its appearance testified to the administration's intention to prevent the elaboration of a concerted platform pertaining to a settlement of the Near East conflict at the conference of heads of Arab states and governments which had opened in Fez, split their ranks and unblock the Camp David process, that is, once again propose a separate approach corresponding to American and Israeli interests. The "Reagan Plan" was more an isolated instance concerning a specific situation. As a whole, however, the ideas of conflict "management" continue to prevail in American "conflict policy".

A graphic example of this is the Afghan situation, in which the United States is equipping the counterrevolutionary bands, attempting to make Afghanistan a permanent factor of pressure on the USSR. When, however, prospects of progress in a political settlement of this problem come to light, the United States and Pakistan make efforts to block it.

Washington's policy in the Indo-Pakistan conflict also reflects the United States' intention to maintain it at a level which would facilitate its realization of its global tasks. The expansion of military cooperation between Washington and Islamabad, which ensures the pursuit of an anti-Afghan policy and affords opportunities for storing American arms on Pakistani territory, is directly related to the confrontation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. At the same time the United States fears the unchecked growth of military tension in Indo-Pakistani relations inasmuch as, first, this process is capable of complicating Pakistan's fulfillment of the role assigned it by Washington in its anti-Soviet strategy and, second, leading to a further strengthening of Soviet-Indian relations. However, preservation of the conflict situation permits the United States to use Pakistan's permanent dependence on American military assistance in its own interests.

The level of Washington's involvement also predetermines the forms of "control"--it may be more direct or indirect. Thus in the Iran-Iraq conflict the United States is keeping its military forces on the "horizon" and has threatened to intervene repeatedly. The United States considers "management" of the Iran-Iraq conflict a most important task. Washington is pursuing the goal of "eroding" the anti-imperialist potential in the policy of both regimes, creating the conditions for a restoration of its own positions and, what is most important, undermining the authority and influence of the USSR in the region. Describing the hierarchy of the White House's policy goals in this conflict, the Soviet scholar R. Makaryan rightly emphasized that "the Iran-Iraq war has not only afforded American imperialism new opportunities for increasing its military presence in the Persian Gulf zone... but has also given rise to hopes (judging by pronouncements in the press) that the situation may be used to restore American positions in Iran and Iraq" (5).

An example of another kind may be observed in the Cambodian situation. The United States formally stands aloof, as it were, however, this "shadowy" position ensures it a sufficiently strong influence on its development and a kind of "indirect control". Putting pressure on the ASEAN countries, it is attempting to prevent their establishment of a dialogue with Vietnam and complicate the search for a political formula of a solution of the conflict. As shown by a comparison of the results of ASEAN foreign minister conferences and the sessions of enlarged conferences attended by representatives of the foreign policy departments of the United States, Japan, the EEC and Australia, Washington's backstage influence proves quite appreciable and decisive even.

Pretensions to the Role of Sole Arbiter

American political scientists distinguish several levels of "settlement". Thus B. Hill points out that "it is necessary to make a distinction between the solution and a settlement of a conflict. When the parties are forced to accept a decision under pressure, it may be said of a conflict that it has been settled, but not solved" (6).

In practice--and this has to be stressed--the United States has preferred in the majority of cases a partial settlement, albeit having declared at times a comprehensive approach. In the race for diplomatic results Washington has concentrated attention on forcing the sides into an accord on a range of

problems which is least acute and painful for them. The main problems of the confrontation remained unsolved, and the result of the mediation activity was ultimately the transition of the conflict to a new crisis stage. The Camp David deal or the Lebanon-Israeli Agreement (May 1983) may serve as an example.

A characteristic feature of the efforts pertaining to a settlement of conflict situations in Asia has been and remains Washington's endeavor to act as sole arbiter. It can be traced sufficiently clearly in H. Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" in the Near East and the role which the Carter administration performed in the achievement and realization of the Camp David accords. At the same time, up to the end of the 1970's the country's leadership did not preclude the possibility of enlisting the Soviet Union in the settlement process at some stage. In the mid-1970's, together with the traditional anti-Soviet approach, a realistic direction was observed also, whose representatives deemed expedient or, at least, permissible cooperation with the USSR in a settlement of the most dangerous conflicts fraught with the possibility of global confrontation.

This line was embodied, in particular, in a paper of the Brookings Institution (1975). Its authors concluded that the basis of a Near East settlement should be the elaboration by mutual consent of an accord taking into consideration the Israeli demand for security and Arab demands for evacuation from the territory occupied in 1967 and self-determination for the Palestinians. The paper emphasized the need for the joint actions of the United States and the USSR (7).

In the practical plane this trend was realized in the Soviet-American joint statement on the Near East of 1 October 1977. True, just a few days later it was disavowed by the U.S. Administration, which signed a "working agreement" with Israeli Foreign Minister M. Dayan and adopted a separate deals policy. At the same time, not in a position to ignore the authority and influence of the USSR in the Arab world and attempting to camouflage the separate and pro-Israeli nature of its activity, the United States was not averse to seeking the Soviet Union's "blessing" for the agreements which had been reached, calling on it to join in the "peace" process.

Immediately following the presentation of the "Reagan Plan" the Republican administration openly aspired to isolate the USSR at all stages of the settlement. Later, considering the broad support which the idea of convening an international conference on the Near East had gained in the world, the United States attempted to substitute for it the "international forum" formula. It was conceived as a kind of "umbrella" for separate negotiations. The administration is thus, as before, hoping to secure its undivided influence on the settlement process.

Military-Power Methods in Conflict Situations

The gamble on a power solution of international problems is also reflected in the expansion of the United States' military-political actions in Asia. They include arms supplies to pro-Western regimes, a buildup of its own military presence and direct aggressive actions.

Weapons supplies stimulate the arms race and constantly nurture conflicts. The United States' efforts to drag out and intensify the Iran-Iraq conflict may serve as an example. Secret American arms supplies to Iran via Israel were exposed in November 1986. Sanctioned by the President and organized with the participation of certain figures of the administration, they run counter to the United States' officially declared embargo on weapons supplies to Iran and demands that the West European allies subscribe to it. It is indicative that the resources obtained from the sale of the American arms were transferred with Israel's help to the Nicaraguan "contras," providing for Washington's "control" of the conflict in Central America.

The main flow of weapons is channeled to "friendly" regimes. Supplying them in quantities far in excess of defensive requirements, the United States is thereby, first, increasing its presence on the territory of the recipient countries (thanks to advisers) and, second, creating arsenals locally for use by American units in the event of their transfer to this region or the other. Washington frequently transfers the most modern arms to the developing countries nominally here inasmuch as they are serviced by American personnel (the AWACS in Saudi Arabia, for example).

The growth of the direct American military presence in Asia has been discerned since the end of the 1970's, when the United States, under the influence of the anti-monarchy revolution in Iran, finally recovered from the "post-Vietnam syndrome". At the same time it assumed qualitatively new forms in the 1980's. First, under the conditions of the "universal" approach to confrontation with the USSR individual Asian subregions came to be regarded by the Reagan administration as kinds of springboards. It is a question primarily of Japan, South Korea and the Near East. Second, the U.S. armed forces themselves began to participate in combat operations and carry out punitive actions. For example, in Lebanon American marines and ships conducted military operations on the side of Israel and the rightwing Christian forces. Aggression was perpetrated against Libya in the spring of 1986.

In South Korea the Pentagon has concentrated ground forces and air and naval assault forces armed with a considerable number of tactical nuclear weapons. The Republican administration assigns the south of the island an exceptionally important role in the pursuit of the policy aimed against the USSR and the other Asian socialist countries. Testimony to this was the decision on an increase in American forces and the deployment of F-16 fighter bombers, neutron weapons and Lance operational-tactical missiles capable of carrying not only conventional but also nuclear and neutron warheads.

In April 1982, following the evacuation of the Israeli Army from Sinai, the United States stationed in this region its battalion, which is a part of the "Multinational Force". Washington claimed at that time that it was a question merely of guarantees of compliance with the "peace" accords between Egypt and Israel. In actual fact Washington was pursuing far-reaching goals. The American battalion on Sinai belongs to the 82d Airborne Division--the assault force of the RDF. It is capable of ensuring the conditions for the reception of an entire division and preparation of a springboard for extensive combat operations. Thus it is a question of missions going far beyond the regional

framework. Things were similar with the commitment of American marines to Lebanon, also as part of the "Multinational Force". It was "supplemented" by 30 naval units, including two aircraft carriers and a battleship, and 300 warplanes.

The present administration is paying particular attention to a further buildup of military positions in the Persian Gulf region, using as a pretext for the intrusion the need "to safeguard the tanker runs and protect the on-shore petroleum complexes". The measures being adopted in fact considerably exceed any "protection" requirements and testify to Washington's intention to gain control over this strategically important area and create there a system of military facilities, including some targeted against the USSR.

The strengthening of the American presence in conflict zones combined with the Pentagon's increase in assistance to its clients is a means not only of "controlling" but also "settling" them in the interests of the United States. For example, military pressure was an important factor contributing to the conclusion of the fettering Lebanon-Israeli Agreement, which Beirut cancelled less than a year later. On the Korean peninsula Washington regards its own armed forces and the strengthening of the Seoul regime as a guarantee of solution of the problem per American scenarios.

The growing military assistance to Thailand incorporating supplies of modern American weapons (F-16 aircraft, radar systems), joint exercises and grants of financial resources are impeding a settlement of the Cambodian conflict.

It is particularly important to stress that Washington is putting the emphasis on strengthening special interventionist units for supporting its own military intervention in various regions. The Reagan administration has not simply continued the Democrats' policy, in whose term in office the RDF was created, but, in accordance with the "low-intensity conflicts" doctrine, has qualitatively enhanced the role of special mobile formations with experience in sabotage operations. Appropriations for them were increased from \$441 million in 1982 to \$1.2 billion in 1986 (8). Hitherto they have been an integral part of the main arms of the service (army, air force and navy), but with the increase in the role of these subunits in the accomplishment of strategic assignments the idea of their separation into an independent subgroup has already been posited. It is assumed that they will be transferred to the control of a special agency subordinate to the defense secretary (9).

Washington's emphasis on the direct use of armed forces in conflict situations is a particular danger for the whole world since it is capable of leading to conflicts going beyond a regional framework.

'Linkage' Tactics

The United States' endeavor to "link" various situations in the world, including regional conflicts, with problems of Soviet-American relations, has come to be manifested more strongly than hitherto in the 1980's. The very idea of ensuring conditions for active confrontation with the USSR at the global and regional levels also implies a closer coupling of regional and global issues of a varying nature. It has to be emphasized here that such "linkage"

is absolutely artificial and contrived--it does not reflect the actual relations between phenomena but is dictated merely by the U.S. leadership's intention to put pressure on the USSR with the aid of such "linkage" in respect of a number of most important problems.

"Linkage" tactics have been part of Washington's foreign policy arsenal since H. Kissinger's time. In his memoirs "The White House Years" he frankly recommended that American governments "deliberately" link various issues in negotiations, "using one of them as a means of pressure to reach an understanding in respect of the other" (10).

The Carter administration, which was initially highly critical of the activity of the former secretary of state, was quite quick to borrow his attitude toward conflict situations and other international problems, adopting, specifically, "linkage" tactics also.

A fervent advocate of "linkage" was Z. Brzezinski, former national security adviser. Thus in the spring of 1978, believing that the development of events in the Horn of Africa was taking an inauspicious turn for the United States, he declared that the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia "will undoubtedly complicate not only the context of the negotiations (on SALT II--I.Z.) themselves but also ratification...." The attempt to blackmail the USSR by open manipulation on the question of a strategic offensive arms limitation agreement was so obvious that, according to Brzezinski himself, the next morning all American newspapers were emphasizing his particular adherence to a policy of "linkage" (11). Z. Brzezinski's ideas were embodied in practice when the Carter administration used the Afghan events as a pretext for Congress' refusal to ratify the SALT II Treaty.

The "linkage" concept has been organically inscribed in the foreign policy constructions of the Reagan administration also. At the current stage this "linkage" presupposes the merger of regional situations of various levels and their incorporation in the form of a component in the context of Soviet-American relations.

Claiming that all interstate conflicts arise in one way or another as a result of the actions of the Soviet Union, the President advanced the proposition concerning their "interlinkage". In practice this means that the United States intends using any local conflict against the USSR and turning any conflict situation into a lever of pressure on the Soviet Union, inciting, where necessary, its outbreak. Accordingly, the political "losses" of Washington and its allies in one part of the world or one country presuppose immediate "compensation" thanks to an offensive in other parts. This approach is partly combined with the "domino" principle, which was revived at the end of the 1970's and which established a certain automatic dependence: a loss by the United States or its allies in one developing country inevitably entails a loss of positions in another. On this basis Brzezinski formulated his "arc of crisis" theory encompassing Iran, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Angola.

Brzezinski's theory served as the basis of the buildup of the American military presence in the Persian Gulf, in the Near East and in the Red Sea

area. The Reagan administration continued this policy, strengthening the intrusion in Asia and subordinating "linkage" tactics to the policy of conflict "globalization".

Role of the United States' Allies and Regional Partners

The incorporation of American allies in conflict situations in Asia was brought about both by an aspiration to stimulate their own policy in various parts of the world and the interests of the United States. Interimperialist contradictions, which predetermined a position of certain Western countries on a number of international issues different to that of the United States, are engendering in Washington the intention to limit opportunities for its allies' independent actions to the maximum possible. At the same time it is increasingly difficult for the U.S. Administration to manipulate conflicts in isolation. Open support for the most aggressive local forces in the developing world is the reason for the mistrust with which it is sometimes treated even by conservative regimes. This objectively narrows the possibilities for American maneuvering. In this situation there is an enhancement of the role of the allies which have their own relations with the participants in regional conflicts and frequently a better grasp of local specifics. And, finally, the United States is not averse to sharing the financial burden with its NATO partners and Japan, shifting onto them part of the military spending connected with the implementation of "conflict strategy".

The theory of three strategic zones, among which are West Europe, the Near East, including the Persian Gulf, and the Far East, which was elaborated at the end of the 1970's, is employed as a kind of conceptual basis of the increased American reliance on its allies in implementation of the foreign policy course in Asia. Particular emphasis, furthermore, is put on the mutual vulnerability of the three zones. Accordingly, there is also an increase in the American allies' role pertaining to support for anti-Soviet strategic tasks in these areas. It is such logic which was demonstrated by Z. Brzezinski, who wrote in the summer of 1983: "If the three central strategic zones are interconnected and are of tremendous importance to us, defense, consequently, of the Near East and Persian Gulf, for example, directly corresponds to the interests of both Japan and West Europe" (12).

In the Near East the United States involved Western countries in the "Multinational Force" in Sinai, making them thereby guarantors of Camp David, and subsequently used West European military contingents at the time of the Lebanon adventure. Tightly tying West Europe to its Near East policy, Washington has actually rendered meaningless the declarations adopted by the EC countries in Venice and Luxembourg, with which West Europe attempted to dissociate itself to a certain extent from Washington's policy pertaining to the Palestinian problem, which is extremely unpopular in the Arab world.

To bring pressure to bear on the allied powers the United States is building up its own military presence in the Persian Gulf region, dressing it as "concern" for oil supplies. West Europe and Japan, whose dependence on oil imports from this region is very high, are thus becoming America's debtors forced to agree to concessions on other most important policy issues.

Also indicative in this connection are the United States' attempts actively to enlist the NATO allies in the implementation of measures of military pressure and blackmail. Even some U.S. congressmen have acknowledged that the use of British bases at the time of the aggression against Libya had, together with a military, a political purpose inasmuch it was to have demonstrated support for the American actions on the part of its partner. Under the pressure of London and Washington the Common Market countries adopted in November 1986 a plan of "collective sanctions" against Syria.

On the eve and at the outset of the 1980's there was a pronounced increase in U.S. interest in the enlistment not only of the West European allies but also Japan in its policy in respect of Asian conflicts. The White House is endeavoring to take as much advantage as possible of Japan's prestige as an "Asian power" and the attitude toward it on the part of the emergent countries which are still inclined to look for its "disinterested" assistance and believe that Tokyo is not pursuing its own strategic goals in the conflicts. However, the act of strengthening the alliance with the United States is gradually frightening away from Japan the emergent states, whose anxiety is caused by Washington's policy of turning its ally into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and conduit of American policy and the readiness with which Japanese ruling circles are consenting to this.

The process of division of functions between the United States and Japan can be seen particularly clearly in the example of the Cambodian conflict. The latter is assuming ever more commitments not only economically but also politically. Specifically, Japanese diplomacy has been considerably more assertive than that of Washington's West European partners, defending in the United Nations the seat for the representative of the ousted Pol Pot regime.

The significance of Japan's assistance to the states on which the United States is counting or which could potentially become centers of new conflicts is growing also. Japanese assistance to Thailand and the "Indochina refugees" and also Pakistan has become a most important element of American conflict "control" in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

The Reagan administration is attempting in parallel also to activate its regional partners (particularly in conflict zones) for the accomplishment of global assignments. Its purpose is to ensure their active and conscious association with the confrontation with the Soviet Union. The creation of informal alliances of states of the region oriented toward the United States is considered in Washington a means of achieving these goals. According to a NEW YORK TIMES report, American officials had claimed that the administration had attempted to cobble together a kind of coalition of Asian countries, directly mending relations with each of them (13). It was such calculations which made for Washington's attempts to create a "strategic consensus" in the Near East.

The United States aspires to use for anti-Soviet purposes regional organizations which already exist also. ASEAN has traditionally been a subject of its close attention. In the spring of 1982 Defense Secretary C. Weinberger approved a directive determining the main areas of American policy in Asia for the current 5-year period. A large part of this document was classified, but

certain parts of it appeared in the press. In Southeast Asia, the directive says, "it is necessary to reinforce the power and unity of ASEAN... given a further increase in the capacity of members of this organization for supporting the extension of U.S. military assistance from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf" (14).

The Reagan administration is also raising to a new level relations with its most dependable allies in the conflict zones. The "strategic cooperation" with Israel may serve as a striking example. It has not only formally enshrined the "special relationship" between the two countries but also officially associated Tel Aviv with American plans of confrontation with the USSR. The Israeli Government has even expressed a readiness to participate in implementation of the SDI program.

In seeking an expansion of the functions of its traditional regional partners the Reagan administration has put particular emphasis on support for counterrevolutionary forces, regarding them as an important component of the global confrontation. In February 1985, in the State of the Union address R. Reagan emphasized the United States' solidarity with the struggle of counterrevolutionary bands from Afghanistan to Nicaragua. And, furthermore, the U.S. President equated assistance to the bands with "self-defense" (15). In a report to Congress of 14 March 1986 the element of comprehensive support for counterrevolutionary forces was strengthened even further. The President emphasized that American assistance should be geared to the utmost strengthening of these forces (16). This factor is being used by the United States increasingly assertively and is regarded as a method of "controlling" conflicts in Asia.

The U.S. Administration's policy geared to an intensification of conflicts and their conversion into an arena of confrontation with the USSR is fraught with the most serious consequences. The entire set of measures for "controlling" or "settling" conflict situations employed by the United States ultimately leads to an escalation of military tension, contributes to the emergence of conflicts beyond the regional framework and contains a threat to international security.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ye. Primakov, "The 27th CPSU Congress and Study of Problems of the World Economy and International Relations" (MEMO No 5, 1986, pp 13-14).
2. THE NATION, 28 December 1985-4 January 1986, pp 710-711.
3. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 24 December 1984, pp 20-21.
4. Ali E.H. Dessouki, "The Middle East Crisis. Theoretical Propositions and Examples" ("Managing International Crises". Ed. D. Frei, New Delhi, 1982, p 88).
5. R.V. Makaryan, "The Persian Gulf Zone. Problems and Prospects," Moscow, 1986, p 77.

6. THE JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, March 1982, pp 114-115.
7. See "Toward Peace in the Middle East. Report of a Study Group," Brookings Institution, 1975.
8. TIME, 13 January 1986, p 16.
9. See ibid., p 18.
10. H. Kissinger, "The White House Years," Boston, 1979, p 129.
11. See Z. Brzezinski, "Power and Principle. Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981," London, 1983, p 185.
12. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Summer 1983, p 11.
13. See THE NEW YORK TIMES, 7 June 1982.
14. Ibidem.
15. TIME, 1 April 1985, p 30.
16. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, May 1986, p 36.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".

"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987.

8850

CSO: 1816/6

EVOLUTION OF CAPITALIST REGULATION OF PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP

[Editorial report] Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, 1987 (signed to press 18 Jan 87) pp 73-82 publishes a three-article discussion entitled "State Regulation and Private Enterprise in Capitalist Countries: Evolution of Mutual Relations" under the rubric "Discussion". This is the continuation of the series which began in issue 10, 1986 and has continued in each issue up to the current one.

The first article by V. Rosin, "Reprivatization and New Conditions of Capitalist Reproduction," analyzes the recent trend toward reprivatization, the "as yet unclear" reasons for it and the common reasons for its emergence in all capitalist countries, albeit in different forms and to different degrees. Rosin rejects the idea that this is a coincidence; rather he attributes it to a natural stage of capitalist development. Given the progressive process of internationalism, says the author, reprivatization "can be viewed as one of the methods of mutual adaptation of economic structures of individual countries under conditions of a growth in integration processes in the world economy." "Reprivatization, even viewed in the context of the broader process of deregulation, does not mean an automatic and unconditionally absolute drop in the role of the state in economic life. This role is transformed." The author notes that the shape of the new model of growth in leading capitalist countries is still not clear, but even today it is possible to determine the main features of the model which will be the long-term one. "Private taking over of regulations, inevitably accompanying government control, is called upon to give free range to the action of market forces...." Rights and responsibilities for making economic decisions are shifting to the private sector. Questions such as how long this will go on, how this will affect the correlation between traditional blocs of state-monopoly regulation, and will new forms arise cannot be answered without further study and analysis, Rosin concludes.

Article two by D. Kuzin, "Some Problems in the Reform of Regulation in the United States," takes as its starting point the 1985 Presidential Commission Report on Competitiveness of U.S. Industry. The lagging in this area noted by the report is attributed to government regulation of the economy and the problems in interaction between the state and business. Inflation, increasing protectionism, the foreign trade deficit and deteriorating product quality are touched upon in this connection. The trend toward reprivatization and weakening state regulation are examined, with pros and cons cited. The author

comments as follows: "Obviously efforts are now aimed not so much at setting business free as at searching for an optimum version of regulation which would eliminate the least effective and promising forms of economic activity." Further: "National regulation has become a factor hindering the growth of the ability to compete since it is not responsive to the conditions of international competition." "Anti-trust regulation impedes the cooperation necessary under present-day conditions, especially in the scientific and technical area and puts small firms in a relatively disadvantageous position." Kuzin comments further that the American administration is facing acute problems of restructuring the system of state intervention in the economy, especially in areas involving mutual relations with the private-capitalist sector. The causes, essence and prospects for individual changes in the state regulations can be understood only by analyzing the evolution of the economic mechanisms of state monopoly capitalism in the 1980's.

The third article in this discussion is entitled "Evolution of the Economic-Political Mechanism and Economic Growth". The author A. Ageyev states that the problem of reprivatization is part of the broader problem of potentials, limits and forms of the further economic and sociopolitical development of capitalism. The role of the technological revolution and the increasing role of nonmaterial production and the human factor in the system of productive forces in the sharp worsening of the economic competitiveness in developed capitalist countries in the 1970's is examined. Ageyev notes that the process of reprivatization of state enterprises can be evaluated as a delegation of property to private capital on the part of the state and by reducing the irrationality of bureaucratic "regulation" the state just increases its influence. "Reprivatization is being undertaken primarily for the purpose of perfecting the economic activity of the state and improving its quality." The author concludes that "in the course of restructuring the economic-political mechanism which is accompanied by the exacerbation of the political struggle the coordinating role of the state is strengthened and there is a redistribution of functions between it and business aimed at stimulating innovating growth and guaranteeing the interests of the ruling class on this basis. There is an active search for new forms of managing the economy, but not deregulation which is understood as a weakening of state influence in the process of economic growth. Regulation of the capitalist economy as a whole is increasing.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".

"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987.

8850

CSO: 1816/6

FRG GREENS' POLITICAL PLATFORM

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNIYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 13 Jan 87) pp 86-94

[Article by A. Zhiritskiy, R. Novikov: "Sociopolitical Movement in Defense of Nature in the West"]

[Excerpts] The movement of "ecologists," "eco-activists," "greens"--as the participants in the struggle in defense of the environment in the West are called--has undergone an appreciable evolution. There has been a pronounced change in the numbers, organizational principles, ideology and nature of assertive action. Its antimonopoly potential has increased considerably. The movement is beginning to have an ever increasing impact not only on public opinion but also on the policy of governments and becoming an influential factor in the general struggle of progressive forces of capitalist countries for a democratic alternative to the solution of ecological problems.

Qualitatively New Stage

Initially the political activity of the organizations and groupings of defenders of the environment was confined mainly to handing in petitions to government authorities and members of parliament. Subsequently, persuaded as to the low success rate of these actions, the ecologists switched to the nomination of parliamentary candidates from their own ranks. This prompted them to form broad election coalitions. The unification of disconnected organizations in uniform coalitions and the very logic of the political struggle in which the ecologists had found themselves involved led to the emergence in a number of Western countries of "Green" parties.

There are currently such parties in Britain, the FRG, France, Japan, Spain, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden and certain other countries. As a rule, their numbers are small, but at elections to local and central organs of power they are managing to gather a considerable number of votes--mainly from the electorate of the other, "traditional" parties. Thus, for example, the FRG's Greens number approximately 40,000, however, at the special Bundestag elections in 1983 the party managed to obtain 5.6 percent of the country's total vote (2.2 million votes) and send 27 deputies to the highest legislative body. At the start of the 1980's the Greens managed to have their members elected to parliament in Denmark, Holland and Luxembourg also. At the last

presidential election in France the ecologists' candidate collected approximately 4 percent of the vote (more than 1 million). Where the Greens either did not wish or were unable to gain the status of "national parties" (in Australia, Italy and the United States, for example) they are concentrating their efforts on activity in local authorities, promoting to parliament their representatives per the lists of other (of the left, more often than not) parties and employing nonparliamentary methods of struggle.

The elections to the European Parliament (the EC Assembly) in the summer of 1984 were marked by the success of the Green parties participating therein, which for the first time in their history won 11 seats. This made it possible to pose the question of the formation in the European Parliament of a Green faction. The bulk of the seats--7 of the 11--accrued to the lot of the FRG Green Party, the rest, to that of the ecologists of Belgium and Holland (2).

The high dynamism of the changes in the ecology movement and its emergence onto the scene of party-political struggle with specific laws and "rules of the game"--all this presupposes the need for a swift "change of signs," increasing the demarcation of forces, bringing new persons to the leadership of the movement and giving rise to a certain reassessment of ideas, views and methods of struggle. The majority of national detachments of the ecology movement in the West has undergone big shakeups in this period, a kind of "grand crisis" and acute clashes between representatives of various currents.

The formation of Green parties increased ideological-political differentiation and organizational division in the ecology movement (3), although it had not been united previously either. Some organizations failed to withstand the test of time, particularly those in which conservative forces had predominated. Some disintegrated and disappeared from public life without trace. Others distanced themselves from the ecology parties in order to continue their autonomous existence, devoting themselves wholly to nonpolitical methods of activity.

Analyzing the complex and at times painful processes in the ecology movement, bourgeois political science draws conclusions concerning some "crisis" of this form of mass social protest. The defenders of the monopolies remain silent here about the fact that the serious confrontation between different trends in the ecology movement is being artificially stoked from above by the ruling circles, which are making constant attacks on its radical-progressive forces, at the same time showing favor to its rightwing elements.

It is not the ecology movement as a form of social protest which is suffering damage currently but the varieties of ideology and tactics which were suggested to it by conservative and leftist groupings. The latter are introducing anarchist sentiments to the movement, advancing "return to nature" slogans and calling for neo-Luddite actions to do away with the benefits of modern civilization. The conservative groupings are directing it predominantly toward enlightenment activity to "reeducate" people, changing nothing in the system when it comes to the point. Both are consciously leading the ecologists away from the solution of acute social problems of the present day and serious political struggle.

The increasing politicization of the ecologists' programs has led to a certain narrowing of the spectrum of the ideological-political currents represented in the Green parties, but has not done away with their ideological variegation. Nonetheless, there has been an obvious shift somewhat to the left of the predominant philosophy in the movement, although it does not as a whole go further than the position of nonproletarian radicalism. The very logic of the development of ecological problems in Western countries would objectively, it might have seemed, have placed people advocating an improvement in the environment in a position of confrontation with capitalism. However, in practice this dependence is embodied very inconsistently and contradictorily. And the reasons are to be found not only in the sphere of the class composition of the movement but in the singularities of its ideological roots and also in the complex problems of the tactics of political struggle currently confronting the Green parties.

Political Platform of the Green Parties

The first successes of the Greens came as the obvious result of their reliance on the radical-democratic strata of bourgeois society aware that it was impossible to remain outside of politics and be dispassionate in respect of the struggle between progressive and reactionary forces which is being conducted today both in their countries and throughout the world on acute problems of the present day, ecological included. But it was they who set the leadership of the ecologists' parties many "difficult" questions in pursuit of the tactical line.

Forced under the new conditions to operate with regard for the regularities of international relations and in an atmosphere wherein all traditional parties are paying special attention to the "ecologization" of their programs, what is more, the leadership of the Greens has found itself confronted with problems of establishing its place on the political scene, broadening its electorate and increasing the strength of the parties themselves. All this is prompting the Greens to preserve for as long as possible the vagueness of their program ideological-political tenets pertaining to fundamental issues, emphasizing attention to ecological subject matter, and thereby have an opportunity to appeal to the broadest strata of the population.

Preserving such positions for a long time is not easy, and the Greens have been forced to broaden their program demands and goals gradually and express themselves increasingly often on this urgent question of domestic and foreign policy or the other, avoiding, it is true, as far as possible, fundamental philosophical problems. However, in attempting to define their attitude toward individual questions without an in-depth and serious elucidation of general, theoretical sociopolitical problems the Greens are inevitably arriving at an empirical system of views, in which inner logic is weak and protest and criticism predominate, but in which uncertainty in respect of key points--the specific content of the social alternative to the capitalist system and the social driving forces of the proposed transformations--remains (4).

The lack of their own fundamental theoretical process stock is forcing the Greens to resort to the extensive borrowing of views and ideas from various traditional ideological systems and currents of social thought. The connection

with the views of thinkers of the past (J.-J. Rousseau, P. Proudhon) and political scientists of most recent times fashionable in the West--the "new left" ideologists (H. Marcuse), representatives of "critical theory" of the Frankfurt School (J. Habermas), and comrades in arms of the "counterculture" (T. Horschach), "limits to growth" (Club of Rome), "eco-development" (I. Saks) and so forth--can easily be discerned in the Greens' program propositions.

A certain influence of Marxism on the formation of certain of the Greens' principles is not in doubt, although it is not discerned in their concept of social development, it is true.

However paradoxical, the scientific-theoretical interpretation precisely of the ecology problem in its contemporary content is weak among defenders of the environment. The reason for this once again lies in the weakness of their philosophical positions. They more readily accept as explanations of the contemporary ecological phenomenon superficial formulas which are thrown to them by bourgeois social science pursuing its narrow class ideological goals than the Marxist proposition concerning the dependence of the attitude toward nature on the nature of social relations.

Of course, the Greens cannot be denied sincerity in their attempts to find answers to acute problems troubling the bulk of the population of capitalist countries. In fact, the ecological sections of the Greens' political programs touch on a broad range of problems of an improvement of legislation pertaining to protection of the environment, use of nontraditional and renewable energy sources, methods of agricultural production (the proliferation of biological agents for combating plant disease, for example), protection of natural scenery, prevention of various forms of pollution of the natural environment, struggle for a reduction in background noise in the cities and at enterprises, more extensive use of secondary resources, preservation of nature "in the wild" and individual facilities thereof and so forth.

However, the most vulnerable aspect of the concept of the bulk of the defenders of the environment in the West is their interpretation of the reasons for the ecology crisis and their views on the means and methods of overcoming it. More often than not the Greens attribute among the main reasons for the ecological disorders economic growth, S&T progress, the extravagant lifestyle born of "industrial civilization" and large-scale industrial development. From this comes their fanatical devotion to the ideas of "anti-growth," extreme technophobia and negative attitude toward the potential of the contemporary S&T revolution for fundamentally transforming the technical-production machinery on an ecologically expedient basis.

The main flaw, however, of the "ecologism philosophy" confessed and persistently preached by Western activists is that its central point is an endeavor to impart to the imperatives and tasks of environmental protection the role of principal determinants of social being and social change and even the proposed world system model (5). This explains the distinctiveness from the viewpoint of classical political thinking--whether proletarian or bourgeois--of the social sections of the programs of the Green parties and movements.

The Greens clearly distinguish the characteristics of the profound crisis which has struck modern bourgeois society and the disparity between the "human dimension" and the lifestyle which it has implanted. However, the serious nature of the criticism of present-day capitalism is not supplemented by the advancement of any social alternatives which are uniform and precise in any way. As the American press has observed, "it is sometimes easier to grasp that to which the Greens are opposed than to make out what they support" (6).

The nature of the social system which corresponds to the ideals of the Greens approximates in principle the petty bourgeois "third way" concept, but does not fit therein entirely. Opposed to "modern industrial civilization," the bulk of the West's ecologists rejects both the capitalist and the socialist development paths. A certain proportion thereof prefers an idealized model of "good," humane, highly moral "post-materialist" capitalism, that is, capitalism without monopolies and large-scale enterprises. There is a current oriented toward a profound restructuring of society, which should lead to socialism--in the form of "eco-socialism," it is true, that is, as defined by the well-known FRG Greens' activist P. Kelly, "an ecological self-governing emancipated socialism" (7).

Generally, an evaluation of the Greens' social alternative is extremely complicated owing to the fact that they display the utmost "restraint" in the formulation and interpretation of a central problem--ownership of the means of production. It is known only that they urge the comminution of large production units, decentralization of the property of monopoly groups and the creation of small enterprises based on the principles of cooperative ownership and democratic self-management.

In the Greens' ideas the national economy should be built on the bases of an "ecological economy," which presupposes an abandonment of "growth," determination of the scale of production and technical progress by "ecological expediency," the universal spread of "alternative production cooperatives" as the base production units and decentralized management of the economy.

Considerable attention in the Greens' social programs is paid to the elaboration of an alternative model of labor and practical ways of its realization. The Greens reject the wage labor of capitalist production and the entire system of relationships therein and largely approximate in this the Marxist position. However, being in the grip of ecological determinism, they emasculate the "exploitation" concept of political economy content. Campaigning for "expedient production labor," the Greens see some utopian production in which on the one hand labor is of a handicrafts nature and, on the other, is free of any physical and psychological stresses and in which complete freedom of labor and freedom from compulsion reign. The latter is understood here not as the exploitation of labor by capital but as any subordination to production, technological and labor discipline (8). On the basis of such labor and also limitation of the scale of production in general the Greens believe it possible to reduce to a minimum the amount of labor in production, increase free time for man's social and creative activity and achieve equality of income, but at a higher level of satisfaction of his requirements.

This model of labor of the Greens is justifiably criticized on the part of the labor unions. "A free choice between less work time and less pay and free time," West German union leader J. Schnabedoth observes, "may be offered a prosperous employer or high-income scientist. For the vast majority of dependent workmen, on the other hand, this free choice, in view of the need to secure means of subsistence, is unacceptable" (9).

The Greens' views on the problem of society's political system are vague and utopian. The point of departure for these views is the self-governing community as the base type of social organization--given full decentralization of power. Federalist concepts also predominate among the Greens in their ideas concerning the system of the international community of peoples also. In the actual practice of the Green parties the reformation of the existing political structures of state-monopoly capitalism which they propose is based primarily on a demand for "direct democracy," which presupposes the extensive enlistment of the population in state administration, the representation of "citizens' associations" in various echelons of power, the adoption of important decisions based on "civic initiatives" and holding of referenda thereon, a halt to the practice of the limitation of civil rights and democratic liberties and a number of other measures pertaining to the democratization of political life. The platform of the majority of the Green parties also provides for "citizens' control" of the activity of the major capitalist enterprises.

The Green parties which have acquired "national" status and parliamentary representation are shifting the emphasis increasingly to political activity in the highest legislative bodies. Thus, for example, in a short time the Green faction in the FRG Bundestag has shown itself to be an active opposition force at the time of discussion not only of environmental problems but also of many questions of domestic and foreign policy. According to the calculations of DER SPIEGEL, one out of every three Green members participating in the work of Bundestag commissions has submitted a bill, one out of every two, a parliamentary inquiry; furthermore, each has made 4 "minor" inquiries and put no less than 17 written or verbal questions (10).

The successes which the Greens have scored, operating inside and outside of parliaments, have to be noted. Thus work on rescuing a number of lakes, rivers and natural and cultural monuments has begun, certain enterprises causing the environment irreparable harm have been shut down and so forth at their initiative. Their influence on the shaping of public opinion on questions of environmental protection has increased. The Greens are increasingly forcing bourgeois politicians with a hostile attitude toward nature-conservation measures to take stock of their opinion.

However, the burden of procedural mistakes in the comprehension of the essence and content of contemporary problems, blind obedience to the "hands off nature" and "nature knows best" slogans, the counterposing always and in everything of the ecological imperative to the tasks of development of the economy--all this is frequently reducing the persuasiveness of the Greens' arguments and depriving their parliamentary and extra-parliamentary initiatives of mobilizing effect. Thus, for example, instead of raising in the Bundestag the question of undeviating compliance with all ecological demands

in the construction of the Rhine--Main--Danube Canal transport artery, which could have played a positive part in the development of all-European economic cooperation, the FRG's Greens demanded an immediate halt to construction operations.

With their appearance on the scene of political struggle the Greens indicated their attitude toward other parties, which is expressed by the "political nonalignment" formula. A leader of the French Political Ecology Movement (11) defines this position as "absolute independence of all political or trade union schools and currents integrated in the contemporary power system, whether on the side of the majority or the side of the opposition" (12). But even the very brief experience of the last 5 years shows that the attempts to keep the mass consciousness of the Greens' supporters within the narrow framework of the philosophy of pure ecologism and ideological and political nonalignment is increasingly exhibiting serious irregularities.

Ecologists in the Peace Movement

The most striking evidence of a change in the political consciousness of ecologists in the West in a positive direction is their emphatic turn toward the peace movement. Although it deprived the Greens of a proportion of the conservative electorate, association with the front of antiwar actions secured for them, on the other hand, additional and broader support on the part of the workers, peasants, democratic professionals, women and the youth. It produced a significant success at the 1984 elections to the Europarlament and contributed to a broadening of the community of positions with other democratic movements--both political and social.

The Greens' platform on antiwar problems contains demands for a general and complete ban on nuclear and other types of weapons of mass annihilation, prevention of an arms race in space and a reduction in military spending. The Greens emphatically oppose the deployment of American nuclear missiles in Europe and are participating in the public campaign for the creation of nuclear-free zones. The Greens' association with the struggle for peace and disarmament has undoubtedly contributed to a broadening of the front of the peace movement, particularly in West Europe. Operating hand in hand with other organizations in "peace marches," the establishment of "peace camps" and other protests, representatives of the Greens are demonstrating steadfastness in the struggle to prevent a nuclear catastrophe and intrepidity in the face of the growing repressive actions against the peace supporters on the part of the West's ruling circles.

At the same time the ecology parties are not always unanimous in their evaluation of the socioeconomic sources of the arms race and determination of the true culprits of the growing danger of thermonuclear war. Nor can we close our eyes to the fact that the activity of a certain proportion of Green pacifists is creating certain difficulties in the world antiwar movement. Participating in international conferences of peace supporters with a wide spectrum of different currents, the representatives of these groups sometimes present propositions knowingly or involuntarily borrowed from the ideological baggage of bourgeois propaganda (that the true nature, for example, of any

national peace supporters' movement is determined by its opposition to its country's government), by which they introduce a spirit of confrontation to the work of these forums and impede constructive discussion of the questions thereat.

FOOTNOTES

2. EUROPE ENVIRONMENT No 213, 1984, p 9.
3. The Green parties unite, as a rule, the lesser proportion of active participants in the ecology movement in their countries.
4. For more detail in respect of the program principles of the Greens see, in particular, "Die Gruenen: Das Bundesprogramm," Bonn, 1980, pp 22-27; DER SPIEGEL, 7 December 1981, pp 21-23 and 28 June 1982, p 58; J.P. McDonald, "Environmental Concern and the Political Process in France" (THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROFESSIONAL, vol 4, 1982, pp 15-21); LE MONDE, 28 April 1981; "The Ecology Movement in West Europe" (MEMO No 6, 1985).
5. See D. Simmonet, "L'ecologisme," Paris, 1979.
6. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 11 October 1982, pp 26-27.
7. DER SPIEGEL, 14 June 1982, p 56.
8. See J. Huber, "Wer soll das alles aendern? Alternativen der Alternativbewegung," Bonn, 1981, pp 54-65.
9. J. Schabedoth, "Wirtschaftspolitik der Gruenen zwischen Utopie und Realitaetsbezug" (NEUE GESELLSCHAFT No 1, 1983, pp 38-39).
10. See DER SPIEGEL, 2 April 1984.
11. Currently this movement under the name Greens--Ecology Party is part, as an autonomous organization, of the political structure of the Green Party in France.
12. Ph. Lebreton, "Les 'apres primaires' de l'ecologisme" (COMBAT NATURE, August-September 1980, p 7).

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".

"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987.

8850

CSO: 1816/6

BLOC SYMPOSIUM ON RATIONAL USE OF SOCIALIST MANPOWER

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 13 Jan 87) pp 118-120

[Ye. Tromlakova report: "Problems of the Rational Use of Manpower"]

[Text] The international scientific symposium "Problems of the Rational Use of Manpower Under the Conditions of the Intensification of the Socialist Economy" was held recently in Moscow. Its organizers were the USSR Scientific Economic Society, the AUCCTU Trade Union Movement Higher School imeni N.M. Shvernik and the USSR Academy of Sciences Economics of the World Socialist System Institute. Scientists from Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, the USSR and the CSSR took part in the symposium.

Opening the symposium, Prof N. Gritsenko, doctor of economic sciences, emphasized the topicality of the subject matter and the need for an extended study thereof in the light of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress.

T. Khachaturov (USSR), member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, observed in his opening remarks that the role of enhanced efficiency in the use of manpower at the current stage of the intensification of the economy is growing constantly. And it is essential in this connection to study the results of theoretical research and accumulated practical experience in the fraternal countries.

The general directions of the work being performed in the CEMA countries on perfecting the use of labor resources were illustrated in the main paper read by Prof K. Mikulskiy, doctor of economic sciences and director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Economics of the World Socialist System Institute. Improvement presupposes the better combination of the demands for the full and rational employment of the population; optimization of the distribution of the population in respect of all spheres of socially useful labor (including education in the home of the younger generation); balance between manpower and jobs under conditions of elimination of obsolete jobs and a rise in the technical level of existing, and the creation on the necessary scale of new jobs corresponding to modern requirements; better use of the means of production on the basis of cost-accounting principles; development of new forms to include the working people in social production (financially autonomous teams, the family contract and others); provision for the workman's systematic adaptation to the changing demands of the economy given a

simultaneous growth of social demands on production (the conditions and content of labor, professional growth prospects and the possibilities of increased earnings based on an increase in the labor contribution); renewal of the content of the social assurances offered by society; and others.

In the speaker's opinion, the solution of these problems presupposes a growth in the responsibility of management authorities for the creation of the appropriate social, organizational and material conditions and an enhancement of the direct role of the working people's masses themselves based on their increased interest and responsibility and also by way of enrichment of the possibilities of social creativity in the sphere of production (new forms of the organization and remuneration of labor, participation in production management and so forth).

The USSR's experience in the sphere of the creation of socioeconomic conditions providing for the more rational use of manpower was discussed in his paper by Prof Ye. Antosenkov, doctor of economic sciences and director of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems Scientific Research Institute. He dwelt on the problems of the organization of social labor and the areas of its improvement and also questions of the stimulation of labor and economies in and distribution of manpower in the intensification process.

Candidate of Economic Sciences L. Osvath (Hungary), Doctor of Economic Sciences J. Kovacs (Hungary), Prof E. Sachse (GDR), Doctor of Historical Sciences L. Gordon (USSR), Doctor of Philosophical Sciences V. Rogovin (USSR) and Doctor of Economic Sciences Yu. Kokin (USSR) devoted their speeches to problems of perfecting the forms and methods of remuneration under the conditions of intensification of the socialist economy. The speakers observed that the measures being implemented in the fraternal countries in the sphere of wages are subordinated to the task of increasing their stimulating function and more fully considering the quantity and quality of labor and the direct linkage of pay to the end results of enterprises' economic activity. Changes in the sources of the formation of the wage and a change in the methods of computing it and also optimization of the proportions between the basic and variable parts of the wage serve as the levers of this linkage.

The basis of an increase in pay should be the resources earned by the enterprise itself. Use of the normative method of formation of the wage fund will contribute to this. In order that it perform a stimulating function, the increasing preferential growth compared therewith of labor productivity is essential.

As distinct from the past, when the main task of the stimulation of labor was performed by the variable part of the wage (bonuses and a variety of extra payments), there is now increased significance in the basic part. Its dependence on the skills level and degree of responsibility of each workman and the contribution of a given occupational group to an acceleration of S&T progress increases. At the same time the significance of the variable part of the wage, which should prevent an unwarranted long-term differentiation in pay, is preserved also. The correlation between the basic and variable parts should be flexible and depend on the forms of pay (hourly or piece-rate).

Differences in the labor contribution and, to a lesser extent, the shortage of manpower in this sphere of production or the other are becoming the basis of pay differentiation.

The role of a stimulation of labor by labor, that is, its improved conditions and increased attractiveness, is increasing. This ensues directly from from the conversion of the need for labor into a principal requirement for the individual. Such a path as compensation for the severity of labor by a growth of the pay for it will in the future lose its significance increasingly.

As the speakers emphasized, scientifically substantiated control of the differentiation in pay arising as a result of the differences in labor contribution and a search for the optimum variants of this differentiation depending on its end results are practiced in the fraternal countries. The increased differentiation is closely dependent on the restructuring of the system of material stimulation, consistent introduction of the principles of cost-accounting, increased independence, a broadening of the rights and a growth of the responsibility of the enterprises and their transition to self-financing and self-supporting production (samookupayemost).

The degree of a country's economic development and the living standard that has been achieved are taken into consideration upon determination of the minimum and maximum in remuneration. Increased differentiation must not lead to a lowering of the existing minimum of remuneration--it is the increases in the wage which should be differentiated. Measures pertaining to an increase in differentiation between various occupational groups (managerial personnel, engineering-technical personnel, workers) are being accompanied by a rapprochement of the remuneration levels by sector and sphere of the national economy.

The structural reorganization of production being undertaken in the socialist countries presupposes fundamental changes in the structure of manpower also and its redistribution between sectors and spheres in favor of those which are characterized by high labor productivity. Operating in this same direction is S&T progress, which releases workers from some spheres and sectors and creates a need for manpower in others. These problems were touched on in their speeches by Candidate of Economic Sciences H. (Klyar) (GDR), Candidate of Economic Sciences W. Dams (GDR), Doctor of Economic Sciences A. Rajkiewicz (Poland), Doctor of Economic Sciences V. Kostakov (USSR), Doctor of Economic Sciences L. Degtyar (USSR), Doctor of Economic Sciences (A. Silin) (USSR), Doctor of Economic Sciences E. Batizi (USSR), Candidate of Economic Sciences Ye. Vorobyev (USSR) and Candidate of Economic Sciences I. Trokan (CSSR).

Under the conditions of a slowing increase in labor resources the need for them is being satisfied mainly not thanks to the enlistment in production of new workmen but by way of a redistribution of manpower released in the process of the modernization, reconstruction and the retooling of enterprises and the elimination of obsolete jobs. The experience of the fraternal countries testifies to the predominantly gradual nature of the redistribution of the released manpower. At the first stage it is used within an enterprise for the

purpose of an increase in the shift-work coefficient, at subsequent stages, is redistributed between enterprises within sectors and between sectors on a given territory, and subsequently, between territories.

This sequence of stages is not obligatory, however. In particular, the territorial redistribution of manpower between areas experiencing a surplus and areas experiencing an acute shortage of labor resources is urgent for the Soviet Union.

The efficient redistribution of manpower presupposes creation of the appropriate economic mechanism. The experience of the socialist countries testifies to the need for a combination of economic levers--the establishment of direct dependence between the results of labor and its remuneration and the transition of enterprises to self-financing and self-supporting production (samookupayemost) with an improvement in the planning mechanism of the release and redistribution of manpower.

Thus the GDR's integrated works receive plan quotas pertaining to economies in manpower. In industry, construction and transport, as the participants in the symposium observed, they have been set the task of releasing 3 percent of the numbers of workmen, although it has not yet been accomplished in full. Ministries, integrated works, enterprises and local authorities of the GDR are elaborating concepts pertaining to labor resources for a 5-year period, which will serve as the basis for the 5-year and annual plans. At the same time the experience of Poland, for example, testifies that the use of administrative levers not underpinned by economic stimuli has the reverse result, as a rule, and the enterprises endeavor to create a manpower reserve.

Functions pertaining to the release and redistribution of the released manpower should be shared between enterprises and the state authorities. Responsibility for efficient employment should be borne by the enterprises, and for full employment, by the state. The functions of the state amount to centralized provision for the retraining and placement of the released manpower. Proceeding from such a distribution of functions, in a number of European socialist countries the central state authorities are creating social funds and employment offices and allocating subsidies for the retraining of worker personnel and the organization of new jobs.

The experience of the release and redistribution of labor resources in the European CEMA countries testifies that a number of important steps has been taken in the direction of optimizing the manpower structure, increasing efficiency of its use and reducing turnover.

At the same time it is essential to bring labor legislation into line with present-day principles of employment regulation. The new trends in the sphere of redistribution of manpower bring about the need for a specification of the concept of the right to labor, which does not mean work in a certain job chosen once for all but presupposes the right of the enterprise and the central authorities to transfer a workman from one place to another in the interests of social production. Thus realization of the right to labor should be accompanied by realization of the principle not only of full but also efficient employment.

A most important condition of the rational use of manpower is an improvement in its qualitative characteristics, a rise in its occupational-skills and educational level and perfection of its structure. This was discussed by Candidate of Economic Sciences I. Beleva (Bulgaria), T. Ryabushkin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences (USSR), R. Khasanova (USSR) and N. Zakharova (USSR).

Bringing the sectoral structure of manpower into line with the demands of intensification presupposes primarily its redistribution among subsectors and also between the material and nonmaterial spheres of the national economy. Changes in the occupational structure are essential--an increase in the proportion of production workers at the expense of those employed in auxiliary operations and also a reduction in the proportion of managerial personnel. An increase in the mobility of the work force requires the assimilation of new specialties and the combination of occupations.

The participants in the symposium emphasized the advantages of collective forms of the working people's inclusion in social production. They permit an intensification in the dependence of the amount of compensation on the end results of work, the elevation of its productivity and an enhancement of the workmen's qualifications and an improvement in discipline.

In the course of the work the participants in the symposium discussed possible measures to ensure a comprehensive approach to a rationalization of the use of manpower under the conditions of production intensification and collated the accumulated experience of the organization and stimulation of social labor and the improvement of the qualitative and structural characteristics of manpower.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".

"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987.

8850

CSO: 1816/6

REVIEW OF 25-YEAR WORK OF BLOC CSCE COMMISSION

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 13 Jan 87) pp 121-127

[Article by V. Razmerov: "Constancy in Research: On the 25th Anniversary of the Commission for Problems of Security and Cooperation in Europe"]

[Text] February will be the 25th anniversary of the formation of the Permanent Commission of Socialist Countries' Research Establishments for Problems of European Security and Cooperation. It was created at a meeting in Prague in February 1962, which had been preceded by a representative scientific conference which had been held there in 1961. The well-known European international affairs experts of the socialist countries assembled there adopted the decision to set up a permanent commission, within whose framework they could develop and coordinate their research pertaining to international-political problems of Europe.

The commission has been performing its tasks successfully for 25 years now. At the sources of it were such major scholars and public figures as A.A. Arzumanyan and N.N. Inozemtsev (USSR). O. Dluski and A. Kruckowski (Poland), W. Bartel (GDR), V. (Soyak) (CSSR) and others. The scientific-practical significance of the commission's work has always been valued highly in the participating countries. Numerous works prepared on a group basis have been prepared in the years of its activity.

Scientific establishments of six socialist countries are participating in the activity of the permanent commission currently: the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences International Relations and Socialist Integration Institute; the Hungarian Foreign Ministry International Relations Institute; the GDR Foreign Ministry International Relations Institute and GDR State Council International Politics and Economics Institute; the Polish Foreign Ministry International Issues Institute; the USSR Academy of Sciences World Economy and International Relations Institute (IMEMO); and the CSSR Foreign Ministry International Relations Institute.

The Soviet section of the permanent commission operates on the basis of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO. Leading associates of the International Relations Department and other subdivisions of the institute participate in it actively. Representatives of the USSR Academy of Sciences History Institute,

Recent and Contemporary History Institute and Institute of State and Law, the USSR Foreign Ministry Moscow State International Relations Institute and other scientific establishments and also of the journals MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN and MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA have participated in a number of the measures implemented by the permanent commission.

The main form of activity of the permanent commission in recent years has been annual meetings, which have discussed topical problems of European security and cooperation, summed up coordination of the national sections' research, evaluated the results of joint studies, discussed publications and drawn up plans for further scientific cooperation. The main place at the meetings of the commission, which are convened once a year in each of the participating countries in turn, is occupied by scientific debate per a script drawn up in advance.

At the completion of the commission session a group of experts or the national section of the country in which the work has been done draws up final summary documents of, as a rule, a forecast nature, on the basis of the material that has been presented and the results of the discussion. The national sections are accorded the right to use these in research work and propaganda activity at their discretion.

In the period 1981-1985 the permanent commission successfully continued its work on a comprehensive study of the problems characterizing the state and prospects of European security and cooperation. Debate was conducted on the following topics: "The Situation in Europe in the First Half of the 1980's and the Prospects for East-West Relations" (October 1981, Prague); "Possible Consequences of the Deployment of the New American Medium-Range Missiles in West Europe" (October 1982, Sofia); "West Europe and the Prospects of the All-European Process" (October 1983, Leipzig); "Danger of the Trends of Militarism and Revanchism in the Political Circles of a Number of Western Countries" (September 1984, Prague); "New Conditions, Tasks and Possibilities of the Struggle for European Security and Arms Limitation" (December 1985, Budapest).

As a result of meetings which had been held earlier, joint documents on the problems discussed in the course of the debate and situational analyses were prepared. In addition, a large part of the material of the 1984 Prague symposium was translated and published in the CSSR. It had been scientifically prepared mainly in the IMEMO in close coordination with other member institutions of the permanent commission.

In the period 1981-1985 scientific-political journals of the countries participating in the commission published approximately 30 articles and papers on problems of European security and cooperation written on the basis of the material of the commission. Many studies written on a bilateral basis are also closely linked with the activity of the permanent commission. In this time material was prepared by the joint efforts of all sections containing scientific recommendations and forecasts pertaining to the most pertinent and important problems of European security and cooperation.

An interesting and meaningful discussion developed at the last regular meeting of the permanent commission, which was held 29-30 October 1986 in Warsaw. The

subject discussed was "Development of the Process of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Position of the West European States and the Impact of Extra-European Factors". Naturally, the participants' attention was attracted to a considerable extent to the results of the meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in Reykjavik. The close connection of European and global problems was confirmed anew.

The material of the Bulgarian section and the propositions of the Polish International Issues Institute pointed to certain prerequisites of the further development of the cooperation and security process. The accumulated experience of East-West relations leaves no doubt that this set of problems is primarily of a political nature. The search for a new system of security demands primarily political and not military-technical solutions. The rapid development of equipment and technology in the military sphere not bound by any political accords could have unprecedented consequences for all states, including those which are developing this equipment and technology. The American "strategic defense initiative" (SDI), the participants in the discussion pointed out, is even now exerting a highly negative influence on the formulation of strategic doctrines.

The participants in the discussion emphasized repeatedly the need for consideration of a number of new elements and processes in Europe and the world as a whole capable of influencing the development of East-West relations. The Polish section, in particular, believes that such phenomena and trends are modifying the polar alignment of forces on the international scene and leading to a relative diminution in the role of the great powers and the appearance of new power centers on a regional scale. In Europe the United States, while preserving its military-strategic positions, is at the same time limited in its influence on the development of the situation. This is primarily the result of the political stimulation of the European states.

The ideas concerning the distinctiveness of Europe as a region with its own specific features and interests have acquired new impetus. The activity of the small and medium-sized European states aimed at an easing of the consequences of tension here is becoming an essential element of security and cooperation.

Just as much importance is attached to the reconsideration of security concepts. Social and economic progress, the technological revolution, restructuring processes in the socialist countries' national economy--all these factors and, primarily, the danger born of the arms race demand the formulation of a new security concept. Contributing to the stabilization of the situation on the continent, it is intended duly to take into consideration the interests of all states.

There have been certain changes in recent years in how the countries of East and West Europe evaluate one another. The emphasis is being put increasingly manifestly on the categories of general interest in the development of relations and cooperation mechanisms of states of the two systems. The West is not always consistent here, however. The biggest disagreements are arising along the West Europe--United States line. The countries which are a part of the European community are stepping up attempts to find their own political character.

The idea was expressed in the discussion that it is time for specialists of the socialist countries to discuss and analyze constructively certain new concepts and projects concerning the military situation on the continent which have been drawn up by Western experts and political scientists. The ideas engendered among West German social democrats, in particular, merit attention. The import of this amounts to gradual changes in the defense structures of East and West in the direction of the creation of "structurally nonaggressive potential" (von Buelow).

Serious attention was paid to the factors determining the situation in Europe. A most important positive element of the process begun in Helsinki is recognition of the political realities which exist on the continent (borders, differences in social systems) as the point of departure for the formation of East-West relations and the exclusion of war as a means of solving disputes.

Despite the nuances in interpretation of the Final Act, all European states are interested in compliance with the basic principles adopted in the Finnish capital. The United States is setting itself entirely different goals. It is pursuing a policy aimed at using the Helsinki process to destabilize the internal situation in the socialist countries and impose on them its models of social arrangement.

The artificial ideologization by certain Western figures of interstate relations and a desire to put the socialist countries on the defensive has also become a negative aspect in East-West relations.

The influence of military aspects of East-West relations is growing also. They are frequently taken as the basis for political evaluations and actions, which ultimately leads to the "disciplining" of the United States' NATO allies. Positive elements appeared here recently, however, which were the result of the Soviet Union's new political offensive. This applies particularly to the prospects of arms reduction in Europe.

Stagnation is observed in the sphere of East-West economic cooperation. This is partly the result of the deliberate economic policy of the NATO states aimed at weakening the socialist countries. There are other factors also. For example, West Europe is paying increasingly great attention to the technology race in the contest with the United States and Japan. Also having a negative effect on the state of East-West economic relations is the fact that the United States regards them as an instrument of rivalry in the military and political spheres.

As observed in Warsaw, the future of detente in Europe is connected with the strengthening conviction of the need to look for joint solutions in questions of security, the capacity for overcoming the impasse in the sphere of military detente and development of the process begun in Helsinki and also with the readiness of all participants in international intercourse in Europe to become a part of it.

The European states, to judge by everything, are interested in the preservation and development of the all-European process, despite the

difficulties and problems which exist here. The socialist countries see it as a factor of further political stabilization and also the surmounting of artificial barriers.

West Europe regards this process as a sphere affording an opportunity for determining its own political character and also demonstrating to a certain extent its independence in respect of the United States and controlling and softening the extremes of the American approach.

The United States is interested in the all-European process least inasmuch as it considers it primarily a forum in which it is possible to engage in so-called public diplomacy aimed at discrediting the Soviet Union and separating the socialist states.

For the neutral and nonaligned countries the Helsinki process is an important sphere of their active participation, in which they can play an appreciable part on the international scene. As far as the small and medium-sized states are concerned, a tendency to approach this process as a platform from which it will be possible to defend European interests is appearing increasingly obviously here.

The agreement in Stockholm shows that the West European NATO states and also the neutral and nonaligned countries support the development of relations in the sphere of military aspects of cooperation also for this corresponds to their vital interests. This is a new feature in East-West relations on the continent.

The United States is endeavoring to find a kind of equivalent to possible progress in the military sphere--it would like to achieve in exchange for this a "concession" on the part of the USSR and the other socialist countries in the sphere of human rights and humanitarian problems understood in highly distinctive manner by Washington. The question was raised in the course of the discussion: do possibilities exist--and within what limits--for rapid progress in the sphere of political and military confidence-building means and security and also for transition to the second phase of the Stockholm conference, which is to discuss the question of a reduction in arms in Europe in accordance with the proposals of the Warsaw Pact countries submitted in June 1986, without specific agreements pertaining to the set of problems of the other "baskets". Considering the constructive nature of the socialist countries' initiative, it may be assumed that the West European NATO participants will increase pressure on the United States for progress to be made on this question.

In the economic sphere there are insufficient possibilities as yet of an appreciable improvement in cooperation along East-West lines. Differences in qualitative and technological levels are to a growing extent becoming an impediment in the way of its development. We may expect here, however, a stimulation of joint efforts and also S&T cooperation with the West in environmental conservation.

The program of nuclear disarmament prior to the year 2000 drawn up by the USSR, the proposals pertaining to a reduction in conventional arms in Europe, the compromise in Stockholm--all this is creating the prerequisites for a

comprehensive approach to the problem of security on the continent. In light of the results of the meeting in Reykjavik particular relevance is attached to the question of what specific steps the socialist countries may take within the framework of the all-European process, particularly in the realm of a reduction in arms in Europe.

The Vienna meeting creates the corresponding conditions not only for an exchange of experience and evaluation of the past (to which, incidentally, the United States and certain other NATO members would like to reduce its role) but also for new steps to be taken pertaining to confidence-building and security in Europe. When evaluating the decisions adopted in Stockholm, the following important element needs to be emphasized: they make it possible to counteract effectively and gradually remove from the consciousness of the politicians and public of West Europe the deep-rooted myth of the "threat from the East," which has been used for decades as the main instrument "disciplining" West European states within the NATO framework. A qualitatively new situation is arising in connection with the possibility of the far-reaching compromises about which M.S. Gorbachev spoke in Reykjavik.

The problems of a reduction in armed forces and armaments in Europe--together with further steps in the business of the creation of an atmosphere of confidence and security--should be the subject of study in the next phase of the Stockholm conference. The priority task in the present situation is the adoption of the set of proposals advanced by the Warsaw Pact countries in Budapest. Procedural issues should not be an obstacle to all-European debate on these proposals. The USSR's approach to disarmament problems, which was confirmed in Reykjavik, affords new prospects for beginning an appreciable reduction in arms--both nuclear and conventional--in Europe. The main obstacle is the American position on the question of the practically unlimited development of the "strategic defense initiative".

A big place in the debate was occupied by discussion of the West European states' positions on security and cooperation in Europe. The speakers from the GDR section, in particular, noted that the process of rethinking previous political standpoints is intensifying, a quest for new concepts is under way and confrontation over the fundamental direction of East-West relations is increasing in Europe under the impact of objective factors, particularly the changes in the military-strategic situation and thanks to the initiative of the Warsaw Pact states.

The paper presented by the GDR section pointed out that a general trend may be discerned in West Europe: albeit to a varying extent, influential political and military circles nonetheless recognize more keenly than previously the need to limit disagreements with the socialist states--lest the East-West confrontation develop into war--and to establish relations of cooperation with them in the solution of European problems.

Considerable significance is attached to the notion of objective interests and their reflection in the strategic way of thinking of the leading figures of West European states. What is prompting them to demonstrate more strongly

than U.S. leaders an interest in an easing of military and political tension and the establishment of greater security, mutual trust and cooperation? The following were pointed out as being among these factors.

The increased vulnerability of West Europe in the event not only of nuclear but also conventional war is compelling a reinterpretation of the problems of war, peace and security on the continent. There is increasing understanding that in the nuclear-space age war cannot be for West Europe a means of solving the East-West conflict and that its prevention has become the primary task of policy in terms of importance.

The struggle surrounding the question of nuclear armament or disarmament and surrounding nuclear problems as a whole and of the thrust of military policy and strategy in the countries in which the United States' nuclear weapons are deployed is having a direct and--what is more--frequently destabilizing impact on the domestic political struggle. This is compelling the main political forces of West European countries to take into consideration to a greater extent the resistance to the policy which is being pursued, which differs in terms of its manifestation and which is being openly expressed by broad strata of the population.

The interdependence of the highly industrialized and densely populated European states in the sphere of environmental conservation, the safety of nuclear reactors and industrial safety, the exploration for and assimilation of new energy sources and source industrial raw material and the development of new production techniques is growing at an increasingly rapid pace. This is giving rise to the appearance in West Europe of a particular interest in European regional cooperation.

The concentration in the EC of considerable economic, financial and S&T potential and also certain successes of political cooperation have, like all the results of West European integration, strengthened West Europe's positions in the rivalry with the United States. There has also been an increase in its aspiration to a more independent role in NATO, international relations as a whole and East-West relations.

Due to domestic policy factors, the governments of West European states also experience far more strongly than the U.S. Government the political impact of the initiatives of the Warsaw Pact states geared to disarmament, increased security and the development of cooperation in Europe. These initiatives are promoting the formation of a new European consciousness and stimulating realism and reason in West Europe.

The directions of the impact of the above-mentioned factors were examined. It was emphasized primarily that under the conditions of a sharp confrontation of ideas they are forming a new understanding and interpretation of security. Whereas predominantly military categories predominate in an evaluation in the United States of problems of security, in West Europe (with manifest differences, it is true, both between the main political forces and between states, as the predominant phenomenon as a whole, however) a different, broader interpretation of security is blazing a trail for itself. Together with military categories it is experiencing the increasingly strong impact of

nonmilitary categories also (the guaranteed functioning of the economy, preservation of the natural foundations of society's existence, domestic sociopolitical stability).

This understanding of security is affording broader opportunities for cooperation between socialist and capitalist states. It has led to the appearance in West Europe of two strategic concepts. First is the confrontational concept, which is represented mainly by the military-industrial complex and rightwing-conservative political forces. Its supporters put the emphasis primarily on military strength and "deterrence," bloc policy, an increase in offensive military potential, rejection of a moratorium on nuclear explosions, the development of new types of weapons and support for the United States' positions on nuclear and space-based arms.

On the other hand, there is a realistic and flexible concept, whose disciples are mainly social democracy, the peace movements and liberal circles. They make of paramount importance the achievement by way of negotiations of the gradual elimination of all nuclear arms, prevention of the militarization of space and a reduction in other arsenals, a defensive military strategy as a whole and a diminution in the role of power factors in East-West relations. Currently the supporters of this concept represent West Europe's biggest force of resistance to the United States' policy of the achievement of military superiority. At the same time they are an important detachment supporting efforts pertaining to a consolidation of security and the development of cooperation in Europe.

It should be noted that the demarcation between the two strategic concepts and their representatives is currently not entirely clear-cut and sharp and that the borders between them are as yet insufficiently structured.

It was noted in the course of the discussion that the arguments concerning West Europe's role have acquired new aspects and also new urgency. All the NATO countries, France included, consider, as before, alliance with the United States the inalienable basis of their strategy and policy in respect of the Warsaw Pact states.

However, there is at the same time increasing understanding that loyalty to NATO and, consequently, alliance with the United States by no means imply complete subordination to Washington's policy of unchecked arms race. There is increasing concern among the public, and in government circles also, in connection with the consequences with which the invariable continuation of the former negative policy of the United States is fraught. This is prompting the governments of West European states to make vigorous efforts to prompt the United States to take account of their interest in an improvement of relations with the USSR.

Although conservative, liberal and social democratic forces persistently adhere--albeit in differentiated manner--to antisocialist notions on all issues concerning Europe, they are nonetheless displaying an interest in the achievement of greater stability and predictability in interstate relations,

accords on the nonuse of force, confidence-building and security measures and the principles of cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection, various spheres of the economy and the humanitarian sphere.

Many speakers observed that there coexist in the policy of the West European NATO states, interconditioning one another, elements of both the old and the new approaches to East-West relations.

The approach to questions of war and peace taking shape in West Europe is being realized, albeit slowly, via a more flexible foreign policy and a readiness for reasonable compromise with the Warsaw Pact states. The idea of a "common European house" advanced by the USSR is also being echoed increasingly in government circles of NATO states, however, this has not as yet been suitably reflected in their practical policy. The governments of the West European NATO countries have yet to display a readiness to avail themselves emphatically and consistently of their political authority to induce the United States to adopt a more realistic policy.

The possibility of the European NATO states exerting a joint influence on the policy of the United States is further complicated owing to the varying degree of their interest in an alliance with Washington and dissimilar views on a number of aspects of its policy. Graphic evidence of this is the polemic surrounding the SDI and certain West European states' participation in research connected with the program. Simultaneously all European NATO countries are trying with a greater or lesser degree of assertiveness to limit as much as possible for Europe the negative consequences of U.S. policy and to counter a further deterioration in the political climate in East-West relations and an increase in tension on the continent.

The trend toward the accelerated formation of a complex of political, industrial-technological and also military power based on the EC and the Western European Union--the so-called "European framework" of the North Atlantic pact--was ascertained in the course of the discussion. Governments and also the bulk of the opposition see it (together with the alliance with the United States) as a most important support of policy in respect of the Warsaw Pact states and a base for West Europe's self-assertion in the face of the imperial ambitions of the United States. This goal is served by, inter alia, the "Single European Act" of the EC states, the strengthening of the bilateral alliance between the FRG and France, the revival of the Western European Union, the "European defense area" concept and plans for the realization of a "European Defense Initiative". To a considerable extent the same goal is also served by the multilateral technological cooperation projects, by means of which in a number of cases the neutral states are being tied more closely to the EC grouping also.

The West European NATO countries operate mainly in the military and political sphere of the European level of East-West relations. Their notions of stability in Europe partially correspond to the idea of all-embracing security in our interconnected world. They provide points of departure for productive dialogue on European security. However, there is a profound gulf between these conclusions and the actual policy which they are pursuing.

Granted all the obviousness of the differences, the fundamental attitude of the NATO countries toward the initiatives of the Warsaw Pact states is dictated, as before, by the intention to induce the latter to accede to NATO demands. Up to now the West European opponents have spurned all the steps proposed by the USSR leading to the complete elimination in Europe of nuclear arsenals. As far as a reduction in conventional arms is concerned, it is being made dependent on prior agreement between the USSR and the United States on nuclear problems. France and Great Britain are opposed to the inclusion of their nuclear weapons in the negotiations. Considerable significance for the European process is attached to the political course of the three main West European powers. The FRG, France and, to a certain extent, Great Britain are seeking the kind of more assertive role in East-West relations, particularly in Europe, as would not, on the one hand, lead to their being in conflict with the United States and, on the other, would permit them to uphold their own specific interests more successfully. The FRG's European policy is under strong pressure on the part of the opposition, primarily the SPD, which advocates "security partnership" on the continent, effective disarmament steps and the all-around development of bilateral and multilateral relations with the socialist countries, and also under the influence of the disagreements within the government coalition, particularly between the CSU and the FDP. In respect of the most important disarmament issues the government fully shares the positions of the United States and in NATO it acts as an arms booster. A specific reflection of the contradictoriness of the FRG's Ostpolitik is its policy in respect of the GDR.

France's policy is dictated to a considerable extent by an endeavor to keep for as long as possible the question of its nuclear potential from being included in the disarmament negotiations, continue the strategy of "nuclear deterrence" and have the freedom to implement France's integration goals in West Europe. In other respects, on the other hand, Paris' interest in a stabilization and, to a certain extent, relaxation of political relations on the continent affords opportunities for a meaningful dialogue on security and cooperation.

The assumption of office in the spring of 1986 of forces of the right hardly changed anything in this respect. Thus France is interested in the success of the Soviet-American negotiations, primarily on the question of arms limitation. At the same time, however, France does not wish to lag behind in technological development (this is indicated by the plan for a government loan for the Eureka program). It is endeavoring to improve its positions in Central and East Europe primarily by political means, and only to a lesser extent, by economic means.

Despite the increasing change of Great Britain in the direction of West European structures, the priority of the alliance with the United States can, as before, still be distinctly discerned in its policy concerning East-West mutual relations. "Atlantism" has recently manifestly predominated over "Europeism" here. On the question of nuclear disarmament in Europe the government of Great Britain occupies a position similar to that of France. Positive changes, however, very slowly, are making themselves felt in the sphere of bilateral relations with the socialist states.

Summary propositions in the course of the debate were formulated on the question of West Europe's attitude toward the all-European process. All West European states view it as an important instrument of East-West relations in Europe, attaching to it greater significance than the United States. From their viewpoint, this process affords an opportunity for easing the negative consequences for their security ensuing from the policy of the United States and for strengthening security in Europe on the paths of cooperation and arms limitation. While endeavoring to weaken the military positions of the Warsaw Pact they are nonetheless attempting to render bloc confrontation more manageable and to lessen the confrontation. Many important elements of their policy connected with the all-European process objectively lead to the consideration of certain demands of mutual security.

A particularly appreciable role in the policy of West European states is performed by interest in the preservation of the results from the detente of the 1970's which were profitable to them and the creation on this basis of conditions more conducive to business cooperation with the European socialist states in the most diverse spheres.

For the neutral and nonaligned West European states the all-European process is the central multifaceted sphere of activity in East-West relations. For them the all-European process and its extension and further development is the main field in which they may express their interest in fruitful measures of confidence-building between states, military detente and an expansion of all-European cooperation.

The differentiated and contradictory nature of West European states' interests and positions on questions connected with the all-European process makes it possible to develop it further in accordance with the logic of the new approach to the problems of peace, security and cooperation in Europe. As observed in the paper of the GDR section, application of the principle according to which successes in the priority area--military detente and nuclear disarmament in Europe--also require an expansion of the infrastructure of trust, economic cooperation and interaction in the field of environmental protection and industrial safety and in the sphere of the "third basket" of the Helsinki Final Act could serve as an important positive source from the political viewpoint.

The debate also discussed questions concerning extra-European factors. The CSSR and USSR sections presented papers on this subject.

The meeting in Warsaw showed once again the efficacy and productiveness of the multilateral cooperation of international affairs experts of the socialist countries in the study of most important problems of contemporary world politics.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".

"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987.

8850

CSO: 1810/6

JAPAN'S POSITION AS MAJOR CREDITOR

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 13 Jan 87) pp 134-136

[Article by O. Korchagina: "Japan--Major Creditor"]

[Text] The export of capital is a characteristic feature of the era of imperialism, and its dynamics, volume and structure reflect the development of interimperialist contradictions and the correlation of forces among the three centers. For this reason great attention is attracted to Japan's movement in 1985, when the country's "net" overseas assets amounted to almost \$130 billion, into first place among the biggest creditors. In the estimation of Japan's Finance Ministry, the analogous figure for Great Britain--the previous leader--amounted to \$90 billion, Saudi Arabia--\$70-80 billion, and the FRG, \$50 billion (1). In turn, the "net" foreign debt of the United States was in excess of \$50 billion (2). At the same time Japan is still noticeably inferior to the United States in terms of the absolute amounts of overseas assets (little more than 50 percent of the American level).

A combination of factors impeding imports of capital and stimulating exports thereof has contributed to the growth of Japan's role as a net creditor. Despite a whole number of measures pertaining to a so-called liberalization of the domestic market (commercial and monetary) adopted primarily under pressure from the United States and the West European countries, a large number of regulations and restrictions on foreign capital imports remains. Exports of capital, however, from Japan have increased considerably in the last two decades. What is more, the increase has been wave-like.

The first wave was observed as of the mid-1960's through the start of the 1970's. It was promoted by the considerable growth of the country's surplus foreign trade balance and as a result of the accumulation of large foreign currency reserves. External motivations for the exporters of capital were the higher level of interest rates in other developed capitalist countries, the need for investments in mining industry overseas to ensure stable raw material sources and the profitability of capital investments in developing states. At the same time in the period of rapid growth of the Japanese economy (from the mid-1950's through the start of the 1970's) domestic demand in the country was expanding rapidly, and the rate of profit remained quite high, and this slowed the export of capital to a certain extent. While having become a net exporter

of capital, since 1971, in terms of its overall amount Japan remained far behind the United States and Great Britain. The situation has changed appreciably only in the last 3-4 years, when the second, far more powerful, wave of the export of capital from Japan has followed. Its scale is determined by the changes in the conditions of reproduction within the country and the appearance of additional external factors.

Mention should be made primarily of the fact that economic development is being realized in a situation of slack domestic demand and that the amount of "surplus" capital, whose investment in the country does not guarantee sufficiently high profits for the businessmen, is growing rapidly. K. Marx wrote: "If capital is exported overseas, this is not because it absolutely could not find an application within the country. This is because it may be invested overseas with a higher profit norm" (3). The existence of such "superfluous" capital is also ensured by the preservation of the traditionally high rate of savings (approximately 20 percent).

Together with this Japan's surplus foreign trade balance has grown sharply (26-fold in 5 years). In 1985 it amounted to \$56 billion. Foreign currency reserves amounted to \$26.5 billion accordingly (4).

Following the oil "shocks" of the 1970's, the problem of ensuring stable raw material sources acquired a new resonance for Japan. Competition on foreign markets, on the part of the "new industrialized countries" included, intensified. The big gap in the levels of bank interest compared with other states, particularly the United States, increased considerably the degree of attractiveness of the export of capital for Japanese investors. In addition, there was a sharp exacerbation of the contradictions between Japan and its trading partners, particularly the United States and the West European countries, where protectionist sentiments in respect of commodity imports from the Land of the Rising Sun intensified. Most recently particular significance has been attached to the currency factor. As a result of a sharp rise in the price of the yen there was an appreciable increase in the costs (this applies primarily to pay for live labor) of production inside Japan relative to other countries, and investing capital overseas became far more profitable.

According to a recent survey conducted by the country's Ministry of Labor, the rise in the price of the yen, trade and economic contradictions and the increased cost of manpower have led to approximately 30 percent of Japanese companies expanding or planning to expand production overseas.

Under the impact of the above-mentioned factors there has not only been a sharp increase in the scale of the export of capital but there have also simultaneously been considerable changes in its forms, spheres of investment and geographical distribution. Prior to the start of the 1970's the predominant role was performed by exports of government short-term capital, but long-term investments have moved into first place over the last 15 years: whereas in 1971 the proportion thereof constituted only 34 percent of the sum total of capital exports, in 1985, almost 70 percent. Investments in an entrepreneurial form and long-term loans to foreign state-owned and private companies have come to acquire increasingly great significance. Exports of short-term capital, on the other hand, that is, primarily deposits in foreign

banks geared to the acquisition of income by way of the use of the intercountry discrepancy in interest rates, have begun to perform a lesser role.

The long-term overseas assets incorporate direct and portfolio investments, loans and export credit. And the government, furthermore, now accounts for little more than 10 percent of their total (30 percent 15 years ago), loans mainly. The rest is private long-term capital. The most important role in the structure of the export thereof at the start of the 1970's was being performed by export credit inasmuch as at that time the priority task for Japan was winning foreign markets by way of an expansion of commodity exports. The proportion of this form of export constituted almost 65 percent of long-term private assets (1971) and was markedly in excess of private direct (24 percent) and, even more, portfolio (5 percent) investments. Now, however, export credit accounts for approximately 9 percent.

The distinctiveness of Japan as an exporter of capital is that, as distinct from the United States and Great Britain, it has built up not direct but portfolio investments. In 10 years (1971-1980) the volume thereof increased more than 60-fold, and in the last 4 years, by a further factor of 4.6! In 1985 alone they grew by two-thirds and amounted to \$145.7 billion (1.5 times more than for the United States). Japanese investors invest capital extensively in government securities of the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands and the stock and debentures of private corporations. Particularly active in acquiring securities are Japanese pension funds and life insurance companies, which are attracted by the possibility of obtaining higher income than in Japan and, what is also of considerable importance, the high reliability of the investments.

The average annual rate of increase in direct investments was particularly high in the 1970's--30 percent--slowing somewhat in the first half of the 1980's, constituting little more than 17 percent. For portfolio investments the analogous indicator is considerably higher--57 and 47 percent respectively. As a result the proportion of direct investments in the sum total of Japanese overseas capital investments has even declined somewhat (from 12 percent in 1980 to 10 percent in 1985). In terms of the sum total of direct investments Japan is almost six times inferior to the United States. Nonetheless, here also its role is gradually growing. Japanese investors have in the last 2-3 years begun to attach particular importance to this form of the export of capital, when there has been a marked complication of the foreign economic situation.

Hitherto the developing states, primarily Asian and Latin American, have accounted for the bulk of Japanese direct overseas capital investments (53 percent of the cumulative volume). At the same time, however, direct investments in the developed countries, among which the United States is in first place (approximately 27 percent of total capital investments), are expanding rapidly. The value and, correspondingly, role of Japanese direct investments in West Europe are far less, but they are growing steadily.

In 1986 there was a four-time lowering of the already low bank interest discount rate. Prior to January 1986 it had been unchanged for 3 years and had

constituted 5 percent, but by November even it was at the 3-percent level. The U.S. Treasury bond rate also declined in 1985-1986, but the gap remains relatively large. The lowering of Japan's discount rate pursued two main goals: first, revitalizing slack domestic demand by way of reducing the cost of credit and lowering savings incentives and, second, having created conditions for a further increase in the outflow of capital from the country, applying the brakes to the growth of the exchange rate of the yen, which is rapid and is actually out of control.

Measures of government regulation of bank interest and the exchange rate of the yen cannot in any way radically alter anything inasmuch as more deep-lying factors are operating. These include the country's erratic economic growth rate and the huge surplus balance of payments. The expansion of the export of capital is, in turn, leading to a growth of income from overseas investments and, correspondingly, an increase in Japan's currency proceeds. In 9 months of 1986 alone long-term capital exports had increased almost 89 percent compared with the analogous period of 1985, foreign currency reserves, 50 percent and the surplus trade balance, 70 percent (5). From this comes the continued high intensity of the export of capital.

Table 1. Japan's Overseas Assets and Foreign Assets in Japan (\$, Billions, Year's End)

	1971 r.	1975 r.	1980 r.	1982 r.	1983 r.	1984 r.	1985 r.
(1) Активы Японии за рубежом	32,8	58,3	159,6	227,7	272,0	341,2	437,7
(2) в том числе ¹							
(3) Частные	13,9	37,7	112,5	174,0	213,6	276,7	373,2
(4) из них							
(5) прямые инвестиции	1,8	8,3	19,6	29,0	32,2	37,9	44,0
(6) портфельные инвестиции	0,3	4,1	21,4	40,1	56,1	87,6	145,7
(7) экспортные кредиты	4,9	6,8	9,8	15,9	18,1	22,8	23,6
(8) займы	0,3	5,0	14,8	23,2	29,3	40,6	46,9
(9) Государственные	18,9	20,6	47,1	53,7	58,4	64,5	64,4
из них							
займы	2,5	5,5	15,5	20,4	22,5	24,5	23,3
(10) Иностранные активы в Японии	23,0	51,3	148,0	203,0	234,7	266,9	307,9
в том числе ¹							
Частные	21,0	48,0	129,2	171,9	201,6	229,6	268,8
из них							
прямые инвестиции	1,3	2,1	3,3	4,0	4,4	4,5	4,7
портфельные инвестиции	3,8	7,7	30,2	47,1	69,9	77,1	84,8
займы	1,9	1,7	1,6	1,3	1,3	1,3	1,2
Государственные	2,0	3,3	18,8	31,1	33,1	37,2	39,1
из них							
займы	0,7	0,4	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1
портфельные инвестиции	0,2	0,5	12,3	24,4	26,1	29,4	30,5
(11) Баланс	9,8	7,0	11,6	24,7	37,3	74,3	129,8
в том числе ¹							
Частные	-7,1	-10,3	-16,7	2,1	12,0	47,1	104,4
из них							
прямые инвестиции	0,5	6,2	16,3	25,0	27,8	33,4	39,3
портфельные инвестиции	-3,5	-3,6	-8,8	-7,0	-13,8	10,5	60,9
Государственные	16,9	17,3	28,3	22,6	25,3	27,3	25,4

Key: 1. Japan's overseas assets. 2. Including (some items not separated).
 3. Private. 4. Of which. 5. Direct investments. 6. Portfolio investments.
 7. Export credit. 8. Loans. 9. Government. 10. Foreign assets in Japan.
 11. Balance.

Calculated from KEIZAI TOKEI NEMPO, 1976, P 118; 1980, P 238; 1984, P 248; THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 7 June 1986, p 1.

FOOTNOTES

1. THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 7 June 1986, p 1.
2. On the United States' foreign debt see MEMO No 7, 1986, pp 137-140.
3. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 25, pt 1, p 281.
4. TOYO KEIZAI TOKEI GEPPU No 8, 1986, tables, p 19.
5. Calculated from THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1 November 1986, p 26; 8 November 1986, p 3.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".

"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987.

8850

CSO: 1816/6

BOOK ON POLITICAL EXTREMISM, TERRORISM REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 13 Jan 87) pp 139-140

[D. Tomashevskiy review: "Dangerous Social Phenomenon"]

[Text] The social phenomenon analyzed in the book,* which has quite a long history, is acquiring new parameters in the modern era. It is now directly invading both the day-to-day life and domestic political struggle of individual countries and the sphere of interstate relations. It is no accident that problems of political extremism, particularly terrorism, are attracting increasingly greater attention from politicians, scholars and the mass media of Western countries, which, however, far from always contributes to ascertainment of the objective truth and is at times accompanied by its deliberate distortion.

This is why a serious study, based on genuinely scientific methodology, of the phenomenon in question is not only of theoretical but also practical-political interest. Relying on an extensive list of sources and literature (both the sparse Soviet and voluminous foreign literature), the author of the monograph in question investigates a number of topical problems of political extremism. The latter, the work observes, "increases particularly, assuming the nature of a dangerous social phenomenon, in periods of exacerbation of social tension, which are increasingly frequently characteristic of the reality of capitalist society as the crisis which it is experiencing intensifies. It is a question of a general crisis embracing all spheres of social life--the economy, politics, culture and morality" (p 44).

It is in the soil of the crisis of bourgeois society that both "left" and rightwing terrorism, which are examined in the corresponding sections of the book, grow. The scholar shows that it is the strata of the petty bourgeoisie, intellectuals and racial and national minorities "maddened" by the horrors of the crisis which predominantly constitute the social support of both and that their philosophy is distorted by similar fallacious ideas, complexes and prejudices (p 152). All this makes for the organic kinship of the two directions, despite all the outward differences and the frenzied verbal exchange of fire between their representatives.

Among the factors which brought about a growth of the impact on the political and social life of the developed capitalist countries of petty bourgeois chaos A. Grachev distinguishes two. First, the significant growth of nonproletarian strata in the social structure of contemporary bourgeois society (the liberal arts and technical professionals, student youth, office workers, service workers and managerial personnel). Second, the increasingly tangible consequences for them of the general crisis of capitalism and the increase in monopoly oppression making their position in society worse and objectively bringing them closer to the working class. It is both "left" and right political extremism, the author believes, which are a specific distorted reaction of individual representatives of these strata to the current situation.

Study of problems of the youth, for which the all-around crisis of capitalism is resulting in a moral and personality crisis, a rupture of relations with society and the counterposing of itself to the existing social structures, including democratic forces and the worker and trade union movement, is of special interest in this context. "Political extremism and also its extreme form--terrorism," we read in the work, "appear to a desperate, spiritually ravaged youth deprived of political experience and moral ideals a version of the shortest, 'direct' path to surmount the acute social problems of contemporary capitalist society" (p 60).

Fundamental significance is attached to the author's thoughts on the correlation of terrorist violence and revolutionary violence and his cogent proposition that terrorist violence, despite the "revolutionary" outer covering in which it is attempted to wrap it, does not bring revolution one iota closer. "'An end for which unjust means are required is not a just end'--this pronouncement of K. Marx," the monograph emphasizes, "puts Marxism and terrorism on different sides of the barricades" (p 126).

While recalling that in the past also terrorist actions were frequently used as pretexts for inciting international conflicts, A. Grachev speaks with full justification about the connection of contemporary political extremism and international politics as a qualitatively new phenomenon. "The dislike of ideological struggle and the intention to substitute 'direct confrontation' for it characteristic of the majority of extremists result, when transferred to the sphere of international politics, in fierce opposition to the concept of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and active attempts to incite the two opposite world social systems to 'ascertain the relationship' between them militarily." The recklessness of such calls in the nuclear age is obvious for their realization would plunge the world into a global catastrophe, regardless of whether they are justified by an aspiration to do away with imperialism "at a stroke" or, on the other hand, promises "to leave communism in the ashcan of history" (p 202).

Terrorism as a state policy is illustrated in action by the policy of Washington, the actions of the racist South African regime and Israel's aggressive policy, in which, as the author observes, "branches of the bloody stream of political terrorism: official policy elevating terror to the category of unconcealed genocide in respect of the Arabs and the terrorist actions of the secret services are joined together" (p 221).

The monograph reveals the Soviet Union's position in respect of terrorism. It was confirmed anew at the 27th CPSU Congress. Undeclared wars, the export of counterrevolution in all forms, political assassination, the taking of hostages, aircraft hijacking, explosions in the streets, at airports and at stations--thus does the CPSU Central Committee Political Report characterize "the repulsive face of terrorism, which its inspirers are attempting to conceal with a variety of shameless fabrications. The USSR rejects terrorism in principle and is prepared to cooperate actively with other states to eradicate it."

In the final chapter the author argues with the assertions of certain Western political scientists concerning a "decline" of extremism, to which the reduction in the 1980's in the number of acts of political terrorism compared with the "leaden Seventies" allegedly testifies. He formulates the following, very important, it would seem, proposition: "Political extremism and terrorism as the extreme expression thereof does not mean a series of escapades of individual eccentric personalities or political adventurers. Nor can it simplistically be reduced to a 'conspiracy' of reactionary forces or the intrigues of the diversionary services of imperialism. It is a question of a contradictory and complex social phenomenon, whose emergence and growth in recent years have their own roots and regularities. Therefore the struggle against political extremism cannot be a one-time act or campaign which is limited in time" (p 250).

Such are merely some aspects of the big and complex subject of the book in question. Of course, many of them are in need of further study. Thus the question of the impact--direct and indirect--on present-day political extremism of the S&T revolution and, in this connection, of the growing danger of terrorism for the cause of peace merits a more in-depth analysis. Importance is attached also to the set of problems connected with various conflicts and crises as abundant soil for international terrorism.

A. Grachev's topical and interesting monograph may undoubtedly be commended to a broad readership.

FOOTNOTE

- * A.S. Grachev, "Politicheskiy ekstremizm" [Political Extremism], Moscow, "Mysl", 1986, pp 278.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".

"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987.

8850

CSO: 1816/6

UK BOOK ON ETHICS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNIYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 13 Jan 87) pp 141-143

[Yu. Osetrov review: "In Defiance of Reason and Morality"]

[Text] "The appearance of nuclear weapons makes necessary a Copernican revolution in ideas on war" (p 2); "considering the monstrous destructive capability of nuclear weapons, can war with the use thereof be considered 'ethical'?" (p 15). We can guess in advance, it would seem, what a person who reasons in such a way will go on to say.

Nonetheless, D. Fischer, employee of the British Ministry of Defence, says in his book "Morality and the Bomb. On Ethical Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence"* by no means what might have been expected considering the above propositions. In fact, an unequivocal conclusion suggests itself: using nuclear weapons means casting a flagrant challenge at elementary humanity. Throughout the first third of the book there is actually no assertion of anything which would differ from this truth.

But in one chapter he switches, for all that, to an examination of the possibilities of the use of nuclear weapons. And here the reader encounters a different approach evoking the most emphatic objections.

After all, it can in no way be said that D. Fischer is under a misapprehension concerning the apocalyptic dangers of nuclear war. The work abounds in references to them. There are the giant figures of anticipated losses--up to 160 million persons (in the United States alone), say, in the first 30 days of a full-scale thermonuclear conflict (p 51); mention of "nuclear winter"; and establishment of the fact that surviving humanity would be hopelessly crippled by the consequences of global radiation.

It is paradoxical that against the backdrop of these terrible truths a chain of reasoning unfolds whose ultimate link is the conclusion that nuclear weapons are not that bad a thing and that their use under certain circumstances should not cause objections. We are faced with a dangerous logic aimed at justifying the use of nuclear arms. It is adorned with fanciful constructions of arguments intended to damp down the natural protest of reason and the senses against such a recommendation.

Such "logic" could, of course, be completely ignored were it the product of the "thoughts" of a lone madman. But the views of D. Fischer are not simply his own work (although he makes a certain individual contribution). Among his arguments there are also those with which aggressive circles of the West and NATO strategists and propagandists wish to justify the permissibility of nuclear war. They are endeavoring to compel people not only to reconcile themselves to such a prospect but also to agree that such a war could be reasonable and advisable.

The author begins with an attempt to attribute--however unnatural this may be--nuclear war to the just wars category. In order to succeed here he construes the category in his own way, "freeing" it of sociopolitical aspects and reducing the characteristics of a just war mainly to noninjury to the peaceful population (pp 49, 58). But nor can such an interpretation in itself impart an "acceptable" appearance to nuclear war--the less so in that it is a question of a nuclear confrontation, that is, one that is particularly destructive and catastrophic in its consequences. In the attempts to overcome this contradiction the author has literally to deform logic. "It is claimed," he acknowledges, "that there can be no just end for nuclear war" (it is easy to understand those who think thus: with what justice could the annihilation of civilization be compatible?). Nonetheless, for D. Fischer "this is a vague assertion" (p 55). The author declares that nuclear war may be fought such that losses are incurred only by military units and that the peaceful population and the environment would not suffer (p 58). He also attempts to make to the idea of so-called "clean nuclear war," which has become a widespread cliché of NATO propaganda, his own contribution by an illustration: the use of nuclear warheads in the form of depth charges for combating submarines. But it is clear that in this case it would be practically impossible to avoid an escalation of the nuclear conflict with all its consequences, not to mention the obvious ecological damage.

But it is hard for the British specialist attempting to fit nuclear war into the just wars category when he attempts to prove that it might not do "inordinate" damage to the peaceful population. Not in a position to assert such a thing directly, he refers to the fact that even in nonnuclear wars there have been episodes when the civilian population has incurred huge losses. The reader himself, of course, will evaluate the "persuasiveness" of the sophistic proposition according to which since there has been evil before, it is perfectly acceptable to repeat it--the more so in that in the event of a nuclear conflict the scale of the evil will--there can be no doubting this--not simply be repeated but exceeded a thousand times over.

Evidently recognizing the extent to which such reasoning is capable of evoking protest, not to mention disagreement on the part of the readers, the author introduces a reservation: in any event, nuclear weapons must be used as a final, extreme means, when all others have been exhausted (also classic NATO reasoning: the North Atlantic bloc will use nuclear weapons first if there are no other means to confront the "enemy") (pp 56-57). The groundlessness of this reservation hardly needs comment. What very broad scope it affords for the use of nuclear weapons!

Concluding his attempts to portray nuclear war as acceptable, D. Fischer nonetheless assays an irresolute synopsis: some criteria of a just war do not preclude the use of nuclear weapons, others prevent it in some way (p 59).

From this, however, it should not be concluded that the author has hesitated as regards the soundness of his general principle. He devotes the second half of the work to efforts to otherwise buttress the proposition concerning the permissibility of a nuclear conflict--mainly with arguments to the effect that the Western countries' defense policy cannot be constructed on a basis other than a readiness to be the first to use nuclear weapons. "But in view of the now strong moral prejudice" against the use of the latter, we read, it is absolutely necessary to investigate "whether it is possible to formulate a logical and effective defense policy which is not based on nuclear weapons" (p 59). We would note at once that one is struck in the passage quoted by the substitution of concepts, which forms the basis of the British expert's further arguments. He attempts to refute the proposition that the world would be safer without nuclear weapons, but means here still to defend the viewpoint that the first use of such and use altogether under any circumstances are justified. Such an erroneous method of demonstration is born of a perfectly clear purpose: it is certainly easier for many Western readers to reconcile themselves to the fact of the existence of these weapons than with the blood-chilling prospect of their use.

But if it is possible to persuade the reader (this is the whole hope) that it is impossible to manage without such weapons "in the interests of security," it will be far simpler inculcating in him the idea that the latter may someday be activated.

Accordingly, D. Fischer tries in vain to prove that the West's armed forces have no alternative to the nuclear component.

He sets about examining hypothetical alternatives. He names as the first pacifism--complete renunciation of the use of weapons. We would note in passing that pacifism is not in the air in Western countries' policy today, but in this case this is not the point. Let us see what D. Fischer says. He says the following: the Western countries would find themselves unarmed in the face of the USSR and its allies, which would impose their will on them (p 62). So the "demonstration" of the unacceptability of pacifism amounts to slander of the socialist countries. The USSR is portrayed as an inexorable threat, which makes pacifism suicidal. And such malicious fabrications are being written precisely when it is the Soviet Union which is struggling for disarmament and the elimination of tension and the United States and its closest allies which are constantly spurning the peaceable initiatives of the socialist countries!

The second demonstration of the alleged impossibility for the West of parting with nuclear weapons is constructed on an even more distorted reality--if it can be even further distorted. D. Fischer asserts that nuclear disarmament, if offered by the West, would encounter the USSR's resistance, in which connection the very idea of such disarmament is pointless. But things are

today precisely the other way about: the Soviet Union is offering nuclear disarmament, and not simply as an ideal, what is more, but having charted a specific path of progress toward this goal.

D. Fischer examines one further alternative to the imperialist powers' nuclear arms (in order to reject it, of course): unilateral nuclear disarmament combined with a system of strategic defense (pp 65-66): the Western countries would take shelter behind an antimissile "shield," having simultaneously eliminated their strike potential. Even an option so "preferential" for the West (actively propagandized by certain circles in the United States, incidentally) is not to the author's liking. Nor, furthermore, is he disposed to go deeper into an analysis of the actual reasons owing to which such a "scenario" is unacceptable. The same "bold" argument here: the "Soviet threat". Since the USSR is hostile and armed with missiles, and a 100-percent defense against them is improbable, there is no point thinking about such plans even.

It is interesting that ultimately even mutual disarmament is rejected. Here also one is struck by the typically "confrontational" way of thinking of the pro-NATO figure. A mutual renunciation, he says, would only make the world more dangerous for now the "price" of an East-West conflict is very high (threat of thermonuclear catastrophe), but otherwise a confrontation would be facilitated (p 67). This entire logic is a different way of putting the same "Soviet military threat" proposition. When the arguments are exhausted--and what, in fact, can be said against mutual disarmament?--the final, crowning argument of anti-Sovietism is brought forth: the USSR is dangerous, consequently, there is no point talking about disarmament.

In conclusion (the chapter "Conclusions and a View to the Future") D. Fischer discusses whether it will be possible in the future to rid ourselves of nuclear weapons. He is generally optimistic, believing that nuclear disarmament will come about sometime and that interim steps to reduce the nuclear potential might be practicable (p 126). But let us not exaggerate the constructiveness of this approach: it is intended for the vague future. But for the present--weapons of mass destruction and the intensifying threat of war.

FOOTNOTE

* London and Sydney, Groom Helm, 1985, pp 136.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".

"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987.

8850

CSO: 1816/6

U.S. BOOK ON SPACE WEAPONS SCIENTISTS

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 13 Jan 87) pp 143-145

[A. Podberezkin review: "Intellectuals on the Road of Madness"]

[Text] A topical feature of international life is the sharply increased attention to questions connected with realization of R. Reagan's "strategic defense initiative". It is natural that concern for the future of mankind is prompting many politicians, scientists and journalists to return to this problem time and again. "The 'star wars' program," the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th party congress observed, "cannot be allowed to be used both as a stimulus to a further arms race and as an obstacle in the way of radical disarmament."

The conclusions set forth by William Broad in the book in question "Star Warriors. A Penetrating Look into the Lives of the Young Scientists Behind Our Space Age Weaponry" may serve as a good illustration of this proposition. The author--one of the most widely read science correspondents of the NEW YORK TIMES--has on the whole made a conscientious and objective analysis of the essence and possible consequences of the realization of the SDI. "Under the patronage of the strategic defense initiative," he writes, "billions of dollars are being allocated for the development and testing of nuclear weapons.... These could be both electromagnetic pulse weapons and microwave weapons. But they could be even more exotic.... Give the arms manufacturers sufficient money, and they will move heaven and earth" (pp 218-219).

Employing a wealth of factual material (the American journalist met with many politicians and scientists and worked in a number of research centers, including a week in the Livermore Laboratory), W. Broad has prepared an original publication in the form of a meditative diary. It is furnished with a multitude of extracts from official documents and references to the pronouncements of this politician and expert or the other both supporting the "star wars" program and opposed.

Understandably, the author of the book was able to see in the laboratory only what he was allowed to see, and the reader can see for himself here how thick is the veil of secrecy in America over all that is related to the SDI. However, the week of impressions and observations were sufficient for a

conclusion to be drawn as to the tremendous danger which is contained in the U.S. President's initiative and which it is attempted to conceal with arguments about the need to create "absolutely impenetrable defenses". This threat is determined by at least two aspects of the program--military-strategic and military-technical.

From the military-strategic viewpoint (W. Broad arrives at this thought at the end of his work) the SDI means weapons not of defense but attack capable of sharply increasing the likelihood of thermonuclear war. In this connection he calls the readers' attention to the fact that the U.S. Administration has in fact abandoned the declared goals of the creation of an "absolutely impenetrable" ABM system in favor of a far more modest "limited" version thereof. An official White House document which is quoted says plainly that "there is no necessity for providing 100-percent protection". "Offensive missiles," the author himself observes, "remain the core of American policy" (pp 208-209).

In addition, as recent events have clearly shown, U.S. ruling circles are accelerating the creation of the latest types of offensive strategic arms and moving toward outright renunciation of the agreements pertaining to a limitation thereof. Weapons systems specially intended for inflicting a first strike on the territory of the USSR and its allies are being increased at an accelerated pace. These actions of Washington compel the American journalist to acknowledge that the "antimissile shield" which is being created "will never be capable of protection against a concentrated attack but only against a limited one, when the bulk of the nuclear potential (of the USSR--A.P.) has been destroyed as the result of a first strike" (p 210).

Also highly important is the second of the above-mentioned aspects, namely, the United States' attempts by means of a "technological" arms race to achieve a number of most important military-political goals. It needs to be emphasized primarily--and the book calls attention to this repeatedly--that the "star wars" program presupposes not only and not so much even the creation of exotic assault weapons but a broad complex of R&D in respect of the entire spectrum of the most important directions of the development of modern science and technology. Thus speaking about the research being conducted at the Livermore Laboratory, W. Broad emphasizes plainly that work is being performed there on "supercomputers, means of communications and other components of vital importance for the creation of a defensive shield" (p 13). Less than 10 percent of the entire amount allocated for the SDI program is spent, he believes, on the development of strike systems proper--third-generation nuclear arms (primarily the X-ray laser, EMP weapons and so forth) (p 206). The bulk of the resources, on the other hand, is spent in other spheres, whose development is seen as the key condition of the embodiment of the U.S. President's idea. Thus the Livermore physicists are concentrating tremendous efforts on the creation of supercomputers (the so-called S-1 project). It is significant that approximately one-third more employees in the laboratory have been enlisted in its realization than in work on assault space-based systems (p 28).

The thought expressed by the author of the book in connection with the significance of computers within the SDI framework is interesting in this

connection. He believes, with good reason, that the United States' abandonment of efforts to set up an ABM system at the start of the 1970's was caused predominantly by its inefficiency connected primarily with the limited possibilities of the computers available at that time. "The problem was that no projectile could have been launched with an accuracy which would have entailed the destruction of another projectile. The American computers and radars of that time were too primitive for accurately determining the location and training (intercept missiles--A.P.) on fast-flying warheads" (pp 52-53).

Many American scientists agree with this assessment of the significance of computers for realization of the SDI and all of modern warfare. Evaluating the consequences of the Anglo-Argentine conflict, for example, one of them plainly declared: the British "lost a ship and many human lives because they lacked essential possibilities in the computer field. This almost cost them the war." The definite conclusion follows: "I believe that computers are now weapons just as much as nuclear warheads" (p 65).

But creation of the most accomplished computing systems cannot currently, of course, be considered solely a military task. It is a question of a most serious problem--political, economic, technical. In this sense the United States is gambling directly on the preferential development and mass introduction in all spheres of human activity--civilian and military--of the latest computers for the purpose of achieving S&T, economic and military superiority to the USSR.

Thus a wide-ranging search is under way in the United States for types of weapons of mass destruction and military equipment using the latest achievements of the S&T revolution to accomplish a "technological spurt" in the arms race. The propaganda support for such programs proposes attractive packaging--the idea of the "exclusion of nuclear weapons". Playing up to the U.S. President, L. West, a physicist at Livermore, asserts that it is a question of the creation of some "weapons of life".

In fact, however, as the book shows, a dangerous policy of a further increase in first-strike potential and the achievement of "technological" superiority has been adopted.

Also well known is one further "applied" angle of the work on the "star wars" program: attempts to drag the Soviet Union into an arms race which would be beyond the capabilities of its economy. In other words, it is a question of the "economic exhaustion" of the USSR. Significant arguments in this connection of an employee of the Livermore Laboratory may be discovered in the book. The Soviet Union will, allegedly, "be destroyed" as a consequence of tremendous expenditure on the arms race and "find itself technologically left behind" (p 63). In other words, the defenders of the SDI assign our country a secondary role and regard its "technological rolling back" as a condition of their security. As far as the security of the USSR is concerned, it is, to judge from the pronouncements of the mercenary from science, to be wholly and fully dependent on Washington's mood.

This manifestly absurd reasoning is at the basis of the ideology of "technological" chauvinism currently being implanted extensively in the United

States. It would seem that not only certain American scientists, who are simply inadequately informed about the state of Soviet science and the economy, but many politicians also think this way. W. Broad's attempts to ascertain on what such calculations are based are highly significant in this connection. As a result of an analysis which he conducted he reaches the conclusion of the complete groundlessness of the latter. The author's usually restrained tone manifestly fails him here: "Soviet science could not have progressed only thanks to idiots or brilliant madmen. Its possibilities should be evaluated soberly" (p 150). Many examples and the pronouncements of experts evaluating the situation objectively are adduced in evidence. Many of them recognize that in a number of the most important fields of science and technology the USSR "is at the cutting edge" (ibid.).

And one further eloquent fact: in the same Livermore Laboratory there is a special secret department codenamed (Zet), which is staffed by 60 highly skilled specialists. It is engaged in the study of Soviet scientific publications in the field of X-ray lasers and so forth, working, according to W. Broad, in close contact with "top intelligence officials" (p 147).

Thus it is not a question of some mythical "technological backwardness" of the USSR, which, as the author rightly acknowledges, could quickly eliminate the United States' advantages, but of the endeavor of this country's ruling circles to impose on the Soviet Union a new round of the arms race which would encompass all conceivable horizons of the development of science, equipment and technology.

In other words, it is a question of an attempt by Washington to use the latest achievements of the S&T revolution as quickly as possible for its own hegemonist ends and draw the Soviet Union into a military-technical contest in all the main areas of the development of human civilization. The American ruling elite is packaging its aggressive plans in the shining propaganda wrapper of the "strategic defense initiative". W. Broad formulates his viewpoint quite definitely in the concluding part of his interesting work: "The week spent in conversation in the laboratory convinced me that the critics' (of the SDI--A.P.) claims are, on the whole, correct." Realization of the President's project would lend impetus to a new costly round of the arms race, which "would make the world a more dangerous place to live. Such a step would increase the risk of an outbreak of war" (p 212).

FOOTNOTE

1. William J. Broad, "Star Warriors. A Penetrating Look into the Lives of the young Scientists behind Our Space Age Weaponry," New York, Simon and Schuster, 1985, pp 245.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".

"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987.

8850

CSO: 1816/6

BOOK REVIEW: CAPITALIST COUNTRIES CONSERVE TRANSPORT ENERGY

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 87 (signed to press 13 Jan 87) pp 150-151

[A. Chulkov review: "Future of Transport Power"]

[Text] The content of the book in question* is essentially considerably more wide-ranging than may be judged from its title. The possibilities of the use on means of transport of alternative energy carriers and power packs and efficient ways of saving energy are examined and a forecast of the volume and structure of energy consumption in this sphere both for the OECD countries as a whole and in terms of the biggest of them individually up to the year 2000, is provided here. In addition, an evaluation of the structure and dynamics of energy consumption in terms of specific forms of transport with an even longer "range"--right up to the end of the next century--is offered.

There are many publications on individual questions of the development of transport power engineering, but summary works encompassing the entire transport complex and devoted to a study of possible ways of perfecting it in the direction of increased efficiency are very rare. An important singularity of this work is not only the wide range of the questions studied but also its focus on the future.

An attempt has been made here to predict the possible trends of energy consumption in transport in the distant future. Despite all the provisional nature of such an approach, the author's considerations are of definite interest since the process of programming the development of transport, power engineering and related sectors is inconceivable without the elaboration of long-term forecasts.

An undoubted merit of the study is its topicality. The decisions of CPSU congresses and party and government decrees provide for the utmost economies in energy resources, in transport also, which accounts for over 13 percent of the fuel and power resources consumed in the USSR national economy. The monograph's specific analysis of the capitalist countries' problems could be applied at the time of elaboration of the long-term program of the development of national transport and power engineering.

V. Skvortsov's calculations testify that an appreciable reduction in specific energy consumption by the capitalist world's means of transport is to be anticipated in the coming decades. This will undoubtedly contribute to a certain easing of the seriousness of the fuel and power situation, the more so in that the existing potential of economies in other energy consumers will have been brought into play by then. This improvement in the situation will possibly lower the degree of urgency of the implementation of individual energy-saving measures, but this will be reflected, apparently, only in the timeframe in which they are realized.

Energy savings in the given sphere will be achieved in the next 10-15 years mainly by way of an improvement in the design of means of transport and their operation. An appreciable reduction in specific energy consumption compared with 1980 of 35 to 50 percent, depending on the form of transport, may be expected by the year 2000 thanks to these factors alone; the most likely average annual rate of decline could constitute in this period 2-3 percent (pp 134, 148).

The conclusion formulated in the book that the promotion of energy efficiency as a basic criterion of the technical perfection and thereby technical-economic efficiency of means of transport will lead to the standardization of designs and the very structure of uniform types thereof "inasmuch as a large number of designs of equally high energy efficiency cannot exist simultaneously" merits attention. "Such standardization could have far-reaching economic consequences" (pp 147-148). The adduced forecast, although not baseless, is not indisputable, in our opinion.

The scholar believes that the realization of some measures leading to a significant growth in specific energy consumption (increased speeds on all forms of transport other than railroad passenger transport and an increase in the size of passenger automobiles, for example) is unlikely before the end of the present century; this is possible in the more distant future only when the world problem of mankind's provision with energy resources is finally solved (p 135).

It has to be agreed that the biggest consumer of petroleum products in the West--automobile transport--is most vulnerable in the event of a complication of the fuel and power situation since it determines least among other consumers the normal functioning of the economy (p 50). The conclusion is that under such conditions the level of comfort of passenger automobiles which has been achieved as of the present time would be superfluous and would not correspond to the objective situation concerning the capitalist countries' provision with fuel and power. B. Skvortsov anticipates a gradual reduction in the size thereof and the power and traction and speed indicators. The events of recent years confirm this supposition. Thus in the 1970's and the start of the 1980's the average weight of the American passenger automobile declined from 1,800 to 1,350 kg, engine capacity, from 185 to 115 h.p. and fuel consumption, from 16-18 to 9-10 liters per 100 km. According to his calculations, the latter indicator in West European countries will by the year 2000 constitute approximately 5.3 liters per 100 km for cars with gasoline engines and approximately 4 liters for those with diesel engines (ibid.). These indications of fuel conservability would seem perfectly realistic.

therein given diesel-engine and electric traction in railroad transport is dubious (pp 76, 77). In fact, given use of the first, the reduction in specific energy consumption would be limited owing to the reduction in the average weight of the train.

Contrary to the author's assertion, the turboprop-turbofan engine is not the sole alternative power installation for passenger airliners (p 112).

However, the said shortcomings, which are largely explicable by the complexity of the problems analyzed, do not detract from the quality of the monograph in question. The broad scope of the subject matter, the use of original procedures when evaluating possible energy savings and forecasting energy consumption, the results obtained by the author--all this testifies to its undoubted scientific significance.

FOOTNOTE

1. B.V. Skvortsov, "Ekonomiya energii na transporte razvitikh kapitalisticheskikh stran" [Energy Savings in Transport of the Developed Capitalist Countries]. Ex. ed. A.D. Grigoryev, doctor of economic sciences, Moscow, "Nauka", 1985, pp 160.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda".

"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987.

8850

CSO: 1816/6

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

18 Aug, 1987

M.T.